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My dissertation devotes to the study of decisions of individuals and their e¤ects on
economic and social outcomes, especially in situations where individuals have conicting
interests and interact under uncertainty. The dynamics of information transmission, repu-
tation formation, and private/public learning in various situations is the main focus of this
dissertation.
In Chapter 1, I study a dynamic game in which a nancial expert seeks to optimize the
utilization of her private information either by information disclosure to an investor or by
self-using. The investor may be aligned or biased: an aligned investor always cooperates on
the disclosed information, whereas a biased investor may strategically betray the expert. I
characterize the joint dynamics of the experts information disclosure and the investors type
revelation and show that, by the process of gradual information disclosure, the expert can
signicantly alleviate the hold-up e¤ect exerted by the biased investor. In particular, I show
that the equilibrium dynamics of the playersinteractions is unique. I also examine how the
expert can further improve her utilization of information by committing to a deadline or by
committing to a particular pattern of information disclosure.
In Chapter 2, I develop a reputational cheap talk model in which an expert acquires and
conveys information and a decision maker takes a payo¤-relevant action. The expert may
be aligned or biased: an aligned expert cares about the decision makers payo¤ and would
like to be known as aligned, whereas a biased expert always distorts information toward a
particular direction. My main nding shows that the aligned experts reputational concern
may have a non-monotonic e¤ect on his incentive to acquire information; that is, he acquires
better information if and only if his reputational concern is moderate. Another nding shows
that, although the biased type of expert only distorts information transmission, the existence
of this type may actually increase the decision makers payo¤. I also examine how delegation
may a¤ect the playersdecisions and payo¤s in this essay and show that even with the rights
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to better use the information ex post, the aligned experts information acquisition incentive
may be weakened ex ante. Finally, I show that the decision maker prefers communication to
delegation whenever informative communication with information acquisition is feasible.
In Chapter 3, I study a dynamic agency problem in which a principal and an agent
interact on a project with initially unknown quality. A key feature in this problem is that
the agents hidden actions can give rise to hidden information about the project quality,
which enables the agent to benet from manipulating the principals learning process. In
particular, the agents attempt on belief manipulation varies in his own assessment about
the project quality. I examine how the principal can structure the provision of incentives by
resorting to relationship termination. Relationship termination has two opposing e¤ects: it
destroys the surplus that the principal can obtain from the relationship continuation, but it
also lowers the informational rents that the agent can capture from the belief manipulation.
I show that in equilibrium the optimal rule of relationship termination follows a cut-o¤
strategy: it is introduced in the contracts only when the expected relationship value is
higher than a threshold value. In consequence, the dynamic agency cost presents a non-
monotonic relationship with the project quality. I also examine how a limitation on the
principals payment ability shifts the agents incentive on belief manipulation backwardly.
In Chapter 4, I consider a multilateral bargaining game in which a manager negotiates
sequentially with several workers to share the units of surplus. The novel feature of my setup
is that the manager can determine the ordering of her bargaining opponents endogenously.
I show that double-sided hold-up e¤ects arise in this game: the workers can hold up the
manager by coordinating their moves, whereas the manager can hold up the workers by
switching between the opponents. The interaction of these two e¤ects gives rise to multiple
equilibria, some of which present ine¢ cient delays. Moreover, the delay may be bounded
away from zero even if the time interval betIen two o¤ers becomes arbitrarily small.
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Chapter 1 A Model of Dynamic Information Disclosure
1.1 Introduction
As Hayek (1945) claimed more than half a century ago, the central issue in a variety of
economic and social interactions is how to utilize information e¢ ciently.1 Theoretical and
practical developments have contributed many e¤ective and commonly used tools to help
achieve this e¢ ciency, including patent protection, contractual enforcement, and property
rights allocation. However, these tools are often unavailable, resulting in a hold-up problem
that discourages the utilization of information. For example, if an initially uninformed party
has learned valuable information from another party, then his incentive to pay for the infor-
mation weakens, as now himself is informed (Arrow, 1962). I provide an equilibrium analysis
of information utilization in this paper and address how a process of gradual information
disclosure helps to alleviate the hold-up problem.
To gain better understanding of this study, consider the scenario that a nancial expert,
who knows about some investment opportunities, seeks cooperation from a fund manager
to optimize the utilization of her information. Being aware that the fund manager may
be more motivated to seize all the information value rather than to establish a cooperative
relationship, the nancial expert may strategically slow down the release of her information
to reduce the risk of being exploited. As the uncertainty about the fund managers motives
is gradually resolved, the nancial expert eventually becomes condent enough to release all
her information.
For another example, consider the scenario that an international auto company aims to
enter the market of a developing country by cooperating with a local company and trans-
ferring its technology. However, because this country lacks an established law system, the
1See Hayek (1945), page 519-520: The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of
how to allocate givenresources..., it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its
totality.
3
auto companys technology is under the risk of being leaked. In response, the auto company
may choose to transfer some preliminary technology rst, which provides an opportunity to
learn about its partner. Contingent on the local companys reactions to these preliminary
transfers, the auto company can decide to transfer more technology or exit the market.
These scenarios share some similarities. First, information is divisible and can be trans-
mitted or disclosed in parts, which allow the values of those parts to be realized separately.
For instance, preliminary technology can also generate revenues for the auto company. Sec-
ond, contractual enforcement on information disclosure may be unreliable or even absent,
which causes the potential hold-up problem. As a result, the partiesinteractions must be
self-enforcing, as in the case of the nancial expert and the fund manager. Finally, timing
cost can be an important factor that a¤ects the utilization of information. Investment op-
portunities lose their values rapidly over time in a volatile stock market, whereas the auto
company may lose market shares to its competitors if it delays the transfer of its technology.
Taking the rst scenario as the prominent example in this paper, I develop a dynamic
game that examines the gradual disclosure of information and its e¤ects on the players
behaviors and the payo¤s. A nancial expert is endowed with an amount of private infor-
mation that is valuable in the stock market, but she can only utilize it ine¢ ciently on her
own because of her limited access to the market. An investor has the potential to maximize
the value of the experts information, but he lacks the relevant information. As a result,
e¢ cient utilization of information requires information disclosure between both parties. In-
teractions go as follows. In each period, the expert may choose to self-use some information,
in which case the investor is inactive. Alternatively, the expert may disclose some informa-
tion to the investor, who can then either cooperate, which is mutually benecial, or betray,
which benets only himself. The investor is either aligned or biased. An aligned investor
always cooperates, whereas a biased investor may strategically betray. The nancial expert
is initially uncertain about the investors type, so she must learn about it over time. Given
the discounting cost, the experts goal is to optimize the payo¤ from her information when
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external contracts are infeasible.
The nancial expert faces two main trade-o¤s in determining her utilization of infor-
mation. The rst trade-o¤ is whether information should be kept for self-use or disclosed.
Although self-use of information yields substantial e¢ ciency loss, the timing cost and the
rents captured by the biased investor must be considered when choosing to disclose informa-
tion. If the investor intends to betray, then self-use is preferred. If the investors cooperation
can be induced, then disclosure is preferred. If the expert chooses to disclose, then the sec-
ond trade-o¤ is the timing of information disclosure. A longer process of disclosure is more
costly in time, but it safeguards the information from the biased investor. A shorter process
of disclosure saves timing cost, but it provides better betrayal opportunity to the biased
investor.
I construct an equilibrium in which the experts trade-o¤s are resolved by a nite sequence
of cut-o¤values, which represent the experts beliefs about the investors type. If the investor
is highly aligned and therefore unlikely to betray, then the expert should disclose information
faster. If the investor is moderately aligned, then the expert should slow down the process
of information disclosure to weaken the biased investors incentive for betrayal. Finally, if
the investor is su¢ ciently biased, then the expert should not disclose any information but
instead keep it for self-use, because any disclosure is too costly. This characterization gives
an explicit insight about when and how the expert can alleviate the hold-up problem by
employing a gradual disclosure of her information.
Moreover, I show that the equilibrium of this game is essentiallyunique.2 The critical
determinant of equilibrium uniqueness is that the completion of information disclosure is
endogenously determined. Specically, if there is an equilibrium (other than the equilibrium I
construct) that requires the biased investor to betray with a higher probability in a particular
period, after observing cooperation the expert believes that the investor is more aligned
2The equilibrium is essentiallyunique, because multiple equilibria can arise if the experts initial belief
about the investors type is at some cut-o¤ values, and can arise in some o¤ equilibrium path of play. This
will be much clear in the following analysis.
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and thereby prefers to speed up her information disclosure in the continuation game, but
then the biased investor should actually cooperate with certainty in the current period.
Conversely, if there is an equilibrium (other than the equilibrium I construct) that requires
the biased investor to betray with a lower probability in a particular period, after observing
cooperation the expert is still very cautious about the investor and thereby prefers to slow
down her information disclosure in the continuation game, which implies that the biased
investor should betray with certainty in this period. In equilibrium, the biased investors
response is unique for (almost) any amount of information disclosure by the expert. As a
result, the experts problem is much like a decision problem in that she chooses the optimal
plan of information disclosure from all feasible plans, which is also unique.
In many circumstances, the time period for information disclosure is limited. I examine
how the existence of a deadline a¤ects the experts information utilization and, specically,
how the experts payo¤ is improved if she commits to a deadline. If the deadline period is
reached, the experts choice is restricted in a way that no gradual disclosure of information,
and therefore no gradual learning about the investors type, is allowed in the future. Such
a restriction lowers the experts ex post payo¤. However, expecting that the expert is more
willing to disclose all her remaining information in the deadline period even her posterior
belief is not su¢ ciently high, the biased investor can e¤ectively decrease his betrayal prob-
abilities in the periods before the deadline period. This decrease in betrayal probabilities,
in turn, increases the experts ex ante payo¤. I show that, with moderate initial beliefs, the
experts equilibrium payo¤ is strictly improved if she commits to a proper deadline.
I also examine the e¤ects on the experts information utilization if she can fully commit
to a particular process of information disclosure. In equilibrium, the optimal process with
commitment has a property that the biased investor is induced to cooperate in all periods
except the last one. In other words, the amount of information disclosed in the nal period
serves as a reward to the biased investor for exchanging his cooperation up to that period.
The experts problem in determining the optimal process is to trade o¤ between the scale of
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the reward and the timing cost to deliver it. Consequently, by fully committing to a proper
process, the experts payo¤ can be improved.
In addition to the examples aforementioned, this game is also applicable to many other
situations. For instance, if the valuable information refers to research ideas, then the game
can address the building and termination of relationship between scientists. More broadly,
if what the expert possesses is some sort of valuable assets, the game can be interpreted as
a contribution game, in which one party contributes inputs and another party contributes
productivity.
On a technical level, I deal with a reputation game in which the action space (the amount
of remaining information to be utilized) varies over time and the timing structure (the
completion of information utilization) is endogenously determined. As a result, part of my
contributions lies in the detailed construction of the equilibrium and the verication of the
equilibrium uniqueness, which o¤er novel insights to the study of games with similar technical
properties.
1.2 Literature
My emphasis on the divisibility of the experts information and its implications for re-
lationship dynamics is related to Baliga and Ely (2010). Baliga and Ely (2010) consider a
model in which a principal uses torture to extract information from an agent who may or may
not be informed. In equilibrium, the informed agent initially resists but eventually concedes,
and his divisible information is gradually extracted. In their paper, the equilibrium rate of
information extraction is determined by the severity of the torture cost; therefore, the grad-
ualism of the information extraction is essentially a constraint to the principals problem. In
contrast, in my paper, gradualism of information disclosure is the experts optimal solution
to alleviate the hold-up problem that she faces; that is, the expert can, but in equilibrium
she optimally chooses not to, disclose all information in a single period.
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Hörner and Skrzypacz (2011) develop a model in which an agent who knows a state of
nature can gradually reveal this state to a rm in exchange for payments. They address the
equilibrium that maximizes the agents ex ante incentives to learn about the state of nature
and show that, in such an equilibrium, revealing information gradually increases the agents
payo¤ and the process of information revelation always exhausts all the time periods. My
study shows the complementary result that gradual information disclosure could be benecial
to the information possessor, but the underlying setup is quite di¤erent. Specically, while
discounting cost and outside option with self-use of information are crucial to my ndings,
they have no roles in their paper. These di¤erences enable me to o¤er new insights to many
real-world situations.
Gradualism also appears as the means to alleviate the hold-up e¤ects in the literature
on contribution games, including Admati and Perry (1991), Gale (2001), Lockwood and
Thomas (2002), Marx and Matthews (2002), and Compte and Jehiel (2004). A key feature
in my work is that gradual information disclosure arises due to asymmetric information
about the investors type, which is absent in these papers. Watson (1999, 2002) studies a
contribution game with two-sided incomplete information and shows that the relationship
between partners generally starts small and grows over time. In his papers, the amounts of
contributions along the time horizon are pre-determined before the game starts. As a result,
the playersactions at any given time are binary; the players either follow the pre-determined
amount or betray. In my paper, the experts action space on information disclosure is a
continuum in each period, and the amounts of disclosure are determined during the process
of play.
The gradual revelation of the investors type is analytically related to the literature on
reputation games, including Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), and
Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992), as well as the literature on the war of attrition with
incomplete information, including Abreu and Gul (2000), and Damiano, Li and Suen (2012).
In these papers, the stage game is repeated and the only variables that change over time are
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the beliefs about the informed playerstypes. In my paper, both the belief and the stage
game vary over time as the amount of remaining information decreases.
Anton and Yao (1994) show that an inventor can appropriate a sizable share of an ideas
market value from a buyer if the inventor threatens to reveal the idea to a competitor in
the event that the buyer defaults. Alternatively, Anton and Yao (2002) show that a seller
can use partial disclosure to signal the full value of an idea and benet from the buyers
competition for ownership of this idea. These papers allow enforceable contracts, but the
timing structure of information disclosure is pre-determined. In contrast, my work focuses on
the endogenous timing structure of information disclosure instead of any explicit contracts.
In most of these papers, except Baliga and Ely (2010), private information takes the
forms of states or types, which are intrinsically indivisible. Therefore, dynamic information
disclosure in these papers refers to a sequence of probabilities that a state or a type is grad-
ually revealed. My paper focuses on the divisibility of information, and therefore dynamic
information disclosure refers to a sequence of amounts that information is gradually revealed,
as explained in the following analysis.
1.3 The model
I consider a dynamic game involving two players: a nancial expert (she or E) and an
investor (he or I). At the beginning of the game, the expert is endowed with an amount
Y0 > 0 of information, which refers to some investment opportunities that can be exploited
in the stock market. A key feature regarding this amount of information is that, although
the number Y0 is common knowledge between the players, the detailed contents of the in-
formation is initially known only to the expert. Thus, the investor must learn the relevant
contents from the expert rst to take actions with the information. For simplicity, I assume
that the experts information is perfectly divisible. Time is discrete and goes to innity.
Both players are risk-neutral and share a common discount factor  2 (0; 1). A potential
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explanation for the factor  is that information in the stock market loses its value over time
if it is not utilized immediately.
Actions and payo¤s are as follows. In period t, if the amount of remaining information is
Yt > 0 and the relationship between the players is still ongoing, then the expert can either use
an amount x  Yt by herself or disclose an amount y  Yt to the investor.3 If an amount x is
self-used, in this period the expert and the investors payo¤s are x and 0, respectively. After
the realization of payo¤s, the game extends to the next period with remaining information
Yt+1 = Yt   x. On the other hand, if an amount y is disclosed, then the investor can choose
to cooperate or betray. Cooperation generates a successand gives payo¤s Ey and Iy
to the expert and the investor, whereas betrayal results in a failure and gives payo¤s 0
and Iy to the expert and the investor. After the realization of payo¤s, the game extends
to period t+ 1 with information Yt+1 = Yt   y. The parameters satisfy
E > 1; I > I > 0; and E + I  I ;
which indicate that, while the investors cooperation is both socially e¢ cient and preferred
to self-use by the expert, the investor can benet more from betrayal. This tension is the
driving force underlying the playersinteractions. In addition, I assume that the relationship
is terminated whenever the investor betrays.4 As a result, the experts only choice after the
relationship termination is to self-use her remaining information. The game ends when all
the information has been utilized.
Some simplications regarding the experts information are adopted in the above setup.
First, di¤erent units of information are equally valuable, which is reected in the linear
payo¤ functions. Second, information is not re-utilizable in the sense that any part of
3In the equilibrium I show later, whenever the expert self-uses her information, she self-uses all of it.
Allowing the expert to disclose and self-use information simultaneously would not change this equilibrium
property, therefore it has no e¤ect on my qualitative ndings.
4Alternatively, I can assume that, even after a betrayal, the expert can continue to disclose information to
the investor. However, information disclosure after a betrayal exerts a lump-sum cost that is high enough to
outweigh any benet from potential cooperation by the investor. Thus, in equilibrium the expert optimally
chooses to self-use her remaining information after a betrayal.
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information can be exploited only once. Third, both self-use and disclosure of information
are observable, so the amount of remaining information in each period is commonly known.
Finally, information is not cumulative to the investor, therefore whenever an amount of
information is disclosed, the investor must utilize it immediately.5 While these simplications
make my analysis tractable, none of them is essential to my qualitative ndings on the
dynamics of information disclosure.
The investor may be aligned or biased. An aligned investor is non-strategic and always
cooperates whenever an amount of information is disclosed to him. Conversely, a biased
investor is strategic and may betray the expert. The expert is initially uncertain about the
investors type and holds a prior belief 0 2 (0; 1) that the investor is aligned. Denote by
t as the experts belief in period t. For notational simplicity, I use  and Y as to refer to
the experts belief and information, respectively, when an explicit indication of time can be
omitted.
A history at the beginning of period t summarizes all playersactions up to this period. A
strategy of the expert species the amount of information she self-uses or discloses in period
t as a function of each history. A strategy of the investor species the action he takes in
period t as a function of each history and the amount of information disclosed by the expert
in this period. The solution concept in this study is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A
strategy prole and a belief updating system consist of an equilibrium if each players strategy
maximizes his/her payo¤ and if the experts belief updating follows Bayesrule whenever
possible. In particular, if in period t the experts belief is t and the biased investor betrays
with probability pt after a positive information disclosure, Bayesrule requires that, after
observing a success, the belief t+1 in period t+ 1 is as follows:
t+1 =
t
t + (1  t)(1  pt)
;
5This assumption has no loss of generality in our setup. I provide a detailed explanation in the Conclu-
sions.
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whereas, after observing a failure, the belief t+1 drops to 0 in period t+ 1.








for k  0. The superscript kin qk is a number indicator, whereas the superscript jin
qj is the power of q. The role of q is that, if the expert discloses an amount y of information
in period t and discloses an amount qy of information in period t+ 1 (based on a success in
period t), the investor is indi¤erent to betraying in these two consecutive periods, which is
an important condition in the analysis of equilibrium.6 By denition, qk is a function of k.
Assumption 1: E > 1 + q   q:
This assumption holds when E is relatively large, that is, the investors cooperation is
su¢ ciently appealing to the expert. Intuitively, it guarantees the existence of equilibrium in
which information disclosure occurs, which is explained below.
Assumption 2: (1  q)E < 1  q:
This assumption holds if  is not too close to 1 when q < 1.7 Intuitively, it implies that,
because time discounting is costly, the expert prefers immediate self-use of information in
period t = 0 to permanent cooperation with the investor, even when the latter is feasible.
Finally, let k be an integer to satisfy the inequalities
E
1 + (1  )(qk   1) > 1 
E
1 + (1  )(qk+1   1) :
By Assumption 1, I have k  1. By Assumption 2, k is nite. In the next section I show that
the periods of information disclosure is bounded above by k + 1 in any equilibrium. Notice
that k increases in E, which indicates that, from the experts perspective, a longer process
6If the investor betrays and terminates the relationship in period t, his payo¤ is Iy. If he cooperates in
period t and betrays in period t+1, his payo¤ is Iy+ Iqy. When q = (I  I)=I , Iy = Iy+ Iqy
holds.
7Notice that q = (I   I)=I < 1, so 1   q > 0 always holds. If q  1, Assumption 2 holds for any
 < 1. But if q < 1, Assumption 2 holds only if  is relatively small.
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of information disclosure is acceptable if the investors cooperation is more productive. Con-
versely, k decreases in q. The intuitive reasoning is that, when q is larger, the expert has to
shift more information to the following periods to induce the biased investors cooperation
in the current period, which makes information disclosure more time costly and therefore
less appealing to the expert. A decrease of  has a similar e¤ect as an increase of q on k.
An immediate observation is that, if the players interaction can only occur in period
t = 0, then the expert discloses all her information to the investor if and only if 0  1=E,
and her equilibrium payo¤ is 0EY0 if 0  1=E and Y0 otherwise. Because of the potential
hold-up e¤ect exerted by the biased investor, the experts willingness to disclose information
is limited. In the next section, I explore how the expert can improve her payo¤ when a
dynamic process of information disclosure is introduced.
1.4 Equilibrium analysis
I study the joint dynamics of the experts information disclosure and the investors type
revelation in this section. Particularly, I show that a process of gradual information disclosure
enables the expert to alleviate the hold-up e¤ect and thereby increase her payo¤.
1.4.1 Preliminary results
Before forwarding to the analysis of equilibrium properties, I present some preliminary
results in this subsection. A denition is introduced rst.
Denition 1 A k-period scheme starting from period t is a scheme satisfying, with a se-
quence yk = (y1; :::; yk 1; yk) and 1  l  k, (1) Yt =
Pk
l=1 yl; (2) yl+1 = qyl if k > l  1; (3)
amount yl of information is disclosed in period t  1 + l if the relationship has not been ter-
minated; and (4) amount
Pk
j=l yj of information is self-used in period t+ l if the relationship
is terminated in the previous period.
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By this denition, a k-period scheme essentially describes a strategy of the expert in
the continuation game starting from period t. Specically, this strategy makes the biased
investor being indi¤erent to betraying in two consecutive periods when k > 1. I will show
that, in equilibrium, if information disclosure occurs, then it follows a k-period scheme.
Denote 0 = 1. I have the following result.








(a) V k(k;Y ) = V
k+1(k;Y ) =
EY
1+(1 )(qk 1) > Y if 1  k  k, and V k(k;Y ) = Y if
k = k + 1, in which V k(;Y ) is recursively dened by
V 1(;Y ) = EY; and for 2  k  k + 1,

















(b) 0 > 

1 > ::: > 





The proof is shown in Appendix A. For 1  k  k + 1, the cut-o¤ values k will dene
the evolution of the experts beliefs after a series of successes in equilibrium, and the value
functions V k(;Y ) will dene the experts equilibrium payo¤ with information disclosure.8
For a particular V k(;Y ), the superscript k indicates that the experts information
disclosure follows a k-period scheme. For an initial belief , the term minf; k 1g=k 1
is the probability that the investor cooperates in the rst period of this scheme. In the
term associated with this probability, EY=qk 1 is the experts payo¤ from the investors
cooperation in the current period, and V k 1(maxf; k 1g;Y   Y=qk 1) is her discounted
payo¤ from the continuation game after observing the cooperation. On the other hand, the
8Notice that the subscript kin k has no relation to the time period k. Instead, it only refers to one
of the numbers 1; :::; k; k + 1.
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term 1   minf; k 1g=k 1 is the probability that the investor betrays in the rst period
of this scheme, and the term (Y   Y=qk 1) is the experts discounted payo¤ from the
continuation game after observing the betrayal.
Lemma 2 Let 1  k; l  k + 1 and k 6= l. If  2 (k; k 1), then V k(;Y ) > V l(;Y ).
The proof is shown in Appendix A. The property of the value functions will indicate that,
for each belief  (except the cut-o¤ values k), the process of information disclosure and the
experts equilibrium payo¤ are uniquely determined.
For k = 2, I introduce Figure 1 to summarize the results presented in the previous
lemmas. For instance, if  2 (2; 1), then V 2(;Y ) > maxfV 1(;Y ); V 3(;Y )g. The blue
bold envelope will capture the experts equilibrium payo¤ from her information as a function
of the belief . Notice that V 2(;Y ) has a kink at 1, which reects the change of its slopes
when  increases across 1. A similar explanation holds for V
3(;Y ) with kinks at 2 and
1.
Consider two beliefs  and 0, where   0. Let function '(;0) satisfy
0 =

+ (1  )(1  '(;0)) :
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Thus, '(;0) is the biased investors betrayal probability that makes the expert update her
belief from  to 0, after observing a success.
Denition 2 Let  2 [k; k 1] and 1  k  k + 1. A belief path k() is a sequence of




0) based on a series of successes.
Whenever a failure is observed, the experts belief drops to zero and stays there forever.
In consequence, the only relevant belief updating path is the evolution of beliefs based on a
series of successes. I will show that, if 0 2 [k; k 1] and 1  k  k + 1, then a pair of a
k-period scheme and a belief path k(0) describes the playersbehaviors and the experts
belief updating on the equilibrium path of play. Moreover, if the relationship is terminated
in period t, the expert should self-use all remaining information in period t+ 1 to avoid the
discounting cost in any equilibrium. From now on, I omit the description of strategies and
beliefs after observing a failure.
1.4.2 Equilibrium results
In this subsection, I characterize the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium and explain
their implications on the playersinteractions and payo¤s.
Before the detailed construction of equilibrium, I illustrate some key points briey. An
intuitive conjecture regarding the playersequilibrium behaviors is that, if the expert intends
to disclose all remaining information Yt in period t, then her belief t should be large enough.
As a result, if 0 < t, the biased investor should use mixed strategy and betray with positive
probability in some period  < t. Moreover, because of the timing cost, the expert prefers
to disclose information as fast as she can, which implies that the biased investor should be
indi¤erent between cooperating and betraying in any period  < t in which information
is disclosed. In consequence, if information disclosure occurs, it should follow a k-period
scheme on the equilibrium path of play. I verify the correctness of these properties below.
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The main di¢ culty in constructing an equilibrium is to describe the playersbehaviors o¤
the equilibrium path. Because of the observability of the experts information disclosure, the
concept of PBE requires that, after a deviation of the expert, the playerscontinuation play
and the experts belief updating should also consist of an equilibrium. Since the experts
information is divisible, before the game ends she has innitely many deviations in each
period. My work is to pin down the continuation play and belief updating after any of the
experts deviations and verify that no protable deviation exists.
Proposition 1 For any 0 2 (0; 1) there exists an equilibrium in which the experts payo¤
is V k(0;Y0) if 0 2 [k; k 1] and is Y0 if 0  k+1, where 1  k  k + 1.
I construct the equilibrium here, and show the proof in Appendix A. Suppose now the
game is in period t with belief t =  and information Yt = Y , and the relationship has not
been terminated.
Case 1:  2 [k; k 1] with 1  k  k + 1.9
On the equilibrium path. Starting from period t, the experts strategy follows a k-period
scheme. The biased investors strategy and the experts belief updating are described by a
belief pathk(). Specically, in period t, the expert discloses Y=qk 1 and the biased investor
betrays with probability '(;k 1). The experts payo¤ is V
k(;Y ), which is measured in
period t.
O¤ the equilibrium path. First, if the biased investor deviates to a probability p0 in
period t, where p0 6= '(;k 1), then the expert continues to update her belief to k 1 after
observing a success.10
Second, consider the experts deviations in period t. There are three cases to consider:
(1.1) an amount y > Y=qk 1 is disclosed; (1.2) an amount y < Y=qk 1 is disclosed; and (1.3)
an amount x  Y is self-used.11
9Notice that for 1  k  k, k can be drawn either from [k; k 1] or from [k+1; k], which implies that




10The betrayal probability of the biased investor is unobservable to the expert. Therefore, the experts
belief updating does not need to follow Bayesrule after the biased investors deviation.
11Implicitly, I have k > 1 in case (1.1).
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Consider case (1.1). If the expert discloses y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1], where 1  l  k   1,
then the biased investor betrays with probability '(;l 1). If a success is observed in the
current period, (a) if l = 1, then in the next period the expert discloses all Y   y, and (b) if
l > 1, then starting from the next period, with probability l the play follows a pair of an
l 1-period scheme and a belief path l 1(l 1), and with probability 1 l the play follows
an l-period scheme and a belief path l(l 1), where l satises







Consider case (1.2). If the expert discloses y  Y=qk, the biased investor cooperates with
certainty. Starting from the next period, the play follows a pair of a k-period scheme and
a belief path k(). If the expert discloses y 2 (Y=qk; Y=qk 1), then the biased investor
betrays with probability '(;k 1). If a success is observed in the current period, (a) if
k = 1, then in the next period the expert discloses all Y   y, and (b) if k > 1, then starting
from the next period, with probability k the play follows a pair of a k   1-period scheme
and a belief path k 1(k 1), and with probability 1 k the play follows a k-period scheme
and a belief path k(k 1), where k satises







Consider case (1.3). The investor is inactive in this case and the experts belief satises
t+1 = . Starting from the next period, the play follows a pair of a k-period scheme and a
belief path k().
Case 2:   
k+1
.
On the equilibrium path. The expert self-uses all Y in period t, and her payo¤ is Y
measured in period.
12It can be veried that l 2 [0; 1] and that it increases in y for y 2 (Yt=ql; Yt=ql 1]. The mixing between
the two schemes that the expert employs here is to keep the biased investor indi¤erent between betraying
and cooperating in period t:
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O¤ the equilibrium path. Only the experts deviations in period t need to be considered.
There are two cases: (2.1) an amount y  Y is disclosed; and (2.2) an amount x < Y is
self-used.
Consider case (2.1). If the expert discloses y  Y=qk+1, then the biased investor betrays
with probability '(;
k+1
). If a success is observed in the current period, starting from the
next period with probability k+1 the play follows a pair of a k + 1-period scheme and a
belief path k+1(
k+1
), and with probability 1 k+1 the expert self-uses all Y   y in period
t+ 1, where k+1 satises




If the expert discloses y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1], where 1  l  k+1, then the continuation play is
the same as specied in case (1.1).
Consider case (2.2). The investor is inactive in this case and the experts belief satises
t+1 = . In the next period, the expert self-uses all Y   x.
The construction of the equilibrium is nished. To have some intuitive understandings,
I illustrate the main features of the equilibrium with a simplied example.
Example: Consider a game with the parameters k  2, q = 1, 0 2 (3; 2), and
Y0 = Y .
With these parameters, on the equilibrium path, the expert discloses information Y=3 to
the investor in period t = 0, and she continues to disclose Y=3 in period t = 1 and Y=3 in
period t = 2, based on a series of successes. In period t = 0, the biased investor betrays
with probability '(0;

2). In period t = 1, if information is disclosed, then he betrays
with probability '(2;

1). In period t = 2, if information is disclosed, then he betrays with
certainty.
The key issue in constructing the equilibrium is how the biased investor should respond
if the expert deviates. Keeping two inquiries in mind is helpful to the understanding of the
equilibrium. The rst one is, given that the biased investor is indi¤erent between cooperating
and betraying in period t = 0 with disclosed information Y=3, should he strictly prefer to
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betray if the disclosed information is Y=3 +  in this period, where  > 0 but is arbitrarily
small?13 The answer is no. If he betrays with certainty in this case, the expert, after
observing a success, knows that the investor is certain to be aligned and would therefore
disclose all remaining information 2Y=3   in the next period. But then the biased investor
should cooperate with certainty in period t = 0 so that he can betray in period t = 1, which
generates a contradiction.
In the equilibrium I construct, if the expert deviates to an amount y  Y=4 in pe-
riod t = 0, then the biased investor cooperates with certainty. If the deviation amount
is y 2 (Y=4; Y=3), then the betrayal probability is '(0;2). If the deviation amount is
y 2 (Y=3; Y=2], then the betrayal probability is '(0;1). Finally, if the deviation amount is
y > Y=2, then the betrayal probability is 1. Figure 2 summarizes the belief updating system
in period t = 0 for this example.
Consider two amounts y and y0 of information disclosure by the expert in period t = 0,
where y; y0 2 (Y=4; Y=3] and y > y0. Notice that the biased investors payo¤ from a betrayal
is strictly higher with y. The second inquiry is, what makes the biased investor use the same




2) 2 (0; 1) in response to the di¤erent amounts y and y0? The
answer relies on the multiple equilibria at the cut-o¤ value 2. In the continuation game
that belief reaches 2, there are two equilibria, one in which the expert employs a 2-period
scheme and one in which the expert employs a 3-period scheme. By mixing between these
two equilibria, the biased investor can be induced to betray with a constant probability
'(0;

2) for any y; y
0 2 (Y=4; Y=3]. The detailed verication is seen in the proof.
Given the biased investors responses, the experts task is to choose the process of infor-
mation disclosure that optimally balances the timing cost and the hold-up e¤ect she faces.
In equilibrium, a 3-period scheme maximizes her payo¤ from information disclosure, which
is given by V 3(0;Y ).
The equilibrium I construct presents some of the main ndings in this study. First, the
expert can mitigate the hold-up problem exerted by the biased investor by disclosing her
information gradually. Specically, if information utilization is restricted in a one-shot game,
the experts payo¤ is V 1(0;Y0) if 0  1=E and Y0 otherwise. In contrast, in the dynamic
game, if 0 2 [k; k 1]\ (k+1; 1) with 2  k  k+1, then the experts equilibrium payo¤
is V k(0;Y0), which is strictly larger than both V
1(0;Y0) and Y0 by Lemma 1 and 2. Thus,
for a non-empty set of initial beliefs, the expert can strictly benet from the dynamics of
information disclosure.
Second, if information disclosure occurs, then it is faster when the investor is more aligned.
In other words, if 0 2 [k; k 1] and 1  k  k + 1, then information disclosure follows
a k-period scheme in equilibrium. Intuitively, if the expert intends to induce the investors
cooperation by information disclosure, she trades o¤ between the discounting cost and the
rents captured by the biased investor. For 1  k  k, this trade-o¤ is resolved by the cut-o¤
values k, with the following indi¤erence conditions:






V k(k;Y ) = V
k(k;Y ):
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At the cut-o¤ values k, given the investors equilibrium strategies, the expert is indi¤erent
between a k-period scheme, which is less time costly but gives the biased investor greater
rents (a payo¤ of IY=q
k 1), and a k + 1-period scheme, which is more time costly but
gives the biased investor less rents (a payo¤ of IY=q
k). Specically, in the k + 1-period
scheme, the biased investor is induced to cooperate with certainty in the rst period, and the
continuation play after this period follows a k-period scheme with less remaining information.
In equilibrium, it is optimal for the expert to use a longer process of information disclosure
when the investor is less aligned.
Finally, information disclosure occurs only if the investor is somewhat aligned; that is,
when 0  k+1. If 0 < k+1, compared with the outside option of self-use, even the most
e¤ective process of information disclosure is too costly to the expert. In equilibrium, the
cut-o¤ value 
k+1
, which is determined by the indi¤erence condition
V k+1(
k+1
;Y ) = Y;
solves the experts problem of when information should be disclosed to the investor.
My second main result is about the equilibrium uniqueness of this game.
Proposition 2 The experts equilibrium payo¤ is unique in this game. That is, the payo¤
is V k(0;Y0) if 0 2 [k; k 1] and is Y0 if 0  k+1, where 1  k  k + 1.
As shown in the proof in Appendix A, the equilibrium of this game is essentiallyunique.
If the initial belief 0 satises 0 2 (k; k 1) and 1  k  k+1, then the playersinteractions




experts information utilization is uniquely determined by self-use. However, the uniqueness
of equilibrium is only in the sense of essentialbecause multiplicity of equilibrium arises
if the initial belief is at the cut-o¤ values and arises in some o¤ equilibrium path of play.
Nevertheless, the experts equilibrium payo¤ is unique for any initial belief.
The endogenous completion of the experts information disclosure is the main determinant
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of the equilibrium uniqueness. In a particular period, if there is a putative equilibrium that
requires the biased investor to betray with a probability larger than the probability he plays
in the equilibrium I constructed, the expert becomes more optimistic about the investors
type and would speed up her information disclosure in the event of a success. However,
expecting that the process of disclosure is faster in the continuation game after a success, the
biased investor should strictly prefer to cooperate in the current period. A similar argument
also shows that there is no other equilibrium in which the biased investor betrays with a
probability less than the probability he plays in the equilibrium I constructed. As a result,
given the biased investors unique response, the experts problem regarding her information
utilization degenerates to a restricted decision problem, which results in a unique process of
information disclosure.
1.5 Extensions
I consider some extensions in this section. My main focus is how the expert can in-
crease her payo¤ if she has some or full commitment power in determining her information
utilization.
1.5.1 Committing to a deadline
In many circumstances, the time period for information disclosure is limited. For instance,
investment opportunities in the stock market may be valuable only before the implementation
of some new regulation policies. In this subsection, I explore the e¤ects of a deadline on the
experts information utilization, especially how the expert can benet from committing to a
deadline.
Denition 3 Let period T be the deadline period; therefore, information disclosure is feasible
only in period t  T .
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In other words, at most T + 1 periods are available for information disclosure.14 If the
deadline period T is reached, the continuation game becomes a one-shot game, and the expert
discloses all remaining information only if her belief satises   1=E. On the other hand, in
the previous section I have seen that, if no deadline exists, the expert discloses all remaining
information in a single period only if her belief satises   1, where 1 > 1=E. This
di¤erence is central to the understanding of a deadlines e¤ects on the experts information
utilization.
Intuitively, if period T is reached, then the expert cannot further benet from gradual
information disclosure and thereby her ex post payo¤ is reduced by this restriction. To see
this, notice that for a belief in the range (
k+1
; 1), the experts payo¤ from a multi-period
information disclosure is strictly larger than her payo¤ from a single-period disclosure or
self-use. However, expecting that in the deadline period the expert is willing to disclose
all remaining information even her belief is not su¢ ciently large (only T  1=E is re-
quired), the biased investor can lower his betrayal probabilities in the periods before the
deadline. In turn, the experts ex ante payo¤ can be increased. For example, if T = 1 and
0 2 [maxf2; 1=Eg; 1), by disclosing an amount Y0=(1 + q)   and thereby inducing the
investors full cooperation in period t = 0, the expert can guarantee a total payo¤ su¢ ciently
close to EY0[1+q0]=(1+q), which is strictly larger than the equilibrium payo¤V
2(0;Y0)
without a deadline. My next result generalizes these intuitions.
Proposition 3 For any 0 2 [k; k 1) and 2  k  k + 1, if the expert commits to a
deadline T = k   1, there exists an equilibrium in which her payo¤ is strictly larger than
V k(0;Y0).
How does the presence of a deadline have e¤ects on the experts information utilization
depends on the experts initial belief about the investors type. In the equilibrium I construct
in the proof, for any deadline T = k 1 and 2  k  k+1, the belief set (0; 1) is partitioned
14I assume that the experts self-use of information is not limited by the deadline T . Thus, even in period
t > T , self-use of information is feasible.
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into three intervals by two cut-o¤ values, 
k
and k, which satisfy 0 < k < k < 1. If
0  k, the experts information disclosure follows an l-period scheme, where 1  l < k,
which never reaches the deadline. The reason is that, although such a scheme requires that
the experts belief is at least 1 for her to disclose all remaining information in the lth period
of this scheme, slowing down the process of disclosure until the deadline is reached is too
time costly. For example, if the initial belief satises 0 > 

1, then the expert discloses all
of her information in period t = 0, no matter what the deadline is. If 0 2 [k; k], then the
experts information disclosure follows a k-period scheme. The reason is that, for this range
of initial beliefs, a scheme reaching the deadline (contingent on a series of successes) can
e¤ectively lower the biased investors betrayal probabilities during the process of disclosure.
Finally, if 0  k, then the expert self-uses her information. Intuitively, if the initial belief
is relatively low, for the expert to update her belief to at least 1=E in the limited time
(at most k periods), the betrayal probabilities during the process of disclosure need to be
su¢ ciently large, which makes information disclosure unattractive. For example, if T = 1




holds and the expert with a belief 0 2 [k+1; 2) is
crowded out of information disclosure by the presence of a deadline.
Most importantly, if the expert has the ability to commit to a deadline, her payo¤ can
be strictly improved if the initial belief satises 0 2 [k; k 1) and 2  k  k + 1. The
reasoning is straightforward. Compared with the k-period scheme in the equilibrium without
a deadline, by choosing a deadline T = k   1, the same k-period scheme of information
disclosure can induce the biased investor to be more cooperative and therefore increase the
experts payo¤.
I describe the experts belief updating system with a deadline T = 2 in the following
gure. If 0  3, then the expert employs a 1-period scheme or a 2-period scheme of
information disclosure. If 0 2 [3; 3], then the expert employs a 3-period scheme that
reaches the deadline based on a series of successes. Finally, if 0  3, then the expert
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self-uses her information. Notice that in this example [3; 

2] 2 [3; 3].
The property of payo¤ improvement is not limited to the set [
k+1
; 1) of initial beliefs.




. As a result, the expert with an initial
belief 0 2 (k+1; k+1) can also benet from gradual information disclosure by committing
to a deadline T = k.
1.5.2 Optimal Commitment
Instead of merely committing to a deadline, in some circumstances the expert can commit
to a sequence y = (y0; y1; :::y ) of information disclosure, in which yt is the amount of
information to be disclosed in period t   contingent on that the relationship is ongoing,
and  may or may not be nite.15 For instance, an auto companys technology transfer to
its partner may follow a pre-committed schedule. I explore the properties of the experts
optimal commitment in this section.





(;Y ) = EY;












The superscript kalso refers to the notion of a k-period scheme.
I simplify the experts optimal commitment problem with the following arguments. First,
because of the linearity of her payo¤ function, if the expert can benet from committing to
a sequence y , then in the optimal commitment all information should be committed; that
is,
P
j=0 yj = Y0. Second, given the optimally committed sequence y
 , the biased investor
should cooperate with certainty in any period t <  . The reason is that, if the biased investor
betrays with probability pt = 1 and terminates the relationship in period t <  , then the
designing of the sub-sequence (yt+1; yt+2; :::y ) has no chance to induce his cooperation.
Therefore, the expert is better o¤ if she re-allocates the amount
P
j=t+1 yj proportionally
to the amounts in the sub-sequence (y0; y1; :::yt). On the other hand, if the biased investor
betrays with probability pt 2 (0; 1) in period t <  , then it is better for the expert to disclose
only yt    in period t for the sake of the investors full cooperation, and then re-allocate 
proportionally to the future periods. It can be veried that, in the limit, the experts optimal









That is, the expert optimally commits to a k-period scheme of information disclosure, con-
tingent on the result that her payo¤ from this scheme is larger than the payo¤ from self-use.
Let k(0) denote the solution to this problem. I have the next result.
Proposition 4 For any 0 2 [k; k 1) and 2  k  k + 1, with the optimal commitment,
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the experts payo¤ is strictly larger than V k(0;Y0).
The key property of the optimal commitment is that, when the nal period of the k(0)-
period scheme is reached, the expert agrees to disclose all remaining information no matter
what her belief about the investors type is in this period. This commitment enables the
expert to induce the biased investors full cooperation during the rst k(0)  1 periods of
information disclosure, which is qualitatively similar to, but e¤ectively stronger than, the
scenario of committing to a deadline.
Given this property, in determining the optimal commitment, the expert essentially trades
o¤between the length of the disclosure process and the amount of information to be captured
by the biased investor in the nal period. In the proof, I show that, if the experts initial
belief is moderate, say 0 2 [k+1; 1), she can strictly benet from her optimal commitment.
Moreover, k(0) (weakly) decreases in 0, which indicates that the higher the betrayal
probability is in the nal period, the longer the process of information disclosure should be.
Besides, for any 0 2 [k; k 1) and 2  k  k + 1, k(0)  k and the inequality is strict
for some initial beliefs 0. In consequence, the process is (weakly) faster in the optimal
commitment scenario than in the scenario without commitment. Finally, I show that the





In this paper, I study a dynamic game in which an expert can utilize her private in-
formation either by self-use or by information disclosure to an investor. The investor has
the potential to realize the value of the experts information in a more e¢ cient way, but he
may have incentive to hold up the expert for his own benet. My main nding is that, in
the unique equilibrium, the expert can mitigate the investors hold-up e¤ect by employing
a process of gradual information disclosure. I also address how the expert can increase her
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equilibrium payo¤ by committing to a deadline or by committing to a particular pattern of
information disclosure.
I briey discuss some assumptions adopted in this study. First, if the expert has no
outside option or Assumption 2 does not hold, then in equilibrium the process of information
disclosure goes to innity when the experts initial belief about the investors type converges
to zero.16 However, this process is less realistic, because amounts of information disclosed in
the very beginning (or in the very end) must also converge to zero if q  1 (or q < 1). Second,
if the experts information is not equally valuable or perfectly divisible, then the ordering of
di¤erent pieces of information to be disclosed may also matter in equilibrium. Finally, given
the aligned investors non-strategic behavior, assuming that information is not cumulative
to the investor is without loss of generality. The reason is that any action on information
accumulation reveals the investors type as biased and therefore causes the expert to stop
information disclosure.17 Because of time discounting and linear payo¤ function, the biased
investor can not benet from information accumulation.
One potential extension of this game is to consider the case in which the investors action
is not observable and his cooperation can generate a success only with a probability of less
than one. In other words, the experts information utilization is not only subject to adverse
selection but also to moral hazard. As a result, after obtaining a payo¤ zero in a period, the
experts belief does not drop to zero. My conjecture is that there exists a positive value of
belief such that, if the experts belief is less than this value, then she resorts to self-use of
information. However, a complete characterization of this setup is more complicated.
Another extension is to consider the case in which the amount Y0 of information is initially
unknown to the investor. For instance, the expert may be of a low type Y0 = YL > 0 with
probability  2 (0; 1) and may be of a high type Y0 = YH > YL with probability 1   .
The dynamics of information disclosure becomes more subtle because of the type pooling
16Technically, the constructions of cut-o¤ values k and value functions V
k(;Y ) in Lemma 1 are not
restricted by the condition V k(;Y )  Y , and I have an innite sequence such that k ! +1 and k ! 0.
17Given Assumption 2, it can be veried that if  = 0, then the expert should self-use her information
instead of seeking cooperation from the biased investor.
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and separating of the experts. Intuitively, a low type of expert may attempt to pretend to
be a high type in order to delay the investors betrayal, whereas a high type of expert may
mimic a low types behavior to fasten the investors type revelation. Alternatively, I may
also assume that the amount of information self-used by the expert is not observable to the
investor. In this case, the expert may use her outside option more strategically because of the
endogenous generation of private types. For instance, it is not necessarily true that whenever
the expert prefers to self-use some information, she self-uses all information immediately. I
leave these questions open for future research.
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Appendix A. Proofs.
The proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. The proof is by induction. Consider V 1(;Y ) and V 2(;Y ) for any possible value
1 2 (0; 1]. I have V 1(0;Y ) < V 2(0;Y ) and V 1(1;Y ) > V 2(1;Y ). Notice that both of
the value functions are continuous and strictly increasing in , but the slope of V 1(;Y ) is
strictly larger than the slope of V 2(;Y ) for any .18 Therefore, given k  1, I have a unique
1 satisfying V
1(1;Y ) = V
2(1;Y ) =
EY




1+q q . It can be
veried that V 1(;Y ) > V 2(;Y ) for  > 1, and V
1(;Y ) < V 2(;Y ) for  < 1.
Now suppose that for any k   1 = 1;   ; k   1 there is a unique k 1 satisfying (a) and
(b). By induction I show that there is a unique k satisfying (a) and (b). First I have






= V k+1(0;Y ):
Second, consider  = k 1. For any possible value 

k  k 1, I have

















(1  1 + (1  )(q
k   1)
1 + (1  )(qk 1   1))
< 0;
in which the second equality holds because V k(k 1;Y ) is linear in Y . Since for any possible
value k 2 (0; k 1] both V k(;Y ) and V k+1(;Y ) are continuous and strictly increasing in ,
and V k(;Y ) has a larger slope, there is a unique k 2 (0; k 1) satisfying (1) V k+1(k;Y ) =
V k(k;Y ), (2) V
k(;Y ) > V k+1(;Y ) for  2 (k; k 1], and (3) V k(;Y ) < V k+1(;Y ) for
18Technically, the slope of V 2(;Y ) at the kink 1 is not dened. However, because V
2(;Y ) is continuous
in , this kink does not a¤ect the comparison between these two value functions. I omit this special case.
Similar treatment is applied to the other value functions.
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 < k. Moreover, the statement of (2) can be augmented to have V
k(;Y ) > V k+1(;Y )
for  > k. To see this, consider  2 [k 1; k 2]. I have















(qk   1  q)
qk
V k 1(;Y ):
By the conditions that E > 1+(1  )(qk 1) and V k 1(;Y )  EY1+(1 )(qk 1 1) , it is direct
to see that V k(;Y ) > V k+1(;Y ) for  2 [k 1; k 2]. Apply this argument recursively, I
have V k(;Y ) > V k+1(;Y ) for  > k.
Moreover, because






V k(k;Y ) = V
k(k;Y );
I have
V k(k;Y ) = V
k+1(k;Y ) =
EY
1 + (1  )(qk   1) > Y;
in which the inequality holds because E > 1 + (1  )(qk   1) for k  k.
Now consider V k+1(;Y ). Because








1 + (1  )(qk   1) > Y;
and V k+1(;Y ) is continuous and strictly increasing in  for any  2 [0; 
k





) satisfying V k+1(
k+1
;Y ) = Y . It can be further veried that V k+1(;Y ) > Y
if and only if  > 
k+1
.
The proof of Lemma 1 is ended. The remainder of this proof solves the cut-o¤ values k
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explicitly. For 1  k  k, let
k = qkE   (qk   1)(1 + (1  )(qk+1   1))
and
	k = qkE   (qk   1)(1 + (1  )(qk   1)):
Given E > 1 + (1   )(qk   1) for k  k, I have 0 < k < 	k. Notice that 1 can be





. For 2  k  k, By the condition






+ V k 1(k 1;Y  
Y
qk 1









1 + (1  )(qk   1) ,
I can solve k recursively as
k =
1








































The proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. First consider 1  k  k. In the proof of Lemma 1 I have seen that, if l = k + 1,
V k(k;Y ) = V
k+1(k;Y ) and V
k(;Y ) > V k+1(;Y ) for any  > k. Now consider l = k+2
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(in case k + 2  k). I have seen that V k+1(k+1;Y ) = V k+2(k+1;Y ) and V k+1(;Y ) >
V k+2(;Y ) for  > k+1. Because  2 (k; k 1) and k > k+1, by transitivity I have
V k(;Y ) > V k+2(;Y ). Recursively, I can show that for any l > k, the inequality V k(;Y ) >
V l(;Y ) holds for any  2 (k; k 1).
By applying a similar argument, I can show that for any k  k + 1 and any l < k,
V k(;Y ) > V l(;Y ) holds for any  2 (k; k 1).
The proof of Proposition 1.
First I introduce a technical result, which will be used in the proof of the equilibrium.
Lemma A1 For  2 [k; k 1] and information Y , with 2  k  k+1 and 2  j  k,
I have the following inequality






+ V j 1(j 2;Y  
Y
qj 1





Proof. Let Zj(;Y ) denote the term on the right side of the inequality. By extending the
value function V j 1(; ), I have








































































+ 2(Y   (1 + q)Y
qj 1
)  (Y   Y
qj 1
)] > 0
because j 1 < 

j 2 and E > 1 + (1  )(qk   1).
The proof of the equilibrium.
Proof. As having been stated before, the observability of the experts information disclosure
requires that, after a deviation by the expert, the playerscontinuation play and the experts
belief updating should also consist of an equilibrium. In particular, notice that the biased
investors choice to cooperate or betray not only depends on the amount of information
disclosed in the current period, but also depends on the expected payo¤ he can obtain in the
continuation game.
Case 1:  2 [k; k 1] with 1  k  k + 1.
On the equilibrium path, the experts information disclosure follows a k-period scheme.
If k = 1 so the expert discloses all Y in period t, it is optimal for the biased investor to
betray with probability '(;0) = 1. If k > 1, the biased investor is indi¤erent between
betraying in period t with a payo¤ IY=q
k 1 and betraying in period t + 1 with a total
payo¤ IY=qk 1 + IqY=q
k 1, so his betrayal probability '(;k 1) is optimal. Moreover,
the experts belief updating follows Bayesrule and her payo¤ is V k(;Y ).
Consider the playersdeviations in period t. Notice that o¤ the equilibrium path the
experts belief updating is not required to follow the Bayes rule, so she can continue to
update her belief as she does on the equilibrium path. Given such a response by the expert,
there is no protable deviation from the probability '(;k 1) for the biased investor.
Consider case (1.1) that the expert deviates to an amount y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1], where
1  l  k   1. If l = 1, it is direct to verify that the biased investor should betray with
probability '(;0) = 1 and after observing a success the expert should disclose Y   y in
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period t+1. Given these responses, the experts deviation payo¤, which is denoted by D, is
D = [Iy + I(Y   y)] + (1  )(Y   y):
Because D is linear in y, the optimal deviation is y = Y=(1+q) +  or y = Y .19 If y =
Y=(1+q) + , by Lemma A1 and Lemma 2, I have
D  lim
#0
D = Z2(;Y )  V 2(;Y )  V k(;Y )
with 2 < k  k + 1 and  2 [k; k 1]. Therefore, it is not a protable deviation for the
expert. If y = Y , by Lemma 2 I have
D = V 1(;Y )  V k(;Y )
with 2 < k  k + 1 and  2 [k; k 1]. So it is not a protable deviation for the expert.
If l > 1, after observing a success the belief is updated to l 1. Because at this belief there
is a continuation equilibrium with an l  1-period scheme and there is another continuation
equilibrium with an l-period scheme (notice that these two equilibria give the expert the same
payo¤ V l 1(l 1;Y   y)), by mixing them with probabilities l and 1  l respectively, the
biased investor is indi¤erent between betraying in period t and betraying in period t+ 1, so
it is optimal for him to betray in period t with probability '(;l 1). Given these responses,









Because D is linear in y, the optimal deviation is y = Y=ql+ or y = Y=ql 1. If y = Y=ql+,
19Without further conditions, it is indeterminate whether D increases in y or not.
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by Lemma A1 and Lemma 2 I have
D  lim
#0
D = Z l+1(;Y )  V l+1(;Y )  V k(;Y )
with 1 < l  k   1 and  2 [k; k 1]. So it is not a protable deviation for the expert. If
y = Y=ql 1, by Lemma 2 I have
D = V l(;Y )  V k(;Y )
with 1 < l  k   1 and  2 [k; k 1]. So it is not a protable deviation for the expert.
Consider case (1.2) that the expert deviates to an amount y < Y=qk 1. If y  Y=qk
and the biased investor cooperates for sure in period t, t+1 = t and the play of a pair of
a k-period scheme and a belief path k() consists of an equilibrium starting from period
t + 1. Given this continuation play, the biased investor actually should cooperates for sure
because
Iy  Iy + I(Y   y)=qk 1
for any y  Yt=qk. Given these responses, if the expert discloses y  Y=qk, her payo¤ is
D = Ey + V
k(;Y   y):
Because D is linear in y, the optimal deviation is y = 0 or y = Y=qk. If y = 0, I have
D = V k(;Y ) < V k(;Y );
so it is not a protable deviation for the expert. If y = Y=qk, by Lemma 2 I have
D = V k+1(;Y )  V k(;Y )
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with  2 [k; k 1]. So it is not a protable deviation for the expert.
If y 2 [Y=qk; Y=qk 1), after observing a success the belief is updated to k 1. Because
at this belief there is a continuation equilibrium with a k   1-period scheme and there is
another continuation equilibrium with a k-period scheme, by mixing them with probabilities
k and 1   k respectively, the biased investor is indi¤erent between betraying in period t
and betraying in period t+ 1, so it is optimal for him to betray in period t with probability









Because D is linear in y, the optimal deviation is y = Y=qk or y = Y=qk 1  . If y = Y=qk,
by Lemma 2 I have
D  V k+1(;Y )  V k(;Y )




D = V k(;Y ):
So it is not a protable deviation for the expert.
Consider case (1.3) that the expert deviates to self-use an amount x  Y . Because
t+1 = t and the continuation play starting from period t+1 is a pair of a k-period scheme
and a belief path k(), in period t the experts deviation payo¤D satises
D = x+ V k(;Y   x)  V k(;Y );
which is because V k(;Y )  Y for  2 [k; k 1] and k  k + 1. So it is not a protable
deviation for the expert.
Case 2:   
k+1
.
On the equilibrium path the investor is inactive and the experts payo¤ is Y .
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Consider case (2.1) that the expert deviates to disclose an amount y  Y . If y  Y=qk+1,
after observing a success the belief is updated to 
k+1
. Because at this belief there is
a continuation equilibrium with a k + 1-period scheme and there is another continuation
equilibrium in which all Y   y is self-used, by mixing them with probabilities k+1 and
1   k+1 respectively, the biased investor is indi¤erent between betraying and cooperating
in period t, so it is optimal for him to betray in period t with probability '(;
k+1
). Given





Ey + (Y   y).
Because D is linear in y, the optimal deviation is y = 0 or y = Y=qk+1. If y = 0, I have
D = Y < Y ,
so it is not a protable deviation for the expert. If y = Y=qk+1, I have










because   
k+1
and E  1 + (1  )(qk+1   1). So it is not a protable deviation for the
expert.
If y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1], where 1  l  k+1, the proof is same to the one described in case
(1.1), and I can verify that
D  V k+1(;Y )  Y
for any deviation payo¤D. So it is not protable for the expert.
Consider case (2.2) that the expert deviates to self-use an amount x < Y . His deviation
payo¤ satises
D = x+ (Y   x) < Y:
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Therefore, it is not a protable deviation for the expert.
The proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. The proof is done by induction. Suppose now the game is in period t with belief
t =  and information Yt = Y . Let W (;Y ) be the experts largest equilibrium payo¤
measured in period t.
Case 1:   
k+1
.
First consider   1. In any equilibrium, the experts payo¤ is no less than V 1(;Y ) =
EY , which is obtained by disclosing all information Y in period t.
Claim 0.1 There is no equilibrium in which the experts payo¤ is strictly larger than
V 1(;Y ).
Suppose not. Then there exists a 0  1 such that there is an equilibrium in which the
experts largest equilibrium payo¤ satises W (0;Y ) > V 1(0;Y ). First, in this equilibrium
the expert does not self-use an amount x  Y in period t. Because if she does so, her
largest equilibrium payo¤ should satisfy W (0;Y )  x + W (0;Y   x), which requires
W (0;Y )  Y < V 1(0;Y ) because of the necessary linearity of W (0;Y ) in Y . Second, in
this equilibrium the expert does not disclose an amount y > Y=(1 + q) in period t. Because
if she does so, the biased investor betrays for sure in this period and the experts largest
equilibrium payo¤ satises
W (0;Y ) = 0[Ey + E(Y   y)] + (1  0)(Y   y) < V 1(0;Y );
in which the inequality is shown in the proof of the previous proposition.
Therefore, if such an equilibrium exists, it is necessary that the expert discloses y 
Y=(1 + q) in period t. Let S1 = f  1jW (;Y ) > V 1(;Y )g and consider 0 2 S1.
Let 0t+1  0 be the belief in period t + 1 after observing a success in period t, and let
W (0t+1;Y   y) be the experts continuation payo¤ at belief 0t+1 in this equilibrium, which
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is measured in period t+ 1. Then the payo¤W (0;Y ) satises
W (0;Y ) =
0
0t+1
(Ey + W (
0







(Ey + W (
0




for any y  Y=(1 + q) and 0t+1  0  1. Because W (0;Y ) is necessarily linear in y, it
reaches the maximum either at y = 0 or y = Y=(1 + q). If y = 0, I have W (0;Y )  Y ,
which contradicts W (0;Y ) > V 1(0;Y ). So it is only possible that y = Y=(1 + q). Because



















)  W (0t+1;
qY
1 + q




so 0t+1 2 S1. Recursively, in any future period l with beliefs 0l  0l 1, where l > t, the
continuation payo¤W (0l;Yl) measured in period l with remaining information Yl > 0 should
satisfy W (0l;Yl) > V
1(0l;Yl) and 
0
l 2 S1. However, because in each period the disclosed
information is no more than 1=(1 + q) of the total remaining information, it can be veried
that






= V 1(1;Y )  V 1(0;Y ):20
Therefore S1 is empty and there is no equilibrium in which the experts payo¤ is strictly
larger than V 1(;Y ) when   1.
Claim 0.2 If and only if  = 1 that there exists an equilibrium in which the expert
does not disclose all Y in period t but her payo¤ is also V 1(;Y ).






is the payo¤ that the expert gets if (1) in each period the disclosed information
is 1=(1+q) of the total remaining information, and (2) the biased investor cooperates for sure in each period.
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x  Y in period t, her payo¤ is strictly less than V 1(;Y ). Second, if there exists such an
equilibrium and the expert discloses y  Y=(1 + q) in period t, her payo¤ should have the
form
W (;Y )  
t+1
(Ey + V
1(t+1;Y   y)) + (1 

t+1
)(Y   y)  V 1(;Y )
for any   1 and an updated belief t+1 in period t+1 after observing a success in period
t. It can be veried that the equalities hold simultaneously if and only if t+1 =  = 

1
and y = Y=(1 + q). Notice that for  = 1, I have shown in Proposition 1 that there is an
equilibrium in which the expert discloses y = Y=(1 + q) in the rst period.
Claim 0.3 If  < 1, there is no equilibrium in which the expert discloses all Y in period
t, therefore the biased investors equilibrium payo¤ is strictly less than IY .
To see this, notice that if  < 1 and the expert discloses y = Y=(1 + q)    in period
t, the biased investors betrayal probability p should satisfy p  '(;1). This is because
that, if p > '(;1), then after observing a success the belief t+1 in period t + 1 satises
t+1 > 

1 and the expert will disclose all Y   y at this belief t+1. But then the biased
investor strictly prefers to cooperate in period t because Iy + I(Y   y) > Iy, which
contradicts p > '(;1). Given p  '(;1), by disclosing y = Y=(1+ q)   in period t and





1(1;Y   y)) + (1 

1
)(Y   y) > V 1(;Y )
when  ! 0. So if  < 1, there is no equilibrium in which the expert discloses all Y in
period t.
For   
k+1
and 1  k  k + 1, I introduce some properties.
Property 1 (P1) If  2 (k; k 1), there is a unique equilibrium, in which the experts
payo¤ is V k(;Y ) and the biased investors payo¤ is IY=q
k 1.
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Property 2 (P2) If  = k, there are multiple equilibria, in which the experts payo¤
is V k(;Y ) and the biased investors payo¤ ranges from IY=q
k to IY=q
k 1 if 1  k  k
and ranges from 0 to IY=q
k if k = k + 1.
Property 3 (P3) If  < k, the biased investors equilibrium payo¤ is strictly less than
IY=q
k 1.
I have seen that these properties are true for   1. In particular, P2 holds for  = 1
because of the mixing between the two equilibria, in one of which a 2-period scheme is
employed and in the other a 1-period scheme is employed.
Suppose these properties hold for  2 [k; k 1) and 1  k  k. Now consider  2
[k+1; 

k). Let y be the amount of information disclosed in period t and p be the biased
investors betrayal probability in this period.
Claim 1.1 In any equilibrium the experts payo¤ is at least V k+1(;Y ).
Step 1.1.1 If y < Y=qk, then p  '(;k). Suppose not, then after observing a success
the belief t+1 in period t + 1 satises t+1 > 

k. By P1, if the biased investor cooperates
in period t his total payo¤ is at least Iy + I(Y   y)=qk 1, which is strictly larger than
the payo¤ Iy by betraying. So he should cooperate for sure in period t. A contradiction.
Step 1.1.2 There exists an k+1 > 0 such that if y 2 (Y=qk   k+1; Y=qk) then p =
'(;k). Suppose not, so p < '(;

k) for any y < Y=q
k, then after observing a success the
belief t+1 in period t+1 satises t+1 < 

k. If y = Y=q
k  and ! 0, the biased investors
payo¤ by betraying in period t converges IY=q
k, while by P3 his payo¤ by cooperating in
period t is strictly less than IY=qk + IqY=q
k = IY=q
k, so he should betray for sure in
period t. A contradiction.
Step 1.1.3 The experts equilibrium payo¤ is at least V k+1(;Y ). To see this, notice









This payo¤ strictly increases in y and converges to V k+1(;Y ) when ! 0. So in equilibrium
the experts payo¤ is at least V k+1(;Y ).
I introduce a new property here, which is stronger than P3.
Property 30 (P30) If  < k, the biased investors equilibrium payo¤ is no larger than
IY=q
k.
With Claim 1.1 shown above, this property holds for  < 1. This is because that, if
 < 1, then the disclosed information y in period t should satisfy y  Y=(1 + q) in any
equilibrium. If the biased investor weakly prefers to betray with y then his equilibrium payo¤
is Iy  IY=(1 + q). If he strictly prefers to cooperate in period t then the continuation
game starting from period t+1 is same to the one starting from period t, except the remaining
information is Y   y (or Y   x if the expert self-uses x in period t). In any case it can be
veried that P30 holds.
Claim 1.2 There is no equilibrium in which the experts payo¤ is strictly larger than
V k+1(;Y ).
Step 1.2.1 Similar to the argument shown for the case   1, if there is an equilibrium in
which the expert self-uses an amount x  Y or discloses an amount y > Y=(1+q) in period
t, the experts payo¤ in such an equilibrium can not be strictly larger than V k+1(;Y ).
Moreover, if and only if  = 
k+1
and x = Y there is an equilibrium in which the experts
payo¤ equals to V k+1(;Y ).
Step 1.2.2 For 2  l  k, if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1) then p = '(;l 1). To see this, rst
notice that if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1) then p  '(;l 1). Suppose not, so p < '(;l 1). Then
by P30 the biased investors payo¤ is no more than Iy+ I(Y   y)=ql 1 by cooperating in
period t, which is strictly less than Iy by betraying, therefore he should betray for sure in
period t. A contradiction. Second, if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1) then p  '(;l 1). Suppose not, so
p > '(;l 1). Then by P1, the biased investors payo¤ is no less than Iy+I(Y  y)=ql 2
by cooperating in period t, which is strictly larger than Iy by betraying, therefore he should
cooperate for sure in period t. A contradiction. Thus, I conclude that if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1)
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then p = '(;l 1). Modify this argument slightly, I can show that if y = Y=q
l 1 then
p 2 ['(;l 1); '(;l 2)].
Step 1.2.3 For 2  l  k, if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1] then there is no equilibrium in which
the experts payo¤ is strictly larger than V k+1(;Y ). Suppose not, then the experts largest
payo¤ in such an equilibrium satises
W (;Y )  
l 1
(Iy + V
l 1(l 1;Y   y)) + (1 

l 1
)(Y   y)  V l(;Y ) < V k+1(;Y );
which contradicts the requirement that W (;Y ) > V k+1(;Y ). A contradiction.
Step 1.2.4 If y < Y=qk, then there is no equilibrium in which the experts payo¤
is strictly larger than V k+1(;Y ). In Claim 1.1 I have seen that it is true for y < Y=qk
and p = '(;k). Now consider y < Y=q
k and p < '(;k). Dene Sk+1 = f 2
[k+1; 

k)jW (;Y ) > V k+1(;Y )g. Similar to the argument shown for the case   1,
I can show that the set Sk+1 is empty. Moreover, I can show that W (;Y ) = V k+1(;Y )
only if  = k+1 and y = Y=q
k+1 for 2  k  k.
Step 1.2.5 If y = Y=qk then p = '(;k). By P3
0, I can show that if y = Y=qk then
p  '(;k). However, if p > '(;k), the experts payo¤ is strictly less than V k+1(;Y ).
So in equilibrium it is necessary that p = '(;k) when y = Y=q
k.
I also pin down what k+1 is in Claim 1.1 by P1 and P3
0. It can be veried that, if y <
Y=qk+1 then p = 0, and if y 2 (Y=qk+1; Y=qk] then p = '(;k). So k+1 = qk+1Y=(qk qk+1).
Thus, if  2 (k+1; k), the unique equilibrium is consisted by a pair of a k + 1-period
scheme and a belief path k+1(). In this equilibrium the experts payo¤ is V k+1(;Y ) and
the biased investors payo¤ is IY=q
k. If  = k+1, by Step 1.2.1 and Step 1.2.4, there are
multiple equilibria, in which the experts payo¤ is V k+1(;Y ), while the biased investors
equilibrium payo¤ ranges from IY=q
k+1 to IY=q
k if 0  k  k   1 and ranges from 0 to
IY=q
k if k = k. So properties P1 and P2 are true for   
k+1
. Moreover, property P30
has also been veried for   
k+1
. The only remaining part is to show that for  < 
k+1
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the biased investors equilibrium payo¤ is no larger than IY=q
k+1, which will be completed
by the proof for the next case.
Case 2:  < 
k+1
.
By self-using all Y in period t, the expert can guarantee a payo¤ Y . I show that if the
expert does not self-use all Y in period t, there is no equilibrium in which the experts payo¤
is no less than Y . To see this, rst I can show that, with an argument similar to the one
shown for the case   1, if the expert only self-uses an amount x < Y or discloses an
amount y > Y=(1 + q) in period t, her payo¤ is strictly less than Y . The remainder of the
proof considers y  Y=(1 + q).
Claim 2.1 If the expert discloses y > Y=qk+1, her payo¤ is strictly less than Y .
Step 2.1.1 For 2  l  k+1, if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1) then p = '(;l 1), and if y = Y=ql 1
then p 2 ['(;l 1); '(;l 2)]. The proof replicates the one shown in Step 1.2.2.
Step 2.1.2 For 2  l  k+1, if y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1] then there is no equilibrium in which
the experts payo¤ is no less than Y . Suppose not, then the experts largest payo¤ in such
an equilibrium satises
W (;Y )  
l 1
(Iy + V




 V l(;Y ) < V k+1(;Y ) < V k+1(
k+1
;Y ) = Y
which contradicts the requirement that W (;Y )  Y . A contradiction.
Claim 2.2 If the expert discloses y  Y=qk+1, her payo¤ is no larger than Y .
Suppose not. Dene Sk+1 = f < k+1jW (;Y ) > Y g. With an argument similar to the
one shown for the case   1, I can show that the set Sk+1 is empty.
Claim 2.3 If the expert discloses y  Y=qk+1, her payo¤ is strictly less than Y .
Suppose not. Then for some 0 < 
k+1
there is an equilibrium in which the experts
payo¤ satises W (0;Y ) = Y by disclosing an amount y  Y=qk+1 in period t. Notice that
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W (0;Y ) takes the form
W (0;Y )  
0
t+1




in which t+1 is the belief in period t+1 after observing a success in period t. For the equality
to hold, it is necessary that (a) 0 = t+1, (b) y = Y=q
k+1 and (c)W (t+1;Y  y) = Y  y. If
(c) is realized by self-using an amount x  Y  y in period t+1, I have seen that it should be
the case x = Y  y. However, in this case the biased investor should betray for sure in period
t, so t+1 = 1 > 
0, which makes the equality infeasible. If (c) is realized by continuing to
disclose, in a recursive way it should be the case that (b0) the principal discloses 1=qk+1 of
the remaining information in each period and (a0) the biased investor cooperates for sure
in each period. However, (a0) contradicts with (b0) because in period t the biased investors
payo¤ by betraying is IY=q








Therefore, the equilibrium is unique when  < 
k+1
, in which the expert self-uses all Y




Finally I pin down the biased investors response if the expert discloses y  Y=qk+1.
First, his betrayal probability p satises p  '(;
k+1
). If not, the next periods belief
after a success is strictly less than 
k+1
and the expert would self-use all Y   y for sure.
But then the biased investor should betray for sure in period t. A contradiction. Second, if
y < Y=qk+1, his betrayal probability p satises p  '(;
k+1
). If not, by P1 his payo¤ is at
least Iy + I(Y   y)=qk by cooperating in period t, which is strictly larger than Iy by
betraying. So he should cooperate for sure. A contradiction. Third, if y = Y=qk+1, by P1





The proof of Proposition 4.
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Let k(0) be the solution to this problem.












For a particular k, if there is a e satisfying V k+1(e;Y ) = V k(e;Y ), I can verify that
V
k
(;Y ) > V
k+1
(;Y ) for  > e and V k(;Y ) < V k+1(;Y ) for  < e. Moreover, I can
explicitly solve that V
k+1





(0;Y ) < V
ek+1
(0;Y ) and V
ek+1
(0;Y )  V ek+2(0;Y ):
It can be veried that ek  1 and for any 1  j  ek, I have V j(0;Y ) < V j+1(0;Y ). The
implication of ek is that, for any k  ek + 1, if there is a e satisfying V k+1(e;Y ) = V k(e;Y ),
then e  0. Thus, for any 0 2 (0; 1), k(0)  ek + 1 is necessary for the experts optimal
commitment.
Similar to the proof shown for Lemma 1, it can be veried that, if ek < k, there is a
unique sequence (e0; e1; :::; ek; :::; eek+1) satisfying (1) ek 1 > ek for 1  k  ek + 1, (2)e0 = 1, e1 = 1, eek+1 = 0, (3) V k+1(ek;Y ) = V k(ek;Y ) = EY1+(1 )(qk 1) > Y for 1  k  ek
and V
ek+1
(0;Y )  Y . Thus, for any 0 2 [ek; ek 1] and 1  k  ek + 1, k(0) = k and
the experts optimal commitment payo¤ is V
k
(0;Y0). Moreover, for 2  k  ek + 1 I can
show that ek < k by showing V k(k;Y ) > V k(k;Y ) recursively. Therefore, the process of
information disclosure with an optimal commitment is (weakly) faster than the process of
information disclosure without a commitment.
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On the other hand, if ek  k, there is a unique sequence (e0; e1; :::; ek; :::; ek+1) satisfying
(1) ek 1 > ek for 1  k  k + 1, (2) e0 = 1, e1 = 1, ek+1  0, (3) V k+1(ek;Y ) =
V
k
(ek;Y ) = EY1+(1 )(qk 1) > Y for 1  k  k and V k+1(ek+1;Y ) = Y . Thus, for any
0 2 [ek; ek 1] and 1  k  k + 1, k(0) = k and the experts optimal commitment payo¤
is V
k
(0;Y0). Similarly, I have ek < k for 2  k  k + 1.




k(0;Y0). Combined with V
k(0)(0;Y0)  V k(0;Y0), I have
V
k(0)(0;Y0) > V
k(0;Y0), which proves the statement in the proposition.
The main di¤erence between the case ek < k and the case ek  k is that, in the rst case
the expert can strictly benet from an optimal commitment for any initial belief 0 2 (0; 1),
whereas in the second case the expert can strictly benet from an optimal commitment if
and only if 0 2 (ek+1; 1), where ek+1 may be strictly larger than 0.
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Appendix B. The proof of Proposition 3.
The proof is done by the following lemmas.









;Y ) = Y if 1  k  k + 1, in which Hk(;Y ) is recursively dened by






















(b) 1 > 
1
> ::: > 
k
> ::: > 
k+1
> 0:
Proof. Consider property (a). By the denition ofHk(;Y ), I have 
1
= 1=E. Recursively,
for 2  k  k + 1 and Hk(
k







j=0(1 + (1  )(qj   1)):
Because E > 1 + (1  )(qk   1), property (b) holds.
Remark B1 In the equilibrium I will construct, the cut-o¤ values 
k
and the value
functions Hk(;Y ) work as follows. If the number of remaining periods feasible for informa-




;Y ) = Y
is the threshold between information disclosure and self-use of information in the current




Lemma B2 For 1  k  k + 1, the following properties hold:
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(c) for  2 [k; k 1), Hk(;Y ) = V k(;Y ) if k = 1 and Hk(;Y ) > V k(;Y ) if k  2.
Proof. Consider property (a). First notice that H1(;Y ) strictly increases in . Now








+ (Y   Y
qk 1
)





+ Hk 1(;Y   Y
qk 1
)
if  > 
k 1. In either case, H
k(;Y ) strictly increases in .
Consider properties (b) and (c). First notice that 
1
< 1 and H
1(;Y ) = V 1(;Y )
hold. Suppose that both (b) and (c) hold for  2 [k; k 1) and 1  k  k. Now consider















By the assumption of induction, I have k+1(;Y )  V k+1(;Y ). If   
k
and k  k 1

















































































  (Y   Y
qk





< k and E > 1 + (1   )(qk   1). If  > k or k > k 1, by modifying the
above argument slightly, I can also show that Hk+1(;Y )   k+1(;Y ) > 0: Therefore, I
have
Hk+1(;Y ) > k+1(;Y )  V k+1(;Y )  Y
for  2 [k+1; k) and 1  k  k. Because Hk+1(;Y ) strictly increases in , I have

k+1
< k+1. This completes the proof of (b) and (c).
Remark B2 In the equilibrium I will construct, given a deadline T = k 1, the experts
equilibrium payo¤ is no less than Hk(0;Y0) if 0  k. By properties (b) and (c) shown in
this lemma, such an equilibrium payo¤ is strictly larger than V k(0;Y0) if 0 2 [k; k 1)
and 2  k  k + 1.
Lemma B3 For 2  k  k + 1, there is a number l(k), which is a function of k, and










(b) Uk;l(;Y ) T Uk;l+1(;Y ) if  T k;l and 1  l < l(k), and Uk;l(;Y ) T Hk(;Y ) if
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 T k;l and l = l(k), in which Uk;l(;Y ) is recursively dened by


















The interpretation of value function Uk;l(;Y ) is as follows. The superscript k indi-
cates the number of periods feasible for information disclosure, whereas the superscript l
indicates that an l-period scheme of information disclosure is employed.
Proof. For 2  k  k + 1, notice that Uk;1(;Y ) = Uk;2(;Y ) holds if  = 1. Therefore,
denote k;1 = 

1. Also, denote 

k;0 = 1.
If k = 2, U2;1(2;1;Y ) = H
2(2;1;Y ) holds. I dene the sequence by a single element
sequence (2;1). It can be veried that all the other properties in (a) and (b) hold.
Consider k = 3. Notice that U3;2(;Y ) = V 2(;Y ), so U3;2(;Y ) strictly increases in
. I also have U3;2(;Y ) > H3(;Y ) when   2;1, and U3;2(0;Y ) < H3(0;Y ). Because
U3;2(;Y ) always has a larger slope, there is a unique 3;2 satisfying U
3;2(;Y ) = H3(;Y )
and 0 < 3;2 < 





3;2). It can be veried that all the other
properties in (a) and (b) hold. Moreover, because H3(2;Y ) > V





Suppose that for 2  k  k a sequence (k;1; :::; k;l(k) 1; k;l(k)) satisfying (a) and (b) has
been dened. Now I dene the sequence for k + 1. First, for any 2  j  l(k), there is a
unique k+1;j satisfying U
k+1;j(;Y ) = Uk+1;j+1(;Y ) and 0 < k+1;j < 

k;j 1. To see this,
notice that if   k;j 1 I have
Uk+1;j(;Y ) = E
Y
qj 1





Uk+1;j+1(;Y ) = E
Y
qj
+ Uk;j(;Y   Y
qj
):
By the assumption of induction, Uk;j 1(;Y )  Uk;j(;Y ) if   k;j 1, so Uk+1;j(;Y ) >
Uk+1;j+1(;Y ) if   k;j 1. On the other hand, I have Uk+1;j(0;Y ) < Uk+1;j+1(0;Y ).
Because both Uk+1;j(;Y ) and Uk+1;j+1(;Y ) strictly increase in  and the former has a
larger slope in , there is a unique k+1;j satisfying the conditions.
Second, there is a unique 0 satisfying Uk+1;l(k)(;Y ) = Hk+1(;Y ) and 0 < 0 < 
k;l(k) 1.
To see this, notice that if   
k;l(k) 1 > k, I have
Hk+1(;Y ) = E
Y
qk
+ Hk(;Y   Y
qk
):
Because Uk;l(k) 1(;Y )  Uk;l(k)(;Y ) > Hk(;Y ) if   
k;l(k) 1, I have U
k+1;l(k)(;Y ) >
Hk+1(;Y ) if   
k;l(k) 1: On the other hand, I have U
k+1;l(k)(0;Y ) < Hk+1(0;Y ). Because
both Uk+1;l(k)(;Y ) and Hk+1(;Y ) strictly increase in  and the former has a larger slope
in , there is a unique 0 satisfying the conditions.
Third, there is a unique 00 satisfying Uk+1;l(k)+1(;Y ) = Hk+1(;Y ) and 0 < 0 < 
k;l(k)
.




, I have Uk+1;l(k)+1(;Y ) > Hk+1(;Y ) because
Uk;l(k)(;Y )  Hk(;Y ). On the other hand, I have Uk+1;l(k)+1(0;Y ) < Hk+1(0;Y ). Because
both Uk+1;l(k)+1(;Y ) and Hk+1(;Y ) strictly increase in  and the former has a larger slope
in , there is a unique 00 satisfying the conditions.
Finally, if 00 < k+1;l(k), dene l(k + 1) = l(k) + 1 and 

k+1;l(k+1)
= 00, and dene
k+1;j = k+1;j for 1  j  l(k). If 00  k+1;l(k), dene l(k + 1) = l(k) and k+1;l(k+1) = 0,
and dene k+1;j = k+1;j for 1  j < l(k). With this construction of the sequence, It can
be veried that all the other properties in (a) and (b) hold.
Remark B3 If the deadline T satises T = k   1 > 0, an important feature is that,
if the experts initial belief is relatively large, she prefers to disclose all information before
the deadline is reached. For instance, if 0  1, the expert discloses all Y0 in period
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t = 0 no matter what the deadline is. Therefore, I need to characterize the cut-o¤ values
and value functions that describe the experts utilization of information for any initial belief.
The systems derived in Lemma B1 and Lemma B3 provide a full description of the experts
behaviors, which will be shown in the equilibrium. Also notice that the value k I introduced
in the main analysis equals 
k;l(k)
here.
Lemma B4 For 2  k  k+1, there exists an equilibrium in which the experts payo¤
is Uk;l(;Y ) if  2 [k;l; k;l 1] and 1  l  l(k), is Hk(;Y ) if  2 [k; k;l(k)], and is Y
if   
k
.
Proof. Suppose now the game is in period t with belief t =  and information Yt = Y , and
the number of remaining periods for information disclosure is k, where 2  k  k+1. Let y
be the amount of information disclosed in period t, and let x be the amount of information
self-used in period t. Consider the strategy prole and belief updating system described as
follows.
Case 1:  2 [k;l; k;l 1] and 1  l  l(k).
On the equilibrium path. Starting from period t, the experts information disclosure
follows an l-period scheme. In the rst period of the l-period scheme, the biased investor
betrays with probability '(; maxf; k 1;l 1g). After observing a success in period t, the
experts belief updates to maxf; k 1;l 1g in period t + 1. In this case, the experts payo¤
is Uk;l(;Y ):
O¤ the equilibrium path. For any deviation by the biased investor, after observing a
success the expert continues to update her belief to maxf; k 1;l 1g in period t + 1. The
remainder considers the experts deviations.
First, consider y > Y=ql 1. If y 2 (Y=qj 1; Y=qj 2] and 2  j  l, the biased investor
betrays with probability '(;k 1;j 2).
21 If a success is observed in period t, (a) if j = 2,
the expert discloses Y   y in the next period, and (b) if j > 2, starting from the next period








the Case 1-equilibrium with a j   2-period scheme is played with probability j and the
Case 1-equilibrium with a j  1-period scheme is played with probability 1 j, in which j
satises







That is, j makes the biased investor being indi¤erent between cooperating and betraying
in period t.22
Second, consider y 2 (Y=ql; Y=ql 1). (a) If   k 1;l 1, the biased investor cooperates
for sure. Starting from period t + 1 the Case 1-equilibrium with an l   1-period scheme
is played. (b) If  < k 1;l 1, the biased investor betrays with probability '(;

k 1;l 1).
After observing a success in period t, if l(k   1) > l   1, starting from the next period the
Case 1-equilibrium with an l   1-period scheme is played with probability l and the Case
1-equilibrium with an l-period scheme is played with probability 1  l, in which l satises







if l(k  1) = l  1, starting from the next period the Case 1-equilibrium with an l  1-period
scheme is played with probability 0l and the Case 2-equilibrium with a k  1-period scheme
is played with probability 1  0l, in which 0l satises









Third, consider y  Y=ql. (a) If   k 1;l 1, the biased investor cooperates for sure.
Starting from period t+1 the Case 1-equilibrium with an l  1-period scheme is played. (b)
If l(k   1) = l and  2 [k 1;l; k 1;l 1], the biased investor cooperates for sure. Starting
from period t + 1 the Case 1-equilibrium with an l-period scheme is played. (c) Consider
22By Case 1-equilibrium, I mean the equilibrium described in Case 1. Similarly, Case 2-equilibrium
refers to the equilibrium described in Case 2. The di¤erence between these two classes of equilibria is that,
in the equilibrium described in Case 1 the deadline is never reached, whereas in the equilibrium described
in Case 2 the deadline is reached based on a series of successes.
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 2 [k 1;j+1; k 1;j] such that l  j  l(k   1)   1. If y  Y=qj+1, the biased investor
cooperates for sure and starting from period t + 1 the Case 1-equilibrium with a j + 1-
period scheme is played. If y 2 (Y=qj+1; Y=qj], the biased investor betrays with probability
'(;k 1;j). After observing a success in period t, starting from the next period the Case 1-
equilibrium with a j-period scheme is played with probability j and the Case 1-equilibrium
with a j + 1-period scheme is played with probability 1  j, in which j satises







(d) Consider  2 [
k 1; 

k 1;l(k 1)]. If y  Y=qk, the biased investor cooperates for sure.
Starting from period t + 1 the Case 2-equilibrium with a k   1-period scheme is played. If
y 2 (Y=qk; Y=ql(k 1)], the biased investor betrays with probability '(;
k 1;l(k 1)). After
observing a success in period t, starting from the next period the Case 1-equilibrium with
an l(k   1)-period scheme is played with probability k and the Case 2-equilibrium with a
k   1-period scheme is played with probability 1  k, in which k satises







Finally, if the expert self-uses x instead of disclosing y, starting from period t + 1 the
Case 1-equilibrium is played if   




k 1;l(k 1)), and Y   y is self-used in period t+ 1 if  < k 1.





On the equilibrium path. Starting from period t, the experts information disclosure
follows a k-period scheme. In the rst period of the k-period scheme, the biased investor
betrays with probability '(; maxf; 
k 1g). After observing a success in period t, the
experts belief updates to maxf; 
k 1g in period t + 1. In this case, the experts payo¤ is
Hk(;Y ).
O¤ the equilibrium path. For any deviation by the biased investor, after observing
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a success the expert continues to update her belief to maxf; 
k 1g in period t + 1. The
remainder considers the experts deviations.
First, consider y > Y=qk 1. (a) If y 2 (Y=qk 1; Y=ql(k 1)], the biased investor betrays
with probability '(;
k 1;l(k 1)). After observing a success in period t, starting from the
next period the Case 1-equilibrium with an l(k 1)-period scheme is played with probability
0k and the Case 2-equilibrium with a k  1-period scheme is played with probability 1  0k,
in which 0k satises









(b) If y 2 (Y=qj; Y=qj 1] such that 2  j  l(k   1), the biased investor betrays with
probability '(;k 1;j 1). After observing a success in period t, starting from the next
period the Case 1-equilibrium with a j   1-period scheme is played with probability 0j and
the Case 1-equilibrium with a j-period scheme is played with probability 1 0j, in which 0j
satises









(c) If y > Y=(1 + q), the biased investor betrays for sure. After observing a success, the
expert discloses Y   y in period t+ 1.
Second, consider y < Y=qk 1. (a) If   
k 1, the biased investor cooperates for sure.
Starting from period t + 1 the Case 2-equilibrium with a k   1-period scheme is played.
(b) If  < 
k 1, the biased investor betrays with probability '(;k 1). After observing a
success in period t, starting from the next period the Case 2-equilibrium with a k  1-period
scheme is played with probability 00k and the expert self-uses all Y   y in period t+ 1 with
probability 1  00k, in which 00k satises







Finally, if the expert self-uses x instead of disclosing y, starting from period t + 1 the
Case 2-equilibrium is played if  2 [
k 1; 

k 1;l(k)), and Y   y is self-used in period t + 1 if
 < 
k 1.
Case 3:   
k
.
On the equilibrium path. The expert self-uses x = Y and her payo¤ is Y:
O¤ the equilibrium path. Consider the experts deviations. (a) If y  Y=qk 1, the
biased investor betrays with probability '(;
k 1). After observing a success in period t,
starting from the next period the Case 2-equilibrium with a k   1-period scheme is played
with probability 00k and the expert self-uses all Y   y in period t + 1 with probability
1   00k, in which 00k is denoted in the previous case. (b) If y 2 (Y=qk 1; Y=ql(k 1)], the
biased investor betrays with probability '(;
k 1;l(k 1)). After observing a success in period
t, starting from the next period the Case 1-equilibrium with an l(k   1)-period scheme is
played with probability 0k and the Case 2-equilibrium with a k   1-period scheme is played
with probability 1 0k, in which 0k is denoted in the previous case. (c) If y 2 (Y=qj; Y=qj 1]
such that 2  j  l(k 1), the biased investor betrays with probability '(;k 1;j 1). After
observing a success in period t, starting from the next period the Case 1-equilibrium with a
j 1-period scheme is played with probability 0j and the Case 1-equilibrium with a j-period
scheme is played with probability 1   0j, in which 0j is denoted in the previous case. (d)
If y > Y=(1 + q), then the biased investor betrays for sure. After observing a success, the
expert discloses Y   y in period t + 1. (e) If the expert self-uses x < Y , in the next period
she self-uses Y   x:
Remark B4 The verication that the strategy prole and belief updating system consist
of an equilibrium is similar to the one shown for Proposition 1. So I omit the details. The
key property is that, given the biased investors strategy, if  2 [k;l; k;l 1] and 1  l  l(k),
the expert prefers an l-period scheme of information disclosure to any other scheme or self-




], the expert prefers a k-period scheme of information disclosure to
any other scheme or self-use; and if   
k
, the expert prefers self-use to any scheme of
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information disclosure.
Lemma B5 If T = k 1,  2 [k; k 1) and 2  k  k+1, there exists an equilibrium
in which the experts payo¤ is strictly larger than V k(;Y ).
Proof. First, by Lemma B2, I haveHk(;Y ) > V k(;Y ) if  2 [k; k 1) and 2  k  k+1.
Second, because k > k, the experts payo¤ is at least H
k(;Y ) in the equilibrium I have
constructed in Lemma B4. Therefore, the statement is true.
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Chapter 2 Reputational Concern with Endogenous Information
Acquisition
2.1 Introduction
Information acquisition and information transmission are essential activities in a variety
of organizations, markets and societies. Uninformed principals who have the authority to
make the nal decisions must rely on these forms of activities performed by experts for the
sake of decision optimality. For instance, when making policies, government o¢ cials often
seek advice from social scientists. For the advice to be valuable, the scientists may need to
acquire the relevant information rst. Investors may ask for suggestions from their nancial
consultants if they are uncertain about the qualities of the projects and may leave it to the
consultants to determine about how informative their reports should be. A pervasive feature
underlying these expert-decision maker interactions is that the expertsadvice and sugges-
tions are often non-veriable and thus explicit contracts contingent on them are infeasible.
Instead, the experts may be self-incentivized by their reputational concerns for being aligned
with the decision makersobjectives (i.e., whether they are perceived as caring about the
decision makerspayo¤s). This is quite common in practice, and helps to explain how these
scientists, consultants, analysts and politicians are motivated and rewarded.
Initiated by the seminal works of Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Joel Sobel (1985), the
literature on reputational cheap talk games has generated many insightful ndings on how the
expertsmotivations to convey information truthfully may be a¤ected by their reputational
concerns. However, most of the studies in this eld assume that the expertsinformation is
exogenously given, and little attention has been paid to the potential e¤ects of reputational
concerns on the expertsinformation acquisition decisions. To obtain a better understanding
of the roles that experts play in our society, I endogenize the expertsinformation acquisition
in the current study and examine the interactions and welfare consequences of the experts
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information acquisition, information transmission and reputational concerns. Specically, I
mainly address the following questions. Would the experts acquire better information if they
are more concerned about their reputations? Would the decision makers benet from the
existence of a type of expert who is certain to contribute nothing in terms of information
acquisition and transmission? If delegation is feasible, would the decision makers prefer
communication to delegation or the inverse?
I develop a reputational cheap talk model in this paper. An expert rst decides whether
costly but more accurate information should be acquired. Afterwards, the expert receives
a signal and sends a message to the decision maker. Based on this message, the decision
maker then takes an action that is payo¤-relevant to both parties. The expert may be
aligned or biased. An aligned expert cares about the decision makers welfare and would
like to be known for being aligned with the decision makers objectives. In contrast, for the
sake of simplicity, a biased expert is assumed to be non-strategic in that he never acquires
better information and is in favor of sending a particular message. The incorporation of
reputational concern in the aligned experts payo¤ captures the idea that experts may be
motivated by how they are perceived by others instead of by explicit compensation schemes.
The aligned expert trades o¤ between three factors: reputation e¤ect, informativeness
e¤ect and information acquisition cost. Sending a message unfavored by the biased type
always separates the aligned expert from the other type perfectly, regardless of what the
nature state is. Thus, this message causes the aligned expert to obtain a larger payo¤ from
reputation building. This e¤ect is known as the reputation e¤ect. In contrast, if the aligned
expert aims to reveal his information truthfully, he benets from the information acquisi-
tion because better information enables the decision maker to take better actions and form
more precise posterior beliefs. This e¤ect is known as the informativeness e¤ect. One of
my main ndings shows that reputational concern may have a non-monotonic e¤ect on the
aligned experts information acquisition incentive; that is, the aligned expert acquires better
information if and only if his reputational concern is moderate. The reasoning behind this
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result is as follows. If the reputational concern is relatively low, the informativeness e¤ect
is outweighed by the acquisition cost, and thus, the aligned experts attempt to perform in-
formation acquisition is restricted. If the reputational concern is relatively high, the aligned
expert is too incentivized to exploit the reputation e¤ect by sending the message unfavored
by the biased type, so better information is worthless to him. Only in the moderate range
of the reputational concern does the informativeness e¤ect dominate both the acquisition
cost and the reputation e¤ect such that the aligned expert has the proper incentive to ac-
quire better information. Additionally, I show that the aligned experts decisions regarding
information acquisition and transmission are complementary: the more truthfully the infor-
mation is transmitted ex post, the stronger the aligned experts incentive is to acquire better
information ex ante. This relationship e¤ectively captures the expertsbehaviors in many
real-world situations.
Abstracting from the detailed models, most of the existing studies on reputation games
show that an individuals reputational concern has a monotonic e¤ect on his/her behavior;
that is, with an increase in the reputational concern, the individuals incentive to take a
decision unfavored by the other individuals either decreases (e.g., Joel Sobel (1985), Benabou
and Laroque (1992) and Wei Li (2010)) or increases (e.g., Morris (2001), Ely and Valimaki
(2003) and Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2008)). The novel nding of a non-monotonic e¤ect
in my study bridges the existing results and further contributes to my understanding of how
an individuals behavior may be a¤ected by his/her concerns with building a reputation.
Another main nding in this study is that, although the biased type of expert contributes
nothing in terms of information acquisition and transmission, the existence of this type of
expert may actually improve the decision makers payo¤. A crucial property in my model
is that if the information acquisition cost is moderate, the aligned expert will attempt to
acquire better information if and only if he is compensated in the form of both better actions
and more accurate beliefs. From the perspective of the decision makers welfare, if it is
certain that the expert is aligned, the decision maker can benet from the experts truthful
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information transmission, but this benet may not be maximized if better information is
not acquired. Conversely, if biased experts are present, the decision maker su¤ers from
the information loss caused by these experts. However, she may benet from the better
information conveyed by the aligned expert if this expert performs information acquisition.
If the probability of an expert being biased is relatively low, the information loss introduced
by the biased type is exceeded by the increased gain from the better information transmitted
by the aligned type. Thus, the decision makers payo¤can be improved. This nding enables
us to starkly compare my results with the results in the aforementioned papers, in which the
decision makers payo¤ is inevitably reduced by the existence of the biased experts because
of the lack of endogenous information acquisition.
Instead of eliciting information through communication, the decision maker may dele-
gate her decision rights to the expert. For instance, in real-world practice, a government
may grant the pricing rights to a regulated rm, and a nancial consultant may have much
discretion on investment decisions. In this study, I also examine the e¤ects of delegation
on the experts information acquisition incentive and on the decision makers choice regard-
ing when delegation should be employed. Delegation may be unrestricted such that the
expert can take any action from the original action space. Alternatively, delegation may
be restricted such that the decision maker can optimally design the delegation set. If the
biased expert always takes the largest permissible action, the key feature under delegation
is that the aligned expert can always separate from the biased type perfectly by taking the
payo¤-relevant action. Thus, the reputation e¤ect vanishes, and the informativeness e¤ect
is limited. I show that, compared with unrestricted delegation, optimally restricted dele-
gation always reduces the aligned experts incentive to acquire better information, which
contradicts the result in Dezso Szalay (2005). Additionally, compared with communication,
delegation (whether unrestricted or restricted) may reduce the aligned experts information
acquisition incentive, which is a counter-example to the result in Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Finally, compared with the result in Wouter Dessein (2002), which nds that the decision
66
maker always prefers delegation to communication whenever informative communication is
feasible, my result is more biased towards communication in the sense that whenever there
exists an equilibrium with information acquisition, the decision maker strictly prefers com-
munication to delegation. This result could be further enhanced if I impose more restrictive
conditions.
2.2 Literature
This paper belongs to the growing literature on cheap talk initiated by Crawford and
Sobel (1982). Joel Sobel (1985) was the rst to consider a reputational cheap talk model in
which the aligned expert conveys information truthfully and the biased expert attempts to
appear aligned. Benabou and Laroque (1992) extend Sobels model by incorporating noisy
signals. The reputational concerns in these papers are "good" in the sense that the biased
experts incentive to manipulate information is restricted. I primarily build on and borrow
from Stephen Morris (2001). Morris endogenizes the role of the aligned expert and shows
that no information can be conveyed in equilibrium if the aligned expert is too concerned
about his reputation. He refers to this phenomenon as "political correctness". Ely and
Valimaki (2003) and Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2008) show that the reputational concern
of the long-run player who is interacting with a sequence of short-run players could lead
to the market being shut down and the loss of all surplus. The authors refer to this e¤ect
as "bad reputation". In these papers, the experts information is exogenously given, and
the focus is on how the information is revealed. In contrast, I endogenize the quality of
information in this study and mainly consider the e¤ects of reputational concern on the
experts information acquisition incentive.
Some recent papers have introduced a third party to the reputational cheap talk games.
Wei Li (2010) analyzes a model in which an intermediary between the expert and the decision
maker exists. She nds that the biased expert and the biased intermediarys reporting
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truthfulness are strategic complements. Li and Mylovanov (2008) and Durbin and Iyer
(2009) develop models in which the expert may acquire information by himself or follow
an interest groups recommendation in exchange for an access fee, and thus endogenize the
source of the experts bias. Another strand of the literature on reputational cheap talk, which
is not so close to ours, focuses on the situations in which the expert has an incentive to build
a reputation regarding his ability. (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Brandenburger and
Polak (1996), Gilat Levy (2004), Andrea Prat (2005), Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006a, b),
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Wei Li (2007) and Giuseppe Moscarini (2007)).
My paper also relates to the literature on information acquisition. Dezso Szalay (2005)
studies a model in which the expert acquires costly information and then chooses an optimal
action. He shows that it may be desirable for the principal to restrict the experts discretion
to improve the information acquisition incentive, even if the expert is perfectly aligned. Hao
Li (2001) derives a similar insight within a group decision framework in which optimally de-
signed conservatism increases expertsattempts to collect evidence and improves the quality
of the group decision. Dur and Swank (2005), Gerardi and Yariv (2008) and Che and Kartik
(2009) show that it could be optimal for the decision maker to hire experts with di¤erent
preferences and opinions because these experts have stronger incentives to collect relevant
information. Because none of these papers are concerned about the experts reputation, they
di¤er substantially from my study.
Finally, my paper refers to the literature on delegation. Aghion and Tirole (1997) note
that delegation always increases the agents incentive to acquire information because he can
better employ the information in the action taking stage. Wouter Dessein (2002) nds that
the decision maker prefers delegation to communication whenever informative communi-
cation is feasible. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) generalize the delegation literature and
characterize the properties of optimal delegation. My ndings in this paper complement
these results regarding the understanding of when the decision maker should delegate her
rights to the expert. For more papers regarding delegation, see, among others, Holmstrom
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(1977, 1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Tymoy Mylovanov (2008), Krishna and Mor-
gan (2008) and Kovac and Mylovanov (2009).
2.3 The model
I consider a communication game involving two players: an expert (referred to as E or
he) and a decision maker (referred to as DM or she). The nature state is binary:  2 f0; 1g.
Each state occurs with probability 1=2. Before he receives a signal s 2 f0; 1g, the expert
has private access to an information acquisition technology that can increase the accuracy
p of the signal. With e¤ort e = 1, which costs c > 0, the signal s will be equal to the state
 with probability p = p1; with e¤ort e = 0, which costs 0, the signal s will be equal to the
state  with probability p = p0. I assume 1=2 < p0 < p1 < 1, so the signal is informative but
imperfect in both cases.23 Afterwards, the expert receives a signal s and sends a message
m 2 f0; 1g to the decision maker. Based on the message, the decision maker takes an action
a 2 [0; 1] to maximize her payo¤. For instance, this action could be a decision about how
much capital should be invested or what the optimal policy should be. Finally, the decision
maker learns the nature state  and forms her posterior belief about the experts type based
on the information in her possession.
The decision makers payo¤ depends on the nature state and her action, which is repre-
sented by the quadratic loss function
 =  (a  )2:
Notice that with this payo¤ function, the decision makers optimal action is equal to the
probability that she attaches to the state  = 1. There are two types of experts: an aligned
23I assume p0 > 1=2. A possible justication for this assumption is that without information acquisition,
the experts signal is informative because of his experience or expertise. For instance, if a nancial expert
is consulted about a particular investment decision, his judgment is informative because of his past research
on the general economic environment. However, if he investigates the context of this particular decision and
obtains additional information, his judgment will be more informative.
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expert (referred to as A) with prior probability  2 (0; 1) and a biased expert (referred to as
B) with prior probability 1  . The aligned expert and the decision maker share the same
preference regarding the current action, and his payo¤ is given by
UA =  (a  )2 + ()  ec;
in which () is the decision makers posterior belief that the expert is aligned,   0
is the aligned experts reputational concern attached to the posterior belief, and ec is the
information acquisition cost. Intuitively, the degree of reputational concern  may represent
the aligned experts future opportunities to provide consultations or nd employment. I use
a reduced form of reputation building in this study to capture the idea that the higher the
reputational concern is, the stronger the experts attempt to appear aligned will be because
of the complementarity between  and (). In the following analysis, I also refer to the
rst term in this payo¤ function as the aligned experts current gain and refer to the second
term as his reputational gain. The biased expert is assumed to be non-strategic in that he
does not acquire better information and always sends the message m = 1.
I look for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in this paper. For the aligned expert, his
strategy A consists of ve probabilities: A = fA; (xA;wA); (yA; zA)g. A is the probability
that he acquires better information. Based on the acquisition decision e = 0, xA (wA) is his
truthful reporting probability that he sends message m = 1 (m = 0) if his signal is s = 1
(s = 0). Similarly, based on the acquisition decision e = 1, yA (zA) is his truthful reporting
probability that he sends message m = 1 (m = 0) if his signal is s = 1 (s = 0). The decision
makers strategy DM is the action am she takes if she receives the message m. Besides, after
observing the realized nature state  the decision maker forms posterior belief () about the
experts type. A strategy prole  and belief updating system  consist of an equilibrium
if each players strategy maximizes his/her payo¤ and if the posterior belief follows Bayes
rule whenever possible. For the sake of simplicity, I restrict my attention to the equilibria in
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which the aligned expert uses pure strategy on his acquisition decision.
My paper belongs to the literature on cheap talk games, and has a babbling equilibrium
in which the decision maker learns nothing about the nature state from the experts message.
Specically, the biased experts non-strategic role implies that his message is uninformative.
If the aligned expert does not acquire better information and always sends message m = 0
regardless of his signal, the decision makers optimal action is to take a0 = a

1 = 1=2.
Expecting to have no e¤ect on the decision makers action, the aligned expert has no incentive
to deviate from this strategy. Thus, the existence of equilibrium is guaranteed in this game.
The interesting question that arises here is when equilibria other than the babbling one exist.
I introduce a denition as follows.
Denition 4 An equilibrium f; g is an informative equilibrium (IE) if am 6= am0 for
m 6= m0 on the equilibrium path.
This denition simply says that the decision makers optimal action is responsive to the
message that she received.24 In the next section, I mainly describe how the existence of
informative equilibria, especially the ones with information acquisition, is a¤ected by the
aligned experts reputational concern.
2.4 Communication
The communication game can be represented by three stages: the stage of information
acquisition, the stage of information transmission, and the stage of action taking and be-
lief updating. The equilibrium behaviors of the players can be identied by the backward
induction approach.
24My denition of informative equilibrium is consistent with those in some studies (e.g., Gilat Levy (2004)
and Wei Li (2010)) but di¤ers slightly from those in some other studies (e.g., Stephen Morris (2001)). Pre-
cisely, my denition is stronger than the one in Morris (2001). In my study, an equilibrium is informative
only if the decision maker can learn something about the nature state, whereas in Morris (2001), an equilib-
rium is informative if the decision maker can learn something about the nature state, or the experts type,
or both. There is no signicant e¤ect on my main ndings if I adopt the denition in Morris (2001).
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2.4.1 Preliminary analysis
Given any strategy of the expert, the decision makers optimal response in the last stage
is uniquely determined. Specically, if PrA(m = lj = k) represents the expected probability
from the decision makers perspective that the aligned expert will send a message m = l if
the state is  = k, where k, l 2 f0; 1g,25 given the non-strategic role of the biased expert, I








and I have the equilibrium belief (jm; ) as
(j0; 0) = 1 and (j1; 0) = PrA(m=1j=0)
PrA(m=1j=0)+(1 ) ;
(j0; 1) = 1 and (j1; 1) = PrA(m=1j=1)
PrA(m=1j=1)+(1 ) :
In appendix A, I provide a general description of the optimal actions to take and the posterior
beliefs to form. This description helps to generate some preliminary results.
Lemma 3 For any informative equilibrium in which a1 > a

0, the aligned expert sends m = 0
with probability one on the equilibrium path if his signal is s = 0; for any informative
equilibrium in which a1 < a

0, the aligned expert sends m = 1 with probability zero on the
equilibrium path if his signal is s = 1.
A crucial property in this communication game is that, regardless of what the nature
state is, the aligned expert can always separate from the biased type perfectly by sending
message m = 0 and thus obtain a larger reputational gain if  > 0. This property could be
25To save notations, the detailed expression of this probability is relegated in appendix A.
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observed from the inequality
(jm = 0;  = k) =  >   (jm = 1;  = k) for k 2 f0; 1g.
I denote this property as the reputation e¤ect. Meanwhile, given a particular signal, if
sending message m = 0 also increases the aligned experts current gain, he should certainly
do so. Lemma 3 captures these arguments.
Lemma 4 For any informative equilibrium in which a1 < a

0, there exists another informa-
tive equilibrium in which a01 > a
0
0.
There is no restriction on how the meaning of a message is conveyed by the expert and
deduced by the decision maker. Potentially, an equilibrium with a1 < a

0 may exist in this
game; that is, the decision maker rationally infers that the probability of the state being  = 1
is higher if the message she received is m = 0 rather than m = 1. The nding in the above
lemma demonstrates that whenever such a "reversely inferred" equilibrium exists, another
"obversely inferred" equilibrium exists. Thus, without loss of generality, I can narrow my
attention to the set of equilibria in which a1  a0.
Lemma 5 If there is information acquisition in an equilibrium, then this equilibrium is
informative.
Information acquisition is socially valuable if the increased accuracy of the signal enables
the decision maker to take better actions that are preferred by both players. However, if
the aligned expert expects his information transmission to have no e¤ect on the decision
makers action, he is actually better o¤ by saving the acquisition cost and simply obtaining
the largest reputational gain. The result in Lemma 5 highlights the necessity of equilibrium
informativeness to the experts attempt to acquire better information, which is one of the
driving forces in my study.
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I are primarily interested in the existence of equilibria with information acquisition and
how this existence varies with the experts reputational concern. The aforementioned results
substantially simplify my investigation of these equilibria. Particularly, if an equilibrium
with information acquisition exists, by Lemma 5 I know that it is necessarily informative,
and by Lemma 4 it is without loss of generality to focus on the case that a1 > a

0. Finally,
by Lemma 3 I only need to focus on the informative equilibria in which the aligned expert
conveys his information truthfully if his signal is s = 0. The main results will be derived in
the next subsection.
2.4.2 Equilibrium analysis
One question remains in the stage of information transmission: when does the aligned
expert have an incentive to tell the truth (at least with a positive probability) after observing
a signal s = 1? With the simplications derived above, an equilibrium is informative if xA > 0
(in case A = 0 in equilibrium) or y

A > 0 (in case 

A = 1 in equilibrium). Intuitively, if the
aligned expert always sends message m = 0 regardless of his information while the biased
expert always sends message m = 1 by assumption, the decision maker can learn nothing
about the nature state, and thus, the equilibrium is necessarily babbling. If the received
signal is s = 1, for the aligned expert to have xA > 0 or y

A > 0 he must be compensated
by the current gain by sending message m = 1 because of the reputation e¤ect by sending
message m = 0: This trade-o¤ is resolved by the following proposition.
Let
 =













I have 0 <  < .
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Proposition 5 For an informative equilibrium to exist, the aligned experts reputational
concern  must be relatively low: if A = 0 on the equilibrium path,   ; if A = 1 on the
equilibrium path,   :
Fix the accuracy of the signals and assume that the decision maker responds optimally.
If the aligned expert receives a signal s = 1, his payo¤ by sending message m = 1, which
is denoted as v1 in the proof, increases with his truthful reporting probability. To see this,
notice that all the terms a1, 
(j1; 0) and (j1; 1) increase in xA (or yA) and v1 increases in
these terms (as long as a1  pi if A = i in equilibrium). Intuitively, the higher the truthful
reporting probability on the signal s = 1 is, the less noisy the message m = 1 is. Thus,
the decision maker can more precisely deduce information about the nature state and the
experts type, which are both benecial to the aligned expert. I denote this payo¤-increasing
property as the informativeness e¤ect.
If the aligned experts reputational concern is relatively low, the aforementioned infor-
mativeness e¤ect outweighs the reputation e¤ect, and thus, an informative equilibrium may
exist. However, if the reputational concern is too large, the aligned expert becomes too incen-
tivized by the desire to build his reputation, and the reputation e¤ect eventually outweighs
the informativeness e¤ect, which causes the communication to become inevitably uninfor-
mative. This nding captures the spirit described by Morris (2001) as "political correctness"
and the one denoted by Ely and Valimaki (2003) and Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2008) as
"bad reputation".
Additionally,  <  implies that, keeping other things unchanged, the higher the signal
accuracy p is, the more supportable it is for an equilibrium to be informative. This could be
seen from the fact that v1 is an increasing function of p, which uncovers another source of
the informativeness e¤ect.
I introduce an assumption for the next result.
Assumption: 2p1 + 1  4p0  0:
This condition reduces the number of potential deviations I need to consider for an
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equilibrium with information acquisition to exist, and its detailed role is explained in the
proof of the next proposition. Because it has no qualitative e¤ect on the remaining ndings,
I assume that it holds in the remainder of this study.
Proposition 6 There is a non-empty set (c; c) such that for any c 2 (c; c) an equilibrium
with information acquisition exists if and only if  2 [
c
; c], where [c; c]  (0; ):
I provide a complete description of the existence of an equilibrium with information ac-
quisition in the proof, in which the cut-o¤ values c, c, 
c
and c are identied. Nevertheless,
the nding is more interesting if the acquisition cost c is in the range (c; c). In this scenario,
reputational concern actually has a non-monotonic e¤ect on the aligned experts information
acquisition incentive: he acquires better information if and only if his reputational concern
is moderate. If the aligned expert intends to reveal his information truthfully (at least with
positive probabilities), the informativeness e¤ect is larger if better information is acquired.
Intuitively, analogous to the reason for  < , truthful revelation of information based on
more accurate signals can induce the decision maker to take better actions and to form more
precise beliefs. However, if the reputational concern is too low, this larger informativeness
e¤ect caused by information acquisition is not enough to cover the acquisition cost, which
implies that the aligned experts incentive to acquire better information is restricted. Con-
versely, if the reputational concern is too high, the aligned expert knows that he will send
message m = 0 to exploit the large reputation e¤ect, regardless of what the signal is. Thus,
better information is worthless to him. Only if the reputational concern is in the moderate
range may the informativeness e¤ect from the information acquisition outweigh both the
acquisition cost and the reputation e¤ect. This establishes the result in the proposition.
One property worth mentioning is the complementarity between the information acqui-
sition and the information revelation. Lemma 5 demonstrates that information may be
acquired only if the information is not totally neglected, the proof of Proposition 6 further
shows that the aligned experts incentive to acquire information is strongest if he aims to
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reveal the better information honestly without any distortion. Thus, in this communication
game the better the ex post usage of information, the more information is acquired ex ante.
Abstracting from the detailed setups, most of the existing studies on reputation games
show that an individuals reputational concern has a monotonic e¤ect on his/her behavior.
Specically, with an increase in the reputational concern, this e¤ect is either "good" in the
sense that the individuals attempt to push an agenda unfavored by the other players is
mitigated (e.g., Joel Sobel (1985), Benabou and Laroque (1992) and Wei Li (2010)), or
"bad" in the sense that the individuals attempt to push such an agenda is intensied (e.g.,
Morris (2001), Ely and Valimaki (2003) and Ely, Fudenberg and Levine (2008)). The novel
nding of the non-monotonic e¤ect in this paper combines these two branches and enables
us to understand the relationship between an individuals reputational concern and his/her
behavior in a more subtle way.
2.4.3 Welfare analysis
The existence of the biased type of expert introduces information/action distortions in
the studies on both good reputation games and bad reputation games. From the viewpoint of
welfare, the decision makers payo¤ is unambiguously lowered in these papers. An interesting
question that arises here is whether the decision maker may actually benet from the possible
existence of a biased expert if information is endogenously acquired. I address the welfare
analysis in this subsection.
One of the well-known properties in the literature on cheap talk games is the multiplicity
of equilibria, which may complicate the welfare comparison among di¤erent scenarios.26 To
avoid such a problem, I restrict my attention to the most informative equilibrium, which is
formally dened as follows.
26For instance, if a babbling equilibrium in scenario X is compared with an informative equilibrium
in scenario Y , it is highly possible that the decision maker prefers the latter scenario. Conversely, if an
informative equilibrium in scenario X is compared with a babbling equilibrium in scenario Y , the decision
maker may prefer the former scenario.
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Denition 5 An informative equilibrium f; g is a most informative equilibrium (MIE),
if there is no other equilibrium f0; 0g such that 0A  A, x0A  xA, w0A  wA, y0A  yA,
z0A  zA on the equilibrium paths and if at least one of the inequalities is strict.
Intuitively, an equilibrium is most informative if there is no other equilibrium in which
the aligned expert acquires and truthfully conveys more information. Apparently, if A =
yA = z

A = 1 in an equilibrium, the amount of information being acquired and transmitted
is maximized. In this case, this equilibrium is a most informative equilibrium. Using this
denition, I derive the following result.
Proposition 7 Suppose c 2 (c; c]. Compared with the non-existence of the biased type, the
decision makers most informative equilibrium payo¤ is improved by the existence of the
biased type if  2 [
c
; c] and  2 (; 1).
I dene  in the proof and can verify that 0 <  < 1. The aligned experts reputational
concern plays two roles in this communication game. It may cause the aligned expert to dis-
tort his information transmission for the sake of the reputation e¤ect, but it may also induce
him to acquire better information for the sake of the informativeness e¤ect. If it is commonly
known that the expert is aligned, the reputation e¤ect vanishes, while the informativeness
e¤ect may be limited if the acquisition cost is relatively large and no information is thus
acquired. If the expert can be biased, the role played by the aligned experts reputational
concern becomes crucial to the decision makers payo¤. On the one hand, the biased type of
expert always distorts the information conveyed in this game. More importantly, according
to Proposition 5, the aligned experts reputational concern may further cause him to produce
an endogenous distortion. The combination of these two distortions could be seen as a cost
of the existence of the biased type. On the other hand, Proposition 6 states that even if
acquisition cost c is in the range (c; c], better information may be acquired in this game if
the decision maker is uncertain about the experts type. This could be seen as a benet of
the existence of the biased type. The result in Proposition 7 shows that from the decision
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makers perspective, the net e¤ect of these cost and benet may be positive if the aligned
experts reputational concern is in the information acquisition zone and if the possibility of
an expert being biased is relatively negligible.
The potential welfare-increasing e¤ect induced by the existence of the biased type di¤ers
substantially from the results in the aforementioned papers and may contribute some general
insights that extend beyond the detailed setup considered in the current study. For instance,
in many environments, even though the decision makers (or the relevant individuals) have
the abilities to learn the types of the experts (or the other individuals) perfectly before the
interactions unfold, they may strategically keep their uncertainty about the types to better
motivate the experts.
2.5 Delegation
Instead of eliciting relevant information through communication and taking actions by
themselves, the decision makers may delegate their decision rights to the experts in many
organizations. For example, government o¢ cials make regular decisions on behalf of the
public, and shareholders grant signicant discretion to company managers. Moreover, to
further limit the agency costs, the decision makers can optimally restrict the expertsdecision
sets, as frequently seen in real life cases in which regulated rms are permitted to set prices
only below some price caps. In this section, I address how the playersdecisions and payo¤s
may be a¤ected by delegation.
The timing of the delegation game proceeds as follows. At the beginning of the game,
the decision maker announces a delegation set A  [0; 1]. Afterwards, the nature state  is
realized, and the expert decides whether better information should be acquired. Information
acquisition increases the accuracy of the signal in the same manner described previously.
Then the expert receives a signal s and takes an action a from the delegation set. Finally,
the decision maker learns the nature state and forms posterior beliefs about the experts
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type.
A natural modication of the biased experts role is to assume that he always takes the
largest permissible action from the delegation set. Apparently, under this assumption, the
biased expert never acquires information in any equilibrium. For the aligned expert and
the decision maker, the strategies and equilibria are dened similarly to those in section 2.3
except that the decision makers belief updating system (ja; ) now depends on the action
a taken by the expert instead of the message m sent by him. I consider both unrestricted
delegation and restricted delegation in this study. Delegation is unrestricted if the delegation
set is A = [0; 1], and delegation is restricted if the delegation set is A = [a; a] in which the
decision maker determines whether a > 0 or a < 1. The latter case captures the widespread
usage of price caps or wage oors in many regulated organizations.27
A direct result in this delegation game is as follows.
Corollary 1 Regardless of whether the delegation set is unrestricted or restricted, the aligned
experts reputational gain is constant in equilibrium.
The intuition for this result is that, if the expert is granted the decision rights, the aligned
expert now can separate from the biased expert by taking the payo¤-relevant actions instead
of sending messages. More importantly, because the delegation set is always a continuum,
this separation is perfect. Thus, the aligned expert always earns the largest reputational gain
under delegation. This property implies that under delegation, the reputation e¤ect vanishes,
and the aligned expert only trades o¤ between the acquisition cost and the informativeness
e¤ect with respect to the current gain if he decides to acquire information. I characterize
the technical results of this delegation game in the next lemma.
27Generally, the decision maker could employ other forms of restrictions on delegation, such as veto-based
delegation (e.g., Tymoy Mylovanov (2008)). Alternatively, because the signal space is binary in my setup,
the decision maker may directly design a two-element action set for the expert to choose from. However,
this sort of restriction may be too strong for real-world observations, especially for situations in which the
action a to be taken is approximately equal to, for example, the amount of optimal investment, tax rate or
price. Hence, in this study, my focus on a weaker restriction such that the decision maker can only decide
the ceiling and oor of the delegation set.
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Lemma 6 (1) If the delegation set is unrestricted, the aligned expert acquires better infor-
mation if and only if c  cu.
(2) If the delegation set is optimally restricted, the aligned expert acquires better infor-
mation if and only if c  cr. The optimally restricted delegation set is A = [0; a0] if c > cr
and is A = [0; a1] if c  cr.
The cut-o¤ values are also denoted in the proof. Compared with unrestricted delegation,
a top-down restriction on the delegation set benets the decision maker in that the action
distortion introduced by the biased type is mitigated. However, the cost of this restriction
is twofold: (i) the action (i.e., p0 or p1) maximizing the aligned experts current payo¤ (and
thus the decision makers payo¤ in case she knows that the expert is aligned) after the signal
s = 1 may become unavailable; and (ii) because of the e¤ect in (i), the aligned experts
incentive to acquire information may be reduced. The decision maker optimally trades o¤
these benet and cost, which results in the equilibrium outcomes characterized in (2).
Importantly, because cr < cu for any  < 1, the property in (ii) actually occurs if
c 2 (cr; cu], which implies that, compared with the unrestricted delegation, the optimally
restricted delegation reduces the aligned experts incentive to acquire better information.
Dezso Szalay (2005) shows that the agent (in his paper) may have a stronger motivation to
collect socially valuable information if his action choices are optimally restricted, and Hao Li
(2001) derives a similar result within a group decision framework. My result complements
these ndings regarding the understanding of how an individuals information acquisition
incentive may be a¤ected by the design of the optimal action choices.
I also obtain the following result.
Corollary 2 Compared with communication, delegation (whether unrestricted or restricted)
may reduce the aligned experts incentive to acquire better information.
A widely accepted principle proposed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) states that if the
decision rights are delegated to the individual who has access to the relevant information
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about the nature state, he is always more motivated to acquire better information than
he would be under communication. Intuitively, if the individual can determine the usage
of the information ex post, his demand for better information increases ex ante. In this
study, I provide a counter-example to this principle, which is depicted in Corollary 2. Under
communication, if the aligned expert intends to convey his information truthfully, the high
accuracy of the signals also benets his reputation-building e¤orts, which enable him to
acquire more costly information in some equilibria. In contrast, under delegation, the aligned
expert only acquires less costly information in equilibrium because the reputational gain is
constant. However, because the aligned experts reputational concern may also destroy his
acquisition incentive, as I emphasized in the communication game, a general comparison
between the communication and the delegation is more ambiguous.
Proposition 8 The decision maker strictly prefers communication with the most informa-
tive equilibrium to the optimally restricted delegation if and only if c 2 (cr; c] and  2 [c; c].
From the decision makers perspective, whether her decision rights should be delegated
depends on the role played by the aligned experts reputational concern under communi-
cation. Particularly, if the aligned expert acquires better information and the acquisition
cost is covered by the increase in both current gain and reputational gain under commu-
nication, delegation actually reduces the aligned experts information acquisition incentive,
which causes the decision maker to obtain a lower payo¤. Although Wouter Dessein (2002)
claims that the decision maker always prefers delegation to communication whenever an in-
formative equilibrium exists under communication (with the leading example in Crawford
and Sobel (1982)), my result in Proposition 8 is relatively biased towards communication.28
If I further assume that   0,29 the result in Proposition 5 can be enhanced such that the
28If I only compare communication with unrestricted delegation, which is the main focus in Dessein (2002),
then the decision maker will prefer communication to a larger extent. Moreover, If  < 1=(2  4p1(1  p1)),
the decision makers payo¤ under unrestricted delegation is lower than  1=4 because of the action distortion
introduced by the biased expert. In this scenario, the decision maker always prefers communication to
unrestricted delegation because any of her equilibrium payo¤s under communication is no lower than  1=4.
290 is dened in the proof of Proposition 2.
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decision maker prefers communication with the most informative equilibrium to delegation
whenever informative equilibrium exists under communication.30 Nevertheless, because the
detailed setup in my paper substantially di¤ers from that of Dessein (2002), my nding here
should be viewed as a complement to his result.
2.6 Conclusions
A common property of many organizations is that experts are incentivized by their rep-
utational concerns instead of explicit monetary payments. In this paper, I study how these
concerns may inuence the expertsattempts to acquire information, which few studies on
reputation games have examined. My main insight shows that for proper information ac-
quisition cost, the aligned expert acquires better information if and only if his reputational
concern is moderate. Another insight is that, although the only role played by the biased
experts is to distort information transmission, the existence of this type of expert may actu-
ally improve the decision makers payo¤. Additionally, I also examine the potential e¤ects
of delegation on the playersdecisions and show that the decision maker prefers communica-
tion to delegation whenever informative communication with information acquisition exists.
These novel ndings enable us to obtain a better understanding of the possible consequences
of an individuals desire to build a reputation.
One potential extension of this paper is to generalize the e¤ort and signal accuracy levels.
For instance, consider an e¤ort cost function c(p) that satises c(1=2) = 0, c(1) = +1, c0 > 0
and c00 > 0. I expect that the qualitative results in my paper will be unchanged with this cost
function. However, the aligned experts optimal acquisition e¤ort may increase and decrease
more smoothly if his reputational concern increases. In this case, the optimal acquisition
30  0 holds if p0(p1+(1 ))(p0+(1 ))  
(1 p0)
((1 p1)+(1 ))((1 p0)+(1 ))  0, which is true if p0 is not
too close to 1=2. If   0 (although it is not necessary) and if an informative equilibrium exists, then I
can verify that the aligned expert always tells the truth without any distortions in the most information
equilibrium. With this property, the decision maker always weakly prefers communication to delegation, and
this preference is strict in some scenarios (e.g., if c 2 (cr; c] and  2 [c; c]).
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e¤ort better justies the non-monotonic e¤ect derived in this paper.
Another extension is to allow the biased expert to be strategic and also have reputational
concerns. For instance, let him have a payo¤ function a + B()   ec, in which  > 0 is
a weight attached to the action taken by the decision maker and B  0 is his reputational
concern with appearing aligned. If the ratio =B is su¢ ciently large, which implies that the
biased expert is mainly interested in inducing a higher action instead of building a reputation,
I can expect my main ndings to remain true. However, if this ratio is relatively small, new
issues may arise. Intuitively, with an increase in the biased experts reputational concern,
the aligned expert will nd it more di¢ cult to benet from the reputational gain. This
increased di¢ culty may cause him to reduce information acquisition but may also cause him
to reduce information distortion, and the net e¤ect would be highly ambiguous. A potentially
meaningful result is that the decision makers payo¤ may be reduced if the biased expert
becomes more concerned about his reputation.
Finally, I may let the expert be a long-run player who interacts with a sequence of short-
run players and thus endogenize the experts reputational concern. I leave these extensions
for future studies.
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Appendix A: A general description of the decision makers optimal actions and posterior
beliefs.
In this appendix, I rst relax my restrictions on the experts strategies and provide a
complete description of the decision makers equilibrium behaviors in the last stage of the
communication game. Particularly, I assume here that the biased expert is also strategic.
Thus, a strategy B of the biased expert also consists of ve probabilities, and each proba-
bility has the same meaning as the one in the aligned experts strategy A. Moreover, the
expert may also use mixed strategy on his information acquisition decision.
For i 2 fA;Bg, let
Pri(m = 1j = 1) = i[p1yi + (1  p1)(1  zi)] + (1  i)[p0xi + (1  p0)(1  wi)];
Pri(m = 1j = 0) = i[(1  p1)yi + p1(1  zi)] + (1  i)[(1  p0)xi + p0(1  wi)];
Pri(m = 0j = 0) = i[p1zi + (1  p1)(1  yi)] + (1  i)[p0wi + (1  p0)(1  xi)];
Pri(m = 0j = 1) = i[(1  p1)zi + p1(1  yi)] + (1  i)[(1  p0)wi + p0(1  xi)]:
Given the strategies A and B, from the perspective of the decision maker, if the state
is  = k, then the expected probability that the type i of expert will send a message m = l
is Pri(m = lj = k), where k, l 2 f0; 1g. Thus, I have the optimal action am as follows:
a1 =
PrA(m=1j=1)+(1 ) PrB(m=1j=1)
PrA(m=1j=1)+(1 ) PrB(m=1j=1)+PrA(m=1j=0)+(1 ) PrB(m=1j=0) ;
a0 =
PrA(m=0j=1)+(1 ) PrB(m=0j=1)
PrA(m=0j=1)+(1 ) PrB(m=0j=1)+PrA(m=0j=0)+(1 ) PrB(m=0j=0) :
Also, I have the equilibrium belief (jm; ) as follows:
(j1; 1) = PrA(m=1j=1)
PrA(m=1j=1)+(1 ) PrB(m=1j=1) ;
(j1; 0) = PrA(m=1j=0)
PrA(m=1j=0)+(1 ) PrB(m=1j=0) ;
(j0; 0) = PrA(m=0j=0)
PrA(m=0j=0)+(1 ) PrB(m=0j=0) ;
(j0; 1) = PrA(m=0j=1)
PrA(m=0j=1)+(1 ) PrB(m=0j=1) :
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In the main equilibrium analysis, the biased expert is assumed to be non-strategic in a
way such that he does not acquire better information and always sends the message m = 1.
In this case, the optimal actions and posterior beliefs can be modied with the terms B = 0,
wB = 0 and xB = 1.
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Appendix B: Proofs.
The proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. First suppose that there exists an informative equilibrium in which A = 0. So the
accuracy of the signal is p0.
With the assumption that the biased expert does not acquire better information and
always sends the message m = 1, if in this equilibrium a1 > a

0, I can verify that 
(j0; 0) =
(j0; 1) = 1, (j1; 0)  , (j1; 1)  , and 1  p0  a0 < a1  p0 for any equilibrium
strategies xA and w

A. Consider the case that the aligned expert has a signal s = 0. By
sending message m = 1, his payo¤, which is denoted by v1, is
v1 =  p0(a1   0)2   (1  p0)(a1   1)2 + [p0(j1; 0) + (1  p0)(j1; 1)]:
While by sending message m = 0, his payo¤, which is denoted by v0, is
v0 =  p0(a0   0)2   (1  p0)(a0   1)2 + :
This is because that from the expectation of the aligned expert, the nature state is  = 0
with probability p0 and is  = 1 with probability 1 p0. Given the conditions derived above,
I have v0 > v1, which implies that in this equilibrium the aligned expert should send message
m = 0 with probability one if his signal is s = 0.
Conversely, if in this equilibrium a1 < a

0, I have 
(j0; 0) = (j0; 1) = 1, (j1; 0) 
, (j1; 1)  , and 1   p0  a1 < a0  p0 for any equilibrium strategies xA and wA.
Consider the case that the aligned expert has a signal s = 1. By sending message m = 1,
his payo¤, which is denoted by u1, is
u1 =  p0(a1   1)2   (1  p0)(a1   0)2 + [p0(j1; 1) + (1  p0)(j1; 0)]:
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While by sending message m = 0, his payo¤, which is denoted by u0, is
u0 =  p0(a0   1)2   (1  p0)(a0   0)2 + :
Similarly, I have u0 > u1, which implies that in this equilibrium the aligned expert should
send message m = 1 with probability zero when his signal is s = 1.
Modifying this argument slightly, I can show that the statement also holds if A = 1 in
this informative equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. Suppose there exists an informative equilibrium in which a1 < a

0. Let this
equilibrium be denoted by the strategy prole  = (A; 

DM) and belief updating sys-
tem (jm; ). Consider another strategy prole 0 = (0A; 0DM) such that 0A = A,
x0A = 1 wA, w0A = 1  xA, y0A = 1  zA, z0A = 1  yA, a01 = 1  a1, a00 = 1  a0, and another
belief updating system 0(jm; ) such that 0(j0; 0) = 0(j0; 1) = 1, 0(j1; 0) = (j1; 1),
0(j1; 1) = (j1; 0). I need to show that this strategy prole 0 and belief updating system
0 also consist of an equilibrium.
First, notice that given the aligned experts strategy 0A, the new belief updating system
0(jm; ) satises the Bayesrule and the decision makers strategy 0DM is her best response.
To see this, I take 0(j1; 0) as an example. Suppose in the original equilibrium f; g I
have A = 0. With the result in Lemma 3, I have x

A = 0 and
(j1; 1) = (1  p0)(1  w

A)
(1  p0)(1  wA)+ (1  )
.
Given the strategy 0A, for the belief 
0(j1; 0) to follow the Bayesrule, it is su¢ cient and
necessary to have the equation
0(j1; 0) = [(1  p0)x
0
A + p0(1  w0A)]
[(1  p0)x0A + p0(1  w0A)] + (1  )
: (1)
88
Since I construct the strategy prole 0 in a way such that 0(j1; 0) = (j1; 1), x0A = 1 wA
and w0A = 1   xA, the equation of (1) actually holds. Thus, the belief 0(j1; 0) follows the
Bayesrule. Similarly, I can verify that the construction of the other beliefs also follows the
Bayesrule and the decision makers actions to take are optimal.
Second, notice that given the decision makers strategy 0DM and belief updating system
0(jm; ), the aligned experts strategy 0A is his best response. To see this, I consider a
potential deviation as an example. Suppose A = 0 in the original equilibrium. By the
informativeness of this equilibrium and the result in Lemma 3, it is necessary that wA < 1
and xA = 0. If the aligned expert has a signal s = 0, the inequality
 p0(a1   0)2   (1  p0)(a1   1)2 + [p0(j1; 0) + (1  p0)(j1; 1)] (2)
  p0(a0   0)2   (1  p0)(a0   1)2 + 
holds because the requirement of equilibrium behaviors; that is, the aligned expert has a
(weakly) larger payo¤ by sending message m = 1 than by sending message m = 0. Now,
given the new strategy prole 0 and belief updating system 0, I need to show that if the
aligned expert has a signal s = 1, he (weakly) prefers to sending messagem = 1 than sending
message m = 0 because of x0A = 1  wA > 0. That is, I need the inequality
 p0(a01   1)2   (1  p0)(a01   0)2 + [p00(j1; 1) + (1  p0)0(j1; 0)] (3)
  p0(a00   1)2   (1  p0)(a00   0)2 + 
to hold. By the construction of 0 and 0, the inequality of (3) actually holds whenever the
inequality of (2) holds. Similarly, by considering all the possible deviations, I can show that
if the aligned expert has no incentive to deviate from his strategy A in the pair of 
 and ,
he has no incentive to deviate from his strategy 0A in the pair of 
0 and 0, which establishes
the optimality of his strategy 0A.
So the strategy prole 0 = (0A; 
0
DM) and belief updating system 
0(jm; ) also consist
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of an informative equilibrium. Especially, in this equilibrium a01 > a
0
0.
The proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists a non-informative equilibrium with a1 = a

0 = 1=2
in which the aligned expert acquires better information. Notice that the aligned experts
payo¤ in this equilibrium is bounded above by  1=4+ c, in which  represents the largest
reputational gain by separating from the biased type perfectly. However, given the decision
makers strategy, if the aligned expert deviates to e¤ort e = 0 and always sends message
m = 0, his deviation payo¤ is  1=4+, which is larger than  1=4+  c. A contradiction.
Thus, if in an equilibrium the aligned type acquires better information, this equilibrium is
necessarily informative.
The proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. First suppose that on the equilibrium path A = 1. By the lemmas above, if the








Also, her posterior beliefs are
(j0; 0) = 1 and (j1; 0) = (1 p1)yA
(1 p1)yA+(1 ) ;
(j0; 1) = 1 and (j1; 1) = p1yA
p1yA+(1 ) :
I summarize some useful properties here, which could be easily veried.






















For the equilibrium to be informative, it is necessary that yA > 0, so the aligned expert
tells truth with positive probability when his signal is s = 1. My work here is to check when
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this condition holds in equilibrium.
Consider the case that s = 1. From the view of the aligned expert, with probability p1
the state is  = 1 and with probability 1   p1 the state is  = 0. Let v0 be his payo¤ by
sending m = 0, I have
v0 =  p1(a0   1)2   (1  p1)(a0   0)2 +   c;
and let v1 be his payo¤ by sending m = 1, I have
v1 =  p1(a1   1)2   (1  p1)(a1   0)2 + [p1(j1; 1) + (1  p1)(j1; 0)]  c:
Notice that for any a0 2 [1   p1; 1=2], @v0=@a0 > 0. Together with @a0=@yA < 0 derived in
Remark 1, v0 is decreasing in yA and is minimized at yA = 1: Dene this value as v0(1), I
have
v0(1) =  p31   (1  p1)3 +   c:
Similarly, I can show that for any a1 2 [1=2; p1], v1 is increasing in yA and is maximized at
yA = 1: Dene this value as v1(1), I have






p1+ (1  ) +
(1  p1)2
(1  p1)+ (1  ) ] c:
Given the cut-o¤ value , it is easy to show that if   , I have v1(1)  v0(1), so sending
messagem = 1 with probability one could be the aligned experts equilibrium behavior when
his signal is s = 1, or say, yA = 1. On the other hand, if  > , sending m = 0 always results
the aligned expert with a payo¤ larger than the payo¤ by sending m = 1, so in this case the
equilibrium can not be informative.
However, notice that if  < , yA = 1 is not the only choice for an equilibrium to be
informative. Specically, there exists a y0A() 2 (0; 1) satisfying v1(y0A())  v0(y0A()) = 0,31
31Abuse the notations slightly, I use y0A() as a function of , and use v1() and v0() as functions of y0A().
91
which means that there is another candidate for an equilibrium to be informative such that
the aligned expert randomizes between the two messages after observing a signal s = 1. Also
notice that @y0A()= > 0. This is because if the reputational concern increases, the aligned
expert has stronger incentive to send message m = 0 after observing the signal s = 1 to
earn the reputational gain by perfectly separating from the biased type. To counteract this
incentive, it is necessary to increase his current payo¤ if he sends m = 1 and reduce this
payo¤ if he sends m = 0, which could be done by increasing y0A.
Now suppose that on the equilibrium path A = 0. Change the notations correspond-
ingly and repeat the proof derived above, I can show that for the existence of informative
equilibrium, it is necessary that   .
The proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. By Lemma 5 I know that if in an equilibrium the aligned expert acquires better
information, this equilibrium must be informative. Also, by Proposition 5 I know that if in
an informative equilibrium there is information acquisition, it is necessary that   . So
in this proof I focus my attention on  2 [0; ].
I rst assume that there exists an informative equilibrium with information acquisition,
and derive the decision makers optimal responses. After that I characterize the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for this equilibrium to hold.









and her equilibrium posterior beliefs follow:
(j0; 0) = 1 and (j1; 0) = (1 p1)yA
(1 p1)yA+(1 ) ;
(j0; 1) = 1 and (j1; 1) = p1yA
p1yA+(1 ) :
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Because of the informativeness of this equilibrium, I have yA > 0. With these actions and




f p1(a0   0)2   (1  p1)(a0   1)2 + g+
1
2
f p1(a1   1)2   (1  p1)(a1   0)2
+[p1
(j1; 1) + (1  p1)(j1; 0)]g   c:
The term in the rst fg is the aligned experts expected payo¤ if he observes a signal s = 0,
and the term in the second fg is his expected payo¤ if he observes a signal s = 1. Now I
consider this experts possible deviations.
Case 1: Deviating to e = 0 and revealing his information truthfully. Let D1 be his








f p0(a1   1)2   (1  p0)(a1   0)2 + [p0(j1; 1) + (1  p0)(j1; 0)]g:




f (a0   0)2   (a0   1)2g+ :




f (a1   0)2   (a1   1)2g+
1
2
f(j1; 1) + (j1; 0)g:








f p0(a0   1)2   (1  p0)(a0   0)2 + g:
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I derive some useful properties here, which could be easily veried.
















Notice that for any yA > 0, D4 < D1 holds, so I can ignore case 4. Moreover, with the
assumption that 2p1 + 1   4p0  0, D3  D1 holds, so I can also ignore case 3.32 If the
aligned expert deviates to e = 0 and uses mixed strategy in the information transmission
stage, his deviation payo¤ is bounded above by maxfD1; D2g, so without loss of generality,
I only need to consider the rst two deviations.
By Proposition 5, I know that there are two scenarios to consider: (1) yA = 1: (2)
yA 2 (0; 1) such that the aligned expert is indi¤erent between sending m = 0 and sending
m = 1 after observing the signal s = 1. I derive the existence conditions separately for these
two scenarios.
Scenario 1: yA = 1:
For notational simplicity, I continue to use a0, a

1, 
(j1; 0) and (j1; 1) in the analysis
of this scenario. But remember that all of them should be modied to incorporate the value





c = (p1   p0)(a1   a0);
c = (p1   p0)(a1   a0) + 
0
2
(p1   p0)((j1; 1)  (j1; 0)):
With , which could be represented as  = (2p1 a

0 a1)(a1 a0)
1 p1(j1;1) (1 p1)(j1;0) in this scenario, I have
the properties such that 0 < c < c and 0 < 0 < . Besides, the slopes of these payo¤s






. When  = 0, D1 = D2 holds. So D1 > D2 for
 < 0 and D1 < D2 for  > 0.
32Here is the only reason I want to introduce the assumption. If 2p1 +1  4p0 > 0, there is a 0 such that
for any  < 0, there exists a  such that D3 > D1 for  < . In this scenario, I need to modify the proof
and compare EUA with D3. This complicates the notations, but has no e¤ect on the qualitative results.
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Compare EUA with maxfD1; D2g. If c > c, I have EUA < maxfD1; D2g for any ,
which implies that the aligned expert always has incentive to deviate, so this informative
equilibrium with information acquisition does not exist. If c  c, there exists a c 2 [0; ]
such that for any   c, I have EUA  D2, and there exists a c 2 [0; 0] such that for
any   
c
, I have EUA  D1. This implies that for any  2 [c; c] this informative
equilibrium with information acquisition exists. Specically, I have
c =
(2p1 a0 a1)(a1 a0) 2c





> 0 if and only if c > c.
Scenario 2: yA 2 (0; 1) such that the aligned expert is indi¤erent between sending m = 0




c = (p1   p0)(a1   a0);
c = (p1   p0)(a1   a0) + e2 (p1   p0)((j1; 1)  (j1; 0)):
in which a0, a

1, 
(j1; 0) and (j1; 1) now should be modied to incorporate the equilib-
rium value yA 2 (0; 1).
By a similar argument, it could be shown that for c > c, this informative equilibrium
with information acquisition does not hold; and for c  c, there exists a 
c
2 [0; e] and a
c 2 [e; ] such that this informative equilibrium with information acquisition holds if and
only if  2 [
c






Now compare these two scenarios. Given the properties I derived in Remark 1 and 2, I
have c < c and for any c  c, [
c
; c]  [c; c] (if c 2 (c; c], let [c; c] be dened by the
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empty set). This implies that for the existence of equilibrium with information acquisition,
the condition derived in scenario 1 is su¢ cient and necessary.
The proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. Let
 =
1 + 4p0(p0   1)
1 + 2p0(p0   1) + 2p1(p1   1) :
If it is commonly certain that the expert is aligned, that is,  = 1, the aligned experts
reputational gain is always , no matter what his decisions on information acquisition and
transmission are. Modify the proof of Proposition 6 slightly, I can show that if c 2 (c; c], the
most informative equilibrium is the one in which the aligned expert does not acquire better




A = 1. In this
equilibrium, the decision makers payo¤ is E = p0(p0   1).
Consider  < 1. By the proof of Proposition 6, I know that if  2 [
c
; c] for any
c 2 (c; c], the most informative equilibrium is the one in which the aligned expert acquires




A = 1. In this
equilibrium, the decision makers payo¤ is E =   1 2(2 ) + 2 p1(p1   1):
For  2 (; 1), I have   1 
2(2 )+

2 p1(p1 1) > p0(p0 1). Thus, if c 2 (c; c], the decision
makers most informative equilibrium payo¤ is improved by the existence of the biased type
if  2 [
c
; c] and  2 (; 1):
The proof of Corollary 1.
Proof. If  = 0, apparently (ja; ) = 0 for any equilibrium action a and belief formation
(ja; ). So in this case the aligned experts reputational gain is constant.
If  > 0, x the accuracy p of the signal and let a(s) 2 A denes the action that
maximizes the experts current gain when his signal is s 2 f0; 1g, that is,
a(s) 2 argmax
a2A
f p(a  s)2   (1  p)(a  1 + s)2g:
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Denote ba as the largest element in A, so the biased expert always takes ba. If a(s) 6= ba for
the signal s 2 f0; 1g, taking a(s) when the signal is s maximizes the aligned experts current
gain, and separates him from the biased type perfectly thus maximizes his reputational gain.
In these scenarios, a(s) is taken in equilibrium and the aligned experts reputational gain
is constant, that is, . If a(s) = ba for the signal s 2 f0; 1g, taking ba causes a reputational
lose for the aligned expert because of (jba; )   for any . Instead, there exists an  > 0
such that for any  2 (0; ], if the aligned expert takes ba  , then again he can separate from
the biased type perfectly and have
 p((ba  )  s)2   (1  p)((ba  )  1 + s)2 + 
>  p(ba  s)2   (1  p)(ba  1 + s)2 + ;
which implies that the loss on the current gain by taking action ba   is outweighed by the
increased benet on the reputational gain. So in these scenarios the aligned experts also
separates from the biased type perfectly, and his reputational gain is constant.
The proof of Lemma 6.
Proof. I denote the cuto¤ values rst. Let
a0 =
1 +p0
2  and a1 =
1 +p1
2  :
I have a1 > a0. Also let





2( 2)2 if   2p0 1p1+p0 1
1
2
(p1   p0)(p1 + p0 + 2p1 22  ) if  < 2p0 1p1+p0 1
:
If the delegation set is unrestricted, then the set is A = [0; 1]. By Corollary 1, the aligned
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experts reputational gain is . I consider the limiting payo¤s that ! 0 if a(s) = ba in the
remainder of this paper. Now consider the aligned experts information acquisition decision.
If better information is acquired, he takes a = p1 if the signal is s = 1 and takes a = 1  p1
if the signal is s = 0. Thus his expected payo¤ is p1(p1   1) +    c in this case. If better
information is not acquired, he takes a = p0 if the signal is s = 1 and takes a = 1   p0 if
the signal is s = 0. Thus his expected payo¤ is p0(p0  1) +  in this case. Comparing these
two cases, the aligned expert acquires better information if and only if c  cu.












in which p is the accuracy of the signal, a  a is the optimal action taken by the aligned
expert if his signal is s = 0, and a  a is the optimal action taken by the aligned expert
is his signal is s = 1. It can be easily veried that let a = 0 is (weakly) optimal for the
decision maker because it can induce the aligned expert to take action a = 1 p if his signal
is s = 0. Thus, in the optimally restricted delegation set, the oor could be a = 0.
On the other hand, a = a should hold in equilibrium. If it is not, which means that given
a and p the aligned experts optimal action a  1=2 is lower than a after observing a signal
s = 1, the decision maker can further lower a to reduce the action distortion introduced by
the biased type. Thus, I only need to consider a = a in equilibrium. First Order Condition
of the decision makers problem shows that a = (1    + p)=(2   ). So, if the decision
maker can expect that the aligned expert acquires better information, then a should be a1,
otherwise it is a0.
Now suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which a = a1 and the aligned expert
acquires information. I need to derive the conditions for this equilibrium to hold. In this




p1(p1   1) + 1
2
[ p1(a1   1)2   (1  p1)(a1   0)2] +   c.
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If he deviates to e = 0, then after signal s = 0 he takes action 1   p0, while after signal
s = 1 he takes action p0 if p0  a1 and takes action a if p0 > a1. Thus, two cases should be
considered.
Case 1:   2p0 1
p1+p0 1 . In the case I have p0  a1 and so after the deviation the aligned
expert takes action p0 if his signal is s = 1. His deviation payo¤ is
D1 = p0(p0   1) + :
If c  cr, the payo¤ EUA is larger than D1, so the equilibrium actually exists.
Case 2:  < 2p0 1
p1+p0 1 . In this case I have p0 > a1 and so after the deviation the aligned




p0(p0   1) + 1
2
[ p0(a1   1)2   (1  p0)(a1   0)2] + .
Similarly, if c  cr, the payo¤ EUA is larger than D2, so the equilibrium also exists in this
case.
The proof of Corollary 2.
Proof. Suppose c  c and  2 [
c
; c]; so under communication, there is information
acquisition in the most informative equilibrium.
Notice that c = 1
2  (2p1   1) (p1   p0) and both c and c converge to 12 (2p1   1) (p1   p0)
if ! 0, which would be less than cu = (p1   p0)(p1 + p0   1). But if ! 1, c converges to
(2p1   1) (p1   p0), which is larger than cu. So there is a b such that if  > b, compared with
communication, unrestricted delegation reduces the aligned experts information acquisition
incentive.
On the other hand, I have c > cr for any . So compared with communication, optimally
restricted delegation always reduces the aligned experts information acquisition incentive.
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The proof of Proposition 8.
Proof. Notice that cr < c. By Proposition 6, if c 2 (cr; c] and  2 [c; c], there exists
an informative equilibrium with information acquisition. Thus, the most informative equi-
librium is the one in which the aligned expert acquires better information and reveals his
information truthfully. In this equilibrium, the decision makers payo¤ is





1   p1): (4)
On the other hand, given c > cr, the optimally restricted delegation set is [0; a0] and there is
no information acquisition under this delegation. So in this equilibrium the decision makers
payo¤ is





0   p0). (5)
Apparently, the payo¤ of (4) is strictly larger than the payo¤ of (5) if p1 > p0 > 1=2. So if
c 2 (cr; c] and  2 [c; c], the decision maker strictly prefers communication with the most
informative equilibrium to the optimally restricted delegation.
Conversely, suppose c =2 (cr; c] or  =2 [c; c] (if [c; c] does not exist, let it be dened
by the empty set). If c = cr and  2 [c; c], then the decision makers most informative
equilibrium payo¤ under communication is still the payo¤ of (4). However, under the opti-
mally restricted delegation, the aligned expert acquires better information and the decision
makers payo¤ is also the payo¤ of (4). So in this scenario, the decision maker is indi¤erent
between communication and the optimally restricted delegation.
If c =2 [cr; c] or  =2 [c; c], there is no informative equilibrium with information acqui-
sition under communication. Thus, in this scenario the decision makers largest payo¤ is
the payo¤ of (5), which is obtained in the equilibrium in which the aligned expert does not
acquire better information, but he reveals his information truthfully. However, under the
optimally restricted delegation, the decision makers payo¤ is either the payo¤ of (4) or the
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payo¤ of (5). So with these parameter ranges, the decision maker weakly prefers the opti-
mally restricted delegation to the communication. Together with all the analysis, c 2 (cr; c]
and  2 [
c
; c] are both su¢ cient and necessary for the decision maker to strictly prefer
communication with the most informative equilibrium to the optimally restricted delegation.
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Chapter 3 Learning, Belief Manipulation and Optimal Relation-
ship Termination
3.1 Introduction
I study a dynamic environment in which a principal owns a project with initially unknown
quality and an agent is employed repeatedly to implement this project. The project can be
either good or bad. In each period, if e¤ort is exerted by the agent, a good project succeeds,
and thereby produces a positive return, with higher probability than a bad project does.
However, if the agent shirks, then the project is certain to fail independent of its type, which
results in a zero return. Because of the unobservability of the agents e¤ort, any reward or
punishment provided by the principal needs to be performance based. The purpose of this
paper aims to examine the equilibrium resolution of the quality uncertainty as well as the
optimal provision of incentives in the absence of long-term contracts.
The key feature in this principal-agent relationship is that the agents hidden action can
generate hidden information. For instance, if the agent deviates to shirk when he is believe
to put in e¤ort, the playersassessments about the project quality diverge in the event of
a failure: the principal is more pessimistic than the agent is. Because of the nature of
the project that a success generated by a bad project is more costly and thereby should
be rewarded more, such a belief-misalignment enables the agent to extract informational
rents from the continuation interactions. In consequence, the principal needs to provide
high powered incentives to induce the agents proper actions, either by monetary transfers
or other instruments. I rst show that, if only monetary payments are feasible, the agents
attempts on belief manipulation, correspondingly his informational rents, increase in his own
assessment about the project quality.
This paper investigates how the principal can counteract the agents belief manipulation
incentive by introducing relationship termination; that is, an instrument other than mon-
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etary payments. From the viewpoint of the principal, terminating the relationship in the
event of a failure has two opposing e¤ects. On one side, it destroys the surplus that the
principal can obtain from a relationship continuation. On the other side, by reducing the
agents continuation payo¤ to zero, it e¤ectively weakens the agents incentive to extract
informational rents by inducing a belief misalignment. In consequence, whether relationship
termination should be introduced in a spot contract depends on the principals trade-o¤
between these two e¤ects. My main nding is that, in equilibrium, the principals optimal
provision of incentives contains relationship termination if and only if her belief about the
project quality is above a threshold. In other words, relationship termination is more likely
to happen when the expected relationship value is relatively high. Notice that in this en-
vironment the instrument of relationship termination is a substitute to the instrument of
monetary payments: the principal optimally chooses relationship termination even when
monetary payments are able to provide all the incentives.
The principals optimal rule of relationship termination has several implications on the
agency cost as well as on the relationship dynamics. First, in equilibrium the agents infor-
mational rent is non-monotonic in the common belief about the project quality: it increases
when the belief is below the threshold but drops to zero when the belief is above the thresh-
old. Second, a failure after a series of successes is more intolerable, in the sense that more
likely to trigger the relationship termination, than a failure after a series of failures is. Fi-
nally, if the prior probability of the project being good is lower than the threshold, then
there is a cut-o¤ time such that the relationship is stable before this time but is subject to
potential termination after this time.
In many circumstances the principals ability to make monetary payments is limited. For
instance, a governments expenditure may not exceed its scal budget in a particular time
period. In this paper I also examine how such a limitation has e¤ects on the principals
contractual arrangements. A key factor is that the principal must resort to relationship ter-
mination more frequently in the events of failures if she can not reward the agent su¢ ciently
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in the events of successes. I show that one periods limitation on payments may give rise to
a backward-transmitting e¤ect on the principals provision of incentives: if the agent expects
that he is more likely to be motivated by punishment instead of reward in the future, he has
stronger attempt to deviate to capture the informational rents today. In consequence, the
principal has to provide stronger incentive today, which may cause a new limitation on mon-
etary payments. Notice that relationship termination serves as a complement to monetary
payments in this environment.
3.2 Literature
My paper is related to the growing literature on career concerns initiated by Holmstrom
(1999). Holmstrom (1999) studies a model in which an agents talent is revealed over time
through observations of performance, and examines how this agents concern for a career may
have benecial or detrimental e¤ects on his decisions. Bonatti and Horner (2012) develop
a model similar to Holmstrom (1999), except that the agents e¤ort is complementary to
his talent. They show that the equilibrium e¤ort levels at di¤erent times are strategic
substitutes and the dynamics of e¤ort is single-peaked over time. Klein and Mylovanov
(2012) consider a reputational cheap talk model and investigate the conditions for an agents
career concerns to overwhelm any myopic incentives to distort his actions and reports. In
all these papers, the agents compensation is determined by the competitive market instead
of any explicit output-contingent contracts. Alternatively, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and
Meyer and Vickers (1997) incorporate explicit contracts in the context of career concern
models and explore the interactions between implicit incentives and explicit incentives. Prat
and Jovanovic (2012) consider a model in which both the agent and the principal can fully
commit to a long-term contract. They show that incentives become easier to provide as the
uncertainty about the agents quality is gradually resolved.
Among this literature, my study is most closely related to Bhaskar (2012). In a model
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with a nite time horizon, Bhaskar (2012) shows that the agents attempt to manipulate the
principals belief becomes stronger when the time horizon lengthens. I complement his result
by showing that, with an innite time horizon, the agents incentive on belief manipulation
increases when his own belief is more optimistic. Most importantly, I show that the principal
can e¤ectively reduce the dynamic agency cost by introducing relationship termination as
a substitute to monetary transfers, which is absent in Bhaskar (2012) as well as in the
aforementioned papers.
My study is also related to the literature on strategical experimentation. Bergemann
and Hege (2005) and Horner and Samuelson (2012) develop venture capital nancing models
that mainly di¤er in the allocation of the bargaining power between the principal and the
agent. They show that equilibrium nancing stops too early compared to the socially e¢ -
cient stopping time. In a sequential testing context without nancing, Gerardi and Maestri
(2012) investigate the optimal long-term contracts for the principal to induce the agents
information acquisition and truth reporting. I share the similarity with these papers that
the quality of the project is learned over time and the agents hidden action may generate
hidden information. However, because in these papers at most one success can be achieved
or reported, the structures of incentive provision are quite di¤erent.
Finally, my study is related to the papers on dynamic moral hazard and dynamic adverse
selection, especially to the rachet e¤ect discussed in La¤ont and Tirole (1988). La¤ont
and Tirole (1988) show that in a repeated agency problem the rachet e¤ect leads too much
pooling of the agents choices in the beginning of the relationship. My main departure is
that, in my model, the agent has to learn his own type gradually and thereby his incentive
to manipulate the principals belief varies over time.
3.3 The model
Consider a dynamic game in which time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, :::,1. There
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are two players: a principal (P or she) and an agent (A or he). The principal owns a project
with initially unknown quality. The project is good with prior probability 0 2 (0; 1) and is
bad with prior probability 1   0. The agent is hired to implement the project repeatedly
and in each period he can either work or shirk. If the agent works, a good project succeeds
with certainty whereas a bad project only succeeds with probability p 2 (0; 1). If the agent
shirks, then the project fails for sure no matter what the type it is. A success generates a
return R > 0 to the principal, but a failure only generates a return 0. Both of the players
are risk neutral and share a common discount factor  2 (0; 1).
I consider a particular circumstance in which the players can not commit to long-term
contracts except that their agreements on relationship termination are credible. In period t,
if the relationship is still ongoing, the time structure is as follows. The principal maximizes
her expected payo¤ by providing a spot contract 't = fbSt ; bFt ; dSt ; dFt g to the agent, in which
bit is the monetary payment to the agent and d
i
t is the probability of relationship continuation
if the realized outcome is i 2 fS; Fg, where S indicates "success" and F indicates "failure".
Given the contract 't, the agent decides whether to accept or reject it, which is denoted
by at = 1 and at = 0 correspondingly. If he accepts the contract, then he further decides
whether to work, which is indexed by et = 1 and costs c > 0, or shirk, which is indexed
by et = 0 and costs 0. After that, an outcome i 2 fS; Fg is realized and payment bit is
delivered. With probability dit the relationship extends to the next period and with the
complementary probability 1   dit the game is ended. Both of the playersoutside option
values are normalized to be zero. In particular, the agent is protected by limited liability.
Thus, bit  0 for any i 2 fS; Fg. I assume that pR > c, which indicates that even a bad
project is socially valuable. The agents choice on working or shirking is unobservable to the
principal. In consequence, the principals contract proposal can only be contingent on the
realized outcomes.
The uncertainty about the project quality is resolved over time. An important feature in
this game is that the agents hidden action gives rise to hidden information and the players
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assessments about the quality may diverge. Let t be the principals belief, or the public




t + (1  t)p
and Ft = 0:
Thus, if the principal expects that the agent works in period t, after observing a success or
a failure, her posterior belief is represented by St or 
F
t respectively. In a similar manner, I
can dene the agents posterior beliefs by bSt and bFt corresponding to the realized outcomes.
I call a belief as a common belief when t = bt.
Contingent on the game has not been terminated, a public history ht summarizes all
the observable decisions and realized outcomes up to period t; that is, for i 2 fS; Fg, ht =
f'0; a0; i0; :::; 't 1; at 1; it 1g. In addition, the agent has a private history bht due to his unob-
servable choices on working and shirking; that is, bht = f'0; a0; e0; i0; :::; 't 1; at 1; et 1; it 1g.
Let Ht and bHt be the sets of all public and private histories. Thus, the evolution of the play-
ersposterior beliefs can be denoted by t := t(ht) and bt := bt(bht). I examine Markovian
Equilibrium in this study. A Markovian strategy of the principal species a contract 't in
period t that depends on the public belief t; that is, 't := '(t). A Markovian strategy
of the agent species actions at and et in period t that depend on the public belief t and
his private belief bt; that is, at := a(bt;t) and et := e(bt;t). A strategy prole and a
belief updating system consist of a Markovian Equilibrium if, given the other players strat-
egy, each players strategy maximizes his/her payo¤, and belief updating follows Bayesrule
whenever possible. I restrict my attention to the equilibria in which the agent only takes
pure actions on the equilibrium path. Notice that by this requirement, the playersbeliefs
necessarily coincide on the equilibrium path. In consequence, belief misalignment can occur
only when the agent deviates.
Because pR > c, the rst-best policy requires that the relationship continues forever and
the agent works in each period. Let S(t) be the expected surplus from the rst-best policy
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if the players has a common belief t in period t. Thus, I have
S(t) =
1
1   ((t + (1  t)p)R  c).
Alternatively, I demonstrate S(t) as the playersexpected relationship value, or rela-
tionship value for short. Notice that S(t) increases in t, which implies that the higher the
playerscommon assessment about the project quality is, the larger is the relationship value.
3.4 Sequential contracts without relationship termination
In this section, I consider the baseline model in which any agreement on relationship
termination is not credible; that is, it is commonly known that in each period the principal
can propose a new contract and the agent can choose to accept or reject. Thus, the principals
contract '(t) only species wage payments b
S(t) and b
F (t). I mainly address how the
agents belief about the project quality a¤ects his incentive to manipulate the principals
belief.
I start the analysis by arguing that, in any equilibrium, the agent participates and works
in each period. If there is an equilibrium in which the agent rejects the principals contract
proposal '(t) in period t at a common belief t, then no information is generated in this
period and the common beliefs follow t+1 = t. In consequence, the principal should o¤er
the same contract in period t+1, '(t+1) = '(t), and the agent should reject it. Recursively,
there is no working, thus no positive surplus to share, starting from period t. However, if
the principal deviates to a contract proposal e'(t) in period t with ebS(t) = c=p +  andebF (t) = 0, where  > 0 but is arbitrarily small, the agent should accept it and works, which
gives both players positive payo¤s. This establishes my argument.
Let V (bt;t) be the agents equilibrium payo¤ depending on his private belief bt and the
principals belief t. In period t, the equilibrium contract '(t) has to satisfy the agents
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incentive comparability constraint, which is given by
V (t;t) = (t + (1  t)p)(bS(t) + V (St ;St ))
+(1  t   (1  t)p)(bF (t) + V (0; 0))  c
 bF (t) + V (t; 0): (IC-1)
Notice that on the equilibrium path the playersbeliefs coincide. If the agent works in period
t, with probability t+(1 t)p the project succeeds, the agent obtains current wage payment




t ); with probability 1 t (1 t)p
the project fails, the agent obtains current payment bF (t) and his discounted continuation
value is V (0; 0). If the agent shirks, the project fails for sure, and his current wage payment
is bF (t). Most importantly, because the agents shirking is an unobservable deviation in
equilibrium, the principal believes that the project is bad with certainty in the event of a
failure, whereas the agents private belief is unchanged, bt+1 = bt = t. Thus, the agents
discounted continuation payo¤ is represented by V (t; 0) when he shirks.
Moreover, the equilibrium contract '(t) also needs to satisfy the agents individual
rationality constraint
V (t;t)  0; (IR-1)
and the limited liability constraint
bS(t), b
F (t)  0: (LL-1)
Let (t) be the principals equilibrium payo¤ depending on her belief t. In period t,
the principals problem is
(t) = max
'(t)
(t+(1 t)p)(R  bS(t)+ (St ))+ (1 t  (1 t)p)(0  bF (t)+ (0))
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s:t: (IC-1), (IR-1), (LL-1). (P-1)
Because of limited liability, the agent can guarantee a non-negative payo¤ in any equi-
librium by shirking in each period; that is, V (bt;t)  0 for any bt and t. As a result, I
can omit the constraint (IR-1). If in period t the common belief is t = 0, then the problem
degenerates to a repeated moral hazard problem thereafter. By standard argument, I can
show that the principal provides a stationary contract '(0) = fc=p; 0g in each period   t
and captures all surplus. Thus, I have
(0) =
pR  c
1   ; and V (0; 0) = 0:
These ndings help to characterize the agents payo¤ V (t;t).
Lemma 7 Without relationship termination, in equilibrium the constraint (IC-1) satises
V (t;t) = V (t; 0) =
(1  p)c
(1  )p t: (1)
The proofs of the results are relegated in the appendix. This result shows that the
agent can earn informational rents in equilibrium because of his ability to manipulate the
principals beliefs. Intuitively, if the principal infers that the project is bad with certainty
after observing a failure, she would propose a stationary contract '(0) = fc=p; 0g in any
period thereafter, which provides the most promising reward on successes. By manipulating
the principals inference strategically, the agent obtains positive payo¤s in the event that the
project is actually good. In addition, the more optimistic the agent himself is, the stronger
is his attempt on belief manipulation, which could be seen from the fact that V (t; 0) is an
increasing function of t:
I proceed to solve for the wage payment bS(t) in the equilibrium condition (1), which
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can be expanded as
V (t;t) = (t + (1  t)p)(bS(t) + V (St ;St ))  c =
(1  p)c
(1  )p t.
Replace V (St ;
S
t ) recursively I obtain
bS(t) =
c
t + (1  t)p
+
(1  p)ct
p(t + (1  t)p)
: (2)
If the project is implemented only once with common belief t, the principals equilib-
rium contract is given by '(t) = fb(t); 0g with b(t) = c=(t + (1   t)p), which induces
the agents working but leaves him no rent. In contrast, in my dynamic setup with repeated
project implementation, to counteract the agents attempt on belief manipulation, the prin-
cipal needs to provide a wage premium in the event of a success; that is, bS(t) in (2) satises
bS(t) > b(t). Moreover, due to the fact that the agents manipulation attempt increases
in t, the principals expected wage payment (t + (1  t)p)bS(t) also increases in t:
With the characterization of the equilibrium contract, the principals equilibrium payo¤
is given by
(t) = (t + (1  t)p)(R  bS(t) + (St )) + (1  t   (1  t)p)(0):
Plug in bS(t) and expand (
S
t ) recursively, I have
(t) =
(t + (1  t)p)R  c
1    
(1  p)c
(1  )p t: (3)
Notice that this payo¤ is actually the di¤erence between the social surplus S(t) and the
agents rents V (t;t). I summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 Without relationship termination, the principals equilibrium contract '(t)
115
is given by
bF (t) = 0 and b
S(t) =
c
t + (1  t)p
+
(1  p)ct
p(t + (1  t)p)
;
and the playersequilibrium payo¤s are given by
V (t;t) =
(1  p)c
(1  )p t and (t) =




In this section, the principal can only resort to monetary transfers to induce working
from the agent, and I show that the agent obtains substantial rents by his ability to create
a belief misalignment. I address the e¤ects on the playersactions and payo¤s when the
principal can introduce socially ine¢ cient relationship termination in the next section.
3.5 Sequential contracts with relationship termination
In many real-world companies the wage contracts mostly are subject to renegotiation,
however, it is less likely to see that a red employee may be re-hired by the same employer.
In this section I consider the circumstance that the players agreements on relationship
termination are credible. As a result, in addition to the wage payments bS(t) and b
F (t), the
principals contract proposal '(t) also species the probabilities of relationship continuation,
dS(t) and d
F (t), contingent on the outcomes. I examine the optimality for the principal
to introduce relationship termination.
Slightly modify the argument presented in the previous section, I can show that in equi-
librium the agent accepts the principals contract and works in each period as long as the
relationship is ongoing. In consequence, the equilibrium contract '(t) proposed in period t
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satises the agents incentive comparability constraint
V (t;t) = (t + (1  t)p)(bS(t) + dS(t)V (St ;St ))
+(1  t)(1  p)(bF (t) + dF (t)V (0; 0))  c
 bF (t) + dF (t)V (t; 0): (IC-2)
The implications of this constraint are similar to the ones of constraint (IC-1), except that
here the continuation probabilities are incorporated. Moreover, '(t) also satises the agents
individual rationality constraint
V (t;t)  0; (IR-2)
the limited liability constraint
bS(t), b
F (t)  0; (LL-2)
and the feasibility constraint
dS(t), d
F (t) 2 [0; 1]: (Fe-2)
With a belief t in period t, the principals problem can be stated as
(t) = max
'(t)
(t + (1  t)p)(R  bS(t) + dS(t)(St ))
+(1  t)(1  p)(0  bF (t) + dF (t)(0))
s:t: (IC-2), (IR-2), (LL-2), (Fe-2): (P-2)
Again, the constraint (IR-2) could be ignored because of limited liability. If in period t the
principals belief is t = 0, I can verify that in equilibrium the principal o¤ers a stationary
contract fc=p; 0; 1; 1g starting from this period and the relationship is never terminated.
Thus, their payo¤s are given by (0) = (pR   c)=(1   ) and V (0; 0) = 0. With this
observation, I establish the following result.
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Lemma 8 With relationship termination, in equilibrium the constraint (IC-2) satises





Condition (4) states that dS(t) = 1, thereby in equilibrium it is never optimal to termi-
nate the relationship after a realized success. Intuitively, punishing the agent in the event of
a success by relationship termination can only induce him to shirk with higher probability,
which worsens the principals provision of incentives. Compared to condition (1) in Lemma
7, the crucial ingredient of condition (4) is that, in equilibrium, whether the agent can ob-
tain positive rents depends on whether the relationship termination would be triggered by a
failure; that is, what dF (t) is.
I proceed to the determination of dF (t). Dene
 =
p2R  pc
p2R  pc+ c .
It can be veried that  2 (0; 1). Replacing bS(t) in the principals problem (P-2) by
condition (4), I have the new problem as
(t) = max
'(t)
(t + (1  t)p)(R + (St ) + V (St ;St ))  c
+(1  t)(1  p)dF (t)(0)  dF (t)V (t; 0)
subject to (LL-2) and (Fe-2). A direct observation is that the relationship continuation
probability dF (t) has no e¤ect on (
S




t ), so I only need to examine the
last two terms. On the equilibrium path of play, a failure reveals the project quality (being
bad) perfectly and the principals continuation payo¤ is uniquely determined by (0) if
the relationship is maintained. In consequence, at the beginning of period t, if the principal
intends to continue the relationship in the event of a failure, her expected payo¤ from this
event is (1 t)(1 p)(0), which decreases in t. However, such a relationship continuation
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enables the agent to obtain informational rents V (t; 0) by belief manipulation, which
increases in t, and the principal has to pay a wage premium to counteract the agents
belief manipulation incentive. The principal trades o¤ between these two opposing e¤ects
in determining the optimal rule of relationship termination and in equilibrium she follows a
cut-o¤ strategy as
dF (t) = 1 if t   , V (t; 0)  (1  t)(1  p)(0);
dF (t) = 0 if t > 
 , V (t; 0) > (1  t)(1  p)(0):
(5)
This optimal rule of relationship termination gives rise to the following insight.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium, socially ine¢ cient relationship termination is introduced in the
contracts if and only if when the relationship value is relatively high.
Recall that the playersrelationship value S(t) strictly increases in t, thereby t > 
 is
equivalent to S(t) > S(
). Intuitively, when the principal is su¢ ciently optimistic about
the project quality, terminating the relationship in the event of a failure only leads to a
negligible loss of future surplus on expectation, but it can reduce the informational rents
captured by the agent substantially. Conversely, when the principal is extremely pessimistic
about the project quality, relationship termination after a failure causes a substantial loss
of future surplus on expectation, but can only save a few rents captured by the agent. As a
result, relationship termination is introduced by the principal if and only if she is optimistic




1 + p    .
In other words, if t = , then 
S
t = 
. With the condition (4) shown in Lemma 8 and the
optimal rule of relationship termination in (5), the principals equilibrium wage payments in
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the events of successes and the agents informational rents are given by
bS(t) =
c








t+(1 t)p and V (t;t) =
(1 p)c







t+(1 t)p and V (t;t) =
(1 p)c
(1 )p t if t  :
(6)
If t  , the wage payment bS(t) in (6) is the same to the one shown in (2), and the
determinant of it can be explained in a similar way. If t > 
, the wage payment bS(t) in
(6) is the same to b(t) shown in the previous section, which is because that now the agent
can not benet from belief manipulation.
The interesting case is the wage payment bS(t) in (6) when  < t  . For any
common belief t from the set (; 
], I have St > 
 and Ft = 0. In either case, the
agents equilibrium rent in the continuation game starting from period t + 1 is zero. In
consequence, in period t the agent has the last chance to obtain positive rent V (t; 0) and
all rent should be paid in the wage payment bS(t) contingent on a success. In particular,
if  is su¢ ciently large, such a wage payment could be large enough to exceed the current
project return R. Also, if  > 1=2, then in this case bS(t) strictly increases in t.
Another insight can be deduced from the agents equilibrium rents.
Corollary 4 With optimal relationship termination, the agents incentive on belief manip-
ulation, as well as his equilibrium rent, is non-monotonic in t:
To see this, notice that with optimal relationship termination V (t;t) rst increases
then decreases (drops to zero) when t increases. This insight indicates that, from the
agents perspective, to start a project with a relatively pessimistic common assessment may
be more promising to him. In addition, since the agency cost of this principal-agent problem
is captured by V (t; 0) when t   and by (1   t)(1   p)(0) when t > , I also
have a non-monotonic relationship between the agency cost and the common belief t in
equilibrium.
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For any t 2 (0; ] in period t, let (t) 2 N be a number satisfy
t
t + (1  t)p(t) 1
  < t
t + (1  t)p(t)
:
The implication of (t) is that, if in period t the common belief is t 2 (0; ], it takes
at least (t) successes for the updated belief to be strictly larger than . For example, if
t 2 (; ], then (t) = 1. For notational simplicity, I also let (t) = 1 if t = 0. With
this denition, the principals equilibrium payo¤ (t) is given by
(t) =
(1  p)t + (1  )p
(1  )(1  p) (R  c)  c
if t > 
; and
(t) =
(1  p)t + (1  )p
(1  )(1  p) (R c) c+
(1  t)(1  p)(1  (p)(t))
(1  )(1  p) (pR c) 
(1  p)c
(1  )p t
if t  :33
I introduce the following result.
Proposition 10 If t > 0, the principals equilibrium payo¤ with optimal relationship ter-
mination is strictly larger than her equilibrium payo¤ without relationship termination; if
t = 0, her equilibrium payo¤s are the same in these two cases.
This result can be veried by directly comparing the principals equilibrium payo¤s with
and without relationship termination. I omit the detailed calculation here. Because relation-
ship termination is an instrument other than wage payments for the principal to incentivize
the agent and it is employed with positive probability when t > 0, it is quite intuitive that
33In the above analysis I assume the tie-breaking rule that if the principal is indi¤erent between relationship
termination and relationship continuation, she continues the relationship with probability one; that is, if
t = 
, then dF (t) = 1. Alternatively, if the principal terminates the relationship with positive probability
when she is indi¤erent, then the equilibrium values bS(), bS(), V (
; ) and () should be slightly
modied. However, all the other values are una¤ected. Because t = 
 is of measure zero, using this
tie-breaking rule is without loss of generality. I keep this assumption in the next section.
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the principals payo¤ can be improved if relationship termination is credible. Particularly,
in this circumstance relationship termination serves as a substitute to monetary payments:
the principal optimally employs relationship termination even monetary payments are able
to provide all the incentives.
Corollary 5 If 0  , the playersrelationship is stable in the rst (0)  1 periods, but
it may be subject to termination after these periods.
This insight describes the relationship dynamics. Intuitively, the rst (0)  1 periods of
the relationship can be interpreted as a "honey-moon" phase in which failures are tolerable in
the sense that no termination is required. In contrast, if the project quality is still uncertain
after this phase, failures become intolerable and termination is triggered in these events.
3.6 Extensions
I consider some extensions in this section. Specically, I investigate how the princi-
pals optimal provision of incentives is a¤ected if the principals ability to make a monetary
payment is limited, and if there is no limited liability on the agent.
3.6.1 Limited wage payments by the principal
In many circumstances a principals ability on wage payments is limited. For instance,
a governments feasible monetary transfer in a particular time period is constrained by its
scal budget, and a companys monetary payment is restricted by its borrowing ability.
In this subsection, I assume that in any period the principals maximal wage payment is
R and examine how this limitation has e¤ects on the players relationship interaction in
equilibrium.34










In the previous section I have show that, if no limitation on wage payments is exerted,
in equilibrium bS(t) < R for any t > 
 or t  , which could be seen from (6). If
bS(t)  R also holds for any  < t  , then exerting a payment limitation has no
e¤ect on the equilibrium contracts. For the analysis here to be non-trivial, I introduce the
following assumption.
Assumption 3: () > R:
The inequality holds when  is su¢ ciently large. With limited wage payments, the
constraint (LL-2) is modied as
0  bS(t), bF (t)  R: (LL-2)
In consequence, now the principals problem is
(t) = max
'(t)
(t + (1  t)p)(R  bS(t) + dS(t)(St ))
+(1  t)(1  p)(0  bF (t) + dF (t)(0))
s:t: (IC-2), (IR-2), (LL-2), (Fe-2): (P-2)
I have the following result.
Lemma 9 With limited wage payments and Assumption 3, in equilibrium there exists t 
 such that bS(t) = R and d
F (t) < 1.
Compared to the results in the previous section, Lemma 9 indicates that, if the principals
ability on wage payments is limited, relationship termination may arise in the contractual
arrangements even when the playersassessment about the project quality is relatively pes-
simistic. The intuitive reasoning is that, to incentivize the agent to work, the principal has to
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punish the agent more heavily in the events of failures if she can not reward him su¢ ciently
in the events of successes.
Since on the equilibrium path of play the playerscommon belief either goes up gradually
or drops to 0 and stays at it forever, without the limitation on payments there is at most
one periods wage that can exceed R, as I have seen in the previous section. Nevertheless, an
interesting implication is that exerting the limitation on payments can actually have longer
e¤ects on the principals provision of incentives.
To see this, consider a common belief t in period t such that 
S
t 2 (; ] and (St ) >
R. The proof of Lemma 9 shows that, if the belief is St in period t + 1, in equilibrium
the principals contract satises bS(St ) = R and d
F (St ) < 1, and the agents payo¤ is
V (St ;
S
t ) = (
S
t +(1 St )p)R c. In other words, the limitation on the principals payment
is binding and the relationship is terminated with positive probability in the event of a
failure. Now consider the belief t in period t. In equilibrium, the constraint (IC-2) can be
expressed by




If I have the further assumption that (t)  ((St +(1 St )p)R  c) > R (which holds if 
is su¢ ciently large), then the principals contract in period t should satisfy bS(t) = R and
dF (t) < 1. In consequence, in both periods t and t + 1 the principals wage payments can
be limited.
The reasoning goes as follows. Expecting that his continuation payo¤V (St ;
S
t ) in period
t+ 1 is lowered because of the principals limited ability to make a payment, the agent has
stronger attempt to shirk in period t when his belief is t. To counteract this attempt,
the principal needs to raise the wage payment bS(t) su¢ ciently, which may cause another
payment restriction in period t. With backward induction, the larger () is, the longer the
e¤ect that the payment limitation can have.
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From the principals perspective, there are two types of relationship termination if a
payment limitation is exerted. If  > , relationship termination continues to be a substitute
to wage payments. In contrast, if   , relationship termination becomes a complement
to wage payments because the latter is not enough to incentivize the agent fully.
3.6.2 No limited liability on the agent
In this subsection I examine how important the assumption on limited liability is to my
ndings in the previous sections. Although assuming that the agent can not be punished
by negative wage payments is quite reasonable in a variety of situations, in many others the
agent can actually bear such punishments. Without limited liability, if the common belief
in period t is t, the principals problem is described by
(t) = max
'(t)
(t + (1  t)p)(R  bS(t) + dS(t)(St ))
+(1  t)(1  p)(0  bF (t) + dF (t)(0))
s:t: (IC-2), (IR-2), (Fe-2): (P-2)
I have the following result.
Lemma 10 Without limited liability on the agent, (t) = S(t) is the principals equilib-
rium payo¤, and V (t;t) = 0 is the agents equilibrium payo¤. The relationship is never
terminated.
To see that this result holds, consider the following contractual arrangement proposed
by the principal in period t when the common belief is t:
dS(t) = d




and bF (t) = 0 if t = 0;
dS(t) = d








F (t) =   (1 p)c(1 )p if t > 0:
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With this contractual arrangement, I also have V (t; 0) = (1  p)ct=((1  )p). In period t,
if the agent shirks his deviation payo¤ satises bF (t) + V (t; 0)  0, while if he works his
payo¤ satises V (t;t) = 0. As a result, the agent has no incentive to shirk in this period.
Because both constraints (IR-2) and (FE-2) are satised, the above contractual arrangement
is an equilibrium arrangement, and the players payo¤s are given by (t) = S(t) and
V (t;t) = 0. Moreover, because this arrangement is always accepted by the agent and it
gives the principal all social surplus, in any equilibrium the playerspayo¤s should satisfy
(t) = S(t) and V (t;t) = 0, which establishes the result in Lemma 10.
In any period t with common belief t, the agents hidden action enables him to manipu-
late the principals belief and thereby earn informational rents in the continuation play of the
game. However, these informational rents are necessarily bounded above. Without limited
liability, by designing a contract that punishes the agent severely enough in the event of a
failure; that is, letting bF (t) be su¢ ciently negative, the principal can e¤ectively counteract
the agents attempt on belief manipulation. In consequence, the agents equilibrium payo¤
can be lowered to make the constraint (IR-2) be binding. Because no relationship termina-
tion is required, the principal captures all the relationship value in equilibrium. This result
illustrates how essential the assumption on limited liability is to my results in the previous
sections.
Without limited liability, an alternative way for the principal to capture social surplus
is to sell the project to the agent. Apparently, by making a take-it-or-leave it o¤er S(0)
in period 0, the principals payo¤ is maximized. However, if the ownership of the project
can not be changed freely, as is often the case, then my characterization of the contractual
arrangement above gives some insights for the principals provision of incentives.
3.7 Conclusions
In this paper I study a dynamic agency problem in which both the principal and agent
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learn about the project quality over time. Because of the unobservability of his choices on
working and shirking, the agent has the potential to manipulate the principals learning
process and thereby benet from the misalignment on beliefs. In particular, the agents at-
tempt on belief manipulation varies in his own learning process. I examine how the principal
can structure the optimal provision of incentives by a combination of monetary payments
and relationship termination and show that, in equilibrium, relationship termination is in-
troduced in the contracts only when the expected relationship value is relatively high. The
optimal rule of relationship termination also gives rise to some implications on the dynamics
of the agents informational rents, of the principals agency cost, as well as of the relationship
evolvement. In addition, I examine how the contractual arrangements may be a¤ected if the
principals ability to make wage payments is limited.
One potential extension of this study is to allow the principal (or both players) to have
long-term commitment power. In this circumstance, because the principal can not renew the
contract to incorporate the generated information, the agents attempt on belief manipulation
may be weakened. However, I expect that such an attempt would not vanish. The reason is,
since on average a success generated by a bad project should be compensated more, the agent
still can benet from a privately more optimistic belief about the project quality. Another
extension is to generalize the information structure in a way such that a good project can
only succeed with probability strictly between p and 1 when the agent works. As a result, the
playersposterior beliefs go down gradually in the events of failures. The challenge is that
in this circumstance the agents informational rents can not be explicitly formulated, which
makes the problem of the optimal trade-o¤ between monetary payments and relationship
termination to be more involved. However, I expect that my main insights continue to hold
even in this generalized setup.
In this paper I only consider the equilibria in which the agent uses pure strategy on the
equilibrium path of play. E¤ort can be put in to examine the existence of equilibria in which
the agent uses mixed strategy. In addition, there may also exist non-Markovian equilibria.
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I leave these questions for the future research.
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Appendix: proofs.
The proof of Lemma 7.
Proof. Notice that the equations hold when t = 0. In the remainder of this proof I consider
the case t > 0.
Step 1. bF (t) = 0 should hold in equilibrium, otherwise the principal can reduce
the payment in the event of a failure and strictly increase her payo¤ without violating any
constraint.
Step 2. V (t; 0) =
(1 p)c
(1 )pt. To see this, notice that if in period t the principal believes
that the project is bad with probability one, her belief remains at it forever no matter what
the agent acts. With this belief, her optimal strategy is to propose a stationary contract
'(0) = fc=p; 0g in each period   t, which maximizes her expected payo¤.
With any private belief b  0 in period   t, the agent should work with the contract
'(0), which is because the current payo¤ (b + (1  b )p)c=p  c by working is larger than
the current payo¤ 0 by shirking in period  , and this periods action has no e¤ect on the
contract provision in the future. Thus, with private belief bt = t, the agents payo¤V (t; 0)
is given by
V (t; 0) = (t + (1  t)p)(
c
p
+ V (St ; 0))
+(1  t   (1  t)p)(0 + V (0; 0))  c:
Abusing the notation slightly, dene a sequence (t; :::; t+l; :::) satisfying t+l+1 = 
S
t+l for
this step, the agents payo¤ V (t; 0) can be reformulated as













It can be veried that t=t+l = t + (1  t)pl, thus, I have
V (t; 0) =
(1  p)c
(1  )pt:
Step 3. If bS(t) > 0 in equilibrium, then V (t;t) = V (t; 0), otherwise the principal
can reduce the payment bS(t) in the event of a success and strictly increase her payo¤
without violating any constraint.
Step 4. In equilibrium, for any   0 in period   t, bS( ) > 0. Suppose not. First
consider the case that bS( ) = 0 for any   0 in period   t. But this simply implies that
V (t;t)  0 < V (t; 0), which contradicts the constraint (IC-1). Second consider the case
that bS( ) > 0 for some, but not all, beliefs  in equilibrium. Consider two consecutive
periods t+ l and t+ l + 1 satisfying bS(t+l) = 0 and b
S(St+l) > 0. By step 3, b
S(St+l) > 0
in period t+ l + 1 requires
V (St+l;
S
t+l) = V (
S
t+l; 0): (A1)
On the other hand, the constraint (IC-1) in period t+ l should satisfy




t+l)  V (St+l; 0) +
c
(t+l + (1  t+l)p)
> V (St+l; 0): (A2)
Clearly, (A1) contradicts to (A2). Thus, the second case can not be true.
The proof of Lemma 8.
Proof. The reasoning for (1) bF (t) = 0, (2) bS(t) > 0, (3) constraint (IC-2) is binding,
and (4) V (t; 0) = (1  p)c=((1  )p) is the same to the one shown in the proof of Lemma
7. The remainder of this proof is to show that dS(t) = 1; that is, the relationship should
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not be terminated in the event of a success.
Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which, for some public belief t, the equi-
librium probability dS(t) < 1. Consider a deviation by the principal such that edS(t) = 1
and other things unchanged. Clearly, all the constraints continue to hold. Because that




t ) > 0 is necessarily true in this equilibrium, if (
S
t ) > 0, then by such a
deviation, the principals payo¤ is strictly increased by an amount
(t + (1  t)p)(edS(t)  dS(t))(St ):




t ) > 0 and such a deviation strictly increases the agents payo¤
by an amount
(t + (1  t)p)(edS(t)  dS(t))V (St ;St ):
By reducing the wage payment bS(t) slightly, the principal can strictly increase her payo¤
without violating any constraint. Thus, in equilibrium dS(t) = 1:
The proof of Lemma 9.
Proof. Notice that a necessary condition for () > R is  > 1=2. In addition, if  > 1=2,
then () strictly increases in .
It can be veried that the result in Lemma 8 continues to hold even the principals
payment ability is limited. Thus, the incentive comparability constraint is




and the principals problem can be rearranged as
(t) = max
'(t)
(t + (1  t)p)(R + (St ) + V (St ;St ))  c
+(1  t)(1  p)dF (t)(0)  dF (t)V (t; 0)
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subject to (LL-2) and (Fe-2).
Step 1. Consider t > 
. It is straightforward to see that the principals equilibrium
contract satises dF (t) = 0 and b
S(t) = c=(t + (1  t)p). Thus, the limitation on wage
payments has no e¤ect on the playersbehaviors and payo¤s when t > 
.
Step 2. Consider t 2 (; ]. In this case, in equilibrium the principal chooses a
probability dF (t) as large as possible, which is because (1  t)(1  p)(0)  V (t; 0)  0
(the inequality is strict if t < 
). Since St > 
 and thereby V (St ;
S
t ) = 0, if the agents
works in period t his payo¤ V (t;t) in (A3) is bounded above by (t + (1  t)p)R  c. In
consequence, his deviation payo¤ by shirking should be no more than this value.
Suppose () < R. It can be veried that there is a  2 (; ) such that




((t + (1  t)p)R  c) < 1
for t 2 (; ], and
bS(t)  R and dF (t) = 1
for t 2 (; ]. As a result, because of the limitation on wage payments, the principal
has to terminate the relationship in the event of a failure with positive probability when
t 2 (; ].
Alternatively, suppose ()  R. It can be veried that for any t 2 (; ],
bS(t) = R and d
F (t) < 1
in equilibrium. Similarly, because of limited wage payments, the principal has to introduce
relationship termination in the contract proposal when t 2 (; ].
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Chapter 4 Multilateral Bargaining with an Endogenously De-
termined Procedure
4.1 Introduction
Conicts and negotiations are central issues in various real-world interactions, and their
signicance has been long recognized from both theoretical and practical standpoints. Since
Rubinstein (1982), the literature on alternative bargaining has deeply shaped our under-
standing of how conicts resolution may be a¤ected by the bargaining procedure, e.g., who
makes an o¤er earlier and who can make o¤ers at a higher frequency. However, most pa-
pers in this literature assume that the procedures are exogenously given and have paid little
attention to how these procedures are determined. With a particular bargaining game, this
paper aims to contribute to the literature by characterizing the endogeneity of bargaining
procedures and their e¤ects on equilibrium properties.
Specically, I consider a multilateral bargaining game in which a manager negotiates
with several workers sequentially, one at a time. When an agreement is reached by the
manager and a worker, one unit of surplus is realized and shared by this pair of players.
This negotiation process may also represent some other situations, for example, a company
renews employment contracts with its senior managers, a manufacturer vertically integrates
its component suppliers, or a country seeks to coordinate its international policies with those
of other countries.
A key feature of my setup is that the manager can choose any (remaining) worker to
bargain with, which implies that the ordering of her opponents to be at the bargaining
table is endogenously determined. This point is important, because if a worker acts too
aggressively, the manager can credibly threaten to move him backwards to the end of the
bargaining sequence and make him su¤er from the time-discounting cost. By doing so, she
can signicantly weaken this opponents bargaining posture. This hold-up e¤ect enables
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the manager to capture more rent from the total surplus, which is one of the main e¤ects
examined in this study.
Conversely, the workers can also hold up the manager and thus counteract her advantage
in endogenously determining the bargaining sequence. Although the units of surplus are
independent of one another and the manager can e¤ectively stop the bargaining game at
any time by making non-serious o¤ers and rejecting any o¤er, each player knows that all of
the agreements will be reached eventually in any equilibrium. This implies that during the
negotiation process, if several agreements remain, one period of delay will cost the manager
much more than a single worker, because the manager cares about the total units in the
continuation game instead of the single one over which she is currently bargaining. In
other words, the manager is relatively impatient, and this impatience enables the workers to
coordinate their moves and extract more surplus from the agreements.
The interaction of these two hold-up e¤ects results in the main properties of equilibrium
in my multilateral bargaining setup. First, I derive the multiplicity of equilibrium and show
that there is a set, which is represented by an interval, such that any value in this set could
be the managers equilibrium payo¤. Intuitively, if the workers follow the same strategy, the
manager is indi¤erent between any two of them to bargain with. By varying the probability
of retaining the current opponent and adjusting the o¤ers properly, I can construct an
equilibrium payo¤ set for the manager. Second, I address the ine¢ ciency of equilibrium. If a
player expects to be rewarded in the continuation game by acting aggressively in the current
period, her/his attempts to delay the agreements will increase, which will cause ine¢ cient
equilibria to arise. Moreover, I strengthen this nding by showing that the real-time delay of
equilibrium may not vanish even if the time interval between two o¤ers becomes arbitrarily
small.
To verify the robustness of the ndings described above, I extend the analysis to incor-
porate the asymmetry of workers. Specically, the surplus of each agreement di¤ers from
others. Although the workers may no longer be able to follow the same strategy, and the
136
manager must treat her opponents di¤erently, the hold-up e¤ects and equilibrium properties
naturally carry over to this setup as long as the degree of asymmetry is not excessive and
the players are relatively patient. However, if the asymmetry among the workers is substan-
tial or the discount factor is su¢ ciently small, the manager may strictly prefer to negotiate
with the workers by following a particular ordering, which results in a unique and e¢ cient
equilibrium.
4.2 Literature
In recent years, a growing number of studies have examined bargaining games in which a
long-run player negotiates with several short-run players in a sequential manner. In Hongbin
Cai (2000, 2003), because the ordering of the bargaining opponents is exogenously given, the
long-run player must move on to another short-run player if no agreement is reached with
the current one in a round. In a setup with one buyer and multiple sellers, several papers
partially endogenize the bargaining ordering by considering that the buyer pre-determines
a particular ordering of the sellers at the beginning of the game and sticks to it during
the negotiation process. These papers are primarily concerned with determining how the
optimal ordering may be a¤ected by the nature of the negotiations, which may be public or
private (see Noe and Wang (2004), and Krasteva and Yildirim (2010)), or by the degree of
asymmetry between the sellers (see Marx and Sha¤er (2007), Jun Xiao (2010), and Krasteva
and Yildirim (2011)). My model complements these papers by further endogenizing the
long-run players role in determining the ordering of her opponents. Specically, even during
the game process, in my model the long-run player can bargain with any remaining short-run
player without the restriction of a xed ordering.
My paper is most analogous to an independent work by Duozhe Li (2011), in which the
bargaining procedure is also endogenously determined. The models di¤er from each other
in the details. In Lis random proposer setup, the only unit of surplus is realized after all
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of the agreements have been reached, which implies that the agreements are perfectly com-
plementary. In contrast, in my deterministic but alternative proposer setup, the agreements
are independent because each worker individually contributes one unit of surplus. Most
importantly, Li mainly addresses how the ordering of reached agreements may be a¤ected
by various transfer schemes, contingent contracts or cash-o¤er contracts. In my setup, I
focus on the interactions of the double-sided hold-up e¤ects and characterize the equilibrium
payo¤ set of the manager.
The current paper is also related to an earlier work by Shaked and Sutton (1984). In
their paper a rm can choose to negotiate with any worker. However, given that only one
job opportunity is available and that the workers are perfectly substitutive, in equilibrium
the outside workers play no strategic roles in Shaked and Suttons model. Instead, the rm
only uses the outside workers to credibly threaten the inside workers bargaining power. In
contrast, in my model the strategic coordination of the workersactions is essential to all of
the main ndings.
Several other papers on bargaining with complete information also characterize the multi-
plicity and ine¢ ciency of equilibrium, e.g., Haller and Holden (1990), Fernandez and Glazer
(1991), Busch and Wen (1995). A common feature of these papers is that the playerspayo¤s
are determined not only by the shares accorded to each player in the event that an agreement
is reached but also by the normal form game played if the negotiation breaks down in the
current period. The additional normal form game contributes to the rise of multiplicity and
ine¢ ciency in these setups, which di¤ers from my setup in a crucial way.
4.3 The model
In my model, a manager (M or she) bargains sequentially with n workers to share n
units of surplus: one unit for each pair of the players M & i, in which i 2 N0 = f1; 2; :::; ng
represents a worker (he) and N0 denes the set of workers at the beginning of the game. I
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assume n  2. Let Nt be the set of the workers remaining in the continuation game starting
in period t. All of the players are risk-neutral and share a common discount factor  2 (0; 1).
A round of bargaining is denoted by an o¤er and a (potential) counter-o¤er. At the
beginning of each round, the manager chooses a worker i 2 Nt to be her bargaining opponent.
Worker i makes the rst o¤er. If the o¤er is accepted, the players receive their proposed
shares, worker i exits the game, and the manager moves on to the next round with a new
opponent j 2 Nt+1. If the o¤er is rejected, then the manager makes a counter-o¤er in the
next period to worker i. If this counter-o¤er is accepted, then the game moves forward in
the same manner as described above. Otherwise, at the beginning of the next round, the
manager chooses to bargain with a worker j 2 Nt+2. Importantly, j may or may not be
i. The ability to determine endogenously the ordering of bargaining opponents captures
the managers bargaining advantage, which is the main focus of the current model. The
game ends if the last agreement is reached. However, if the manager engages in perpetual
disagreements with some workers, the game lasts indenitely.35
The game considered in this study assumes complete and perfect information. A history
of this game summarizes all of the actions that have been taken in the past.36 A players
strategy is a function that species how she/he acts contingent upon the histories that have
been reached. By convention, the equilibrium in my setup refers to the notion of Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium, and an equilibrium outcome v0 = (vM0 ; (v
i
0)i2N0) describes each players
total payo¤measured in period t = 0. I use the realized ordering of agreements to index the
workers with numbers. For instance, v10 represents the payo¤ of the worker who reaches the
rst agreement with the manager, v20 represents the payo¤ of the worker who reaches the
second agreement, and so on until vn0 . Additionally, throughout the paper, an o¤er x 2 [0; 1]
35The structure of this bargaining round can be generalized to incorporate more bargaining frictions. For
instance, if the manager begins bargaining with a worker in period t, then depending on no agreement has
been reached between them, the rm may change her opponent only after T  2 periods have elapsed. To
capture the main intuitions, in this model I focus on the case with T = 2.
36There are three categories of histories: the histories at the beginning of period t, the histories before
the proposer makes an o¤er and the histories before the responder accepts/rejects the o¤er. Notice that the
rst two categories coincide with each other in Rubinsteins (1982) model, whereas in my model, they di¤er
in the periods during which the manager has an opportunity to choose her opponent.
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denoted in the players strategies in any period t refers to the share that the manager
receives in this period, regardless of whether the o¤er is made by the manager. Thus, if the
ith agreement with an o¤er xi is reached in period ti in an equilibrium, the manager and the




tixi and vi0 = 
ti(1  xi)
respectively. Besides, let vt = (vMt ; (v
i
t)i2Nt) represent the playersdiscounted payo¤s in the
continuation games starting in period t.
An equilibrium is ine¢ cient if delay exists in this equilibrium, which means that at least
one of the proposals is rejected on the equilibrium path and the nal agreement is reached
in period t  n.
In the remainder of this section, I present two preliminary results.
Lemma 11 In any equilibrium of this multilateral bargaining game, if the penultimate agree-
ment is reached in period t  1, then the last agreement is reached in period t with the o¤er
x = =(1 + ).
After the penultimate agreement has been reached, only one worker remains, and the
continuation game degenerates into the standard bilateral bargaining game introduced by
Rubinstein (1982). Thus, the result is immediate. To save notations, I omit the descriptions
of strategy proles and outcomes in the continuation games in which a maximum of only
one agreement can be reached.
Lemma 12 In any equilibrium of this multilateral bargaining game, no perpetual disagree-
ment exists between the manager and any worker.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there is an equilibrium in which for a subset N  N0, there is
perpetual disagreement between the manager and any worker i 2 N . Let t be the period
during which the manager reaches her last agreement with the workers in the set N0nN .
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Then in period t + 1, an o¤er with a share x 2 (0; 1) between the manager and any worker
i 2 N is protable for both parties. Hence, this o¤er should be accepted. A contradiction.
This result indicates that, although the manager has the advantage that she can endoge-
nously determine the bargaining procedure, this advantage is limited. More precisely, the
manager has the ability to temporarily leave aside a worker and bargain with the others rst.
However, she can not credibly threaten to leave aside this worker forever.37
4.4 Equilibrium analysis
I derive the main equilibrium properties in this section. I introduce some equilibria in
subsection 4.4.1 and highlight how the interaction of the two hold-up e¤ects results in the
multiplicity of equilibrium. In subsection 4.4.2, I explore the property of ine¢ ciency and
show that the delays in some equilibria may not vanish if the time interval between two o¤ers
converges to zero. Finally, in subsection 4.4.3, I show that the hold-up e¤ects and the main
properties carry over to the setup with asymmetric workers.
4.4.1 Multiplicity of equilibrium
The lemmas presented in the last section indicate that if n = 2, the agreements must
be reached in two consecutive periods in any equilibrium. Because of the time-discounting
between periods, the manager has strong attempt to nish all of the negotiations as quickly
as possible. However, this attempt actually enhances the workersbargaining powers. This
nding will be clearly shown by Example 1.
Example 1 An equilibrium with no worker-switching when n = 2.
37This lack of commitment power is a central feature of my setup that di¤erentiates our results from those
of Shaked and Suttons (1984) study.
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(1) If no agreement has been reached, worker i at the bargaining table makes an o¤er
x = =(1+ )2 and rejects any o¤er larger than y = (1+   3)=(1+ )2; the manager makes
an o¤er y, and rejects any o¤er less than x.
(2) If worker i rejects the managers o¤er in period t   1, he is re-chosen to be at the
bargaining table in period t.
The proofs of this example and of the remaining results are shown in the appendix. In this
equilibrium, the workersstrategies only depend on the maximum number of agreements to
be reached, and the manager is indi¤erent with regard to her opponents. Thus, retaining the
current opponent is a (weakly) best response. However, this no worker-switching property
enables the workers to coordinate their bargaining postures and act aggressively.
To demonstrate this point more clearly, I show that the equilibrium payo¤ vector is
v0 = ((+
2+3)=(1+)2; (1++2)=(1+)2; =(1+)). If  ! 1, then v0 ! (3=4; 3=4; 1=2).
Worker i, who signed the rst agreement in period t = 0, receives a payo¤ close to 3=4. In
Rubinsteins (1982) model, each player o¤ers 1=(1 + ) to himself/herself. However, in this
example before any agreement is reached, worker i o¤ers [1 + 2=(1 + )]=(1 + ) to himself
at the bargaining table, as the surplus is 1 + 2=(1 + ) instead of 1. The key is that the
additional term 2=(1 + ) is the discounted share that the manager can obtain from the
second agreement (in equilibrium). Expecting to be retained until the agreement is reached
enables worker i to internalize the managers payo¤ from the later agreement and to capture
more rent. In this manner, the workers can collectively hold up the manager.
The next example introduces the second hold-up e¤ect and shows how the manager may
benet from her ability to determine the bargaining ordering endogenously.
Example 2 An equilibrium with worker-switching when n = 2.
(1) If no agreement has been reached, worker i at the bargaining table makes an o¤er
w = =(1 + ) and rejects any o¤er larger than z = 1   2=(1 + ); the manager makes an
o¤er z and rejects any o¤er less than w.
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(2) If worker i rejects the managers o¤er in period t   1, he is re-chosen to be at the
bargaining table after the manager has bargained with worker j for one round.
Because the proof is quite similar to the proof of Example 1, it is omitted. Given the
workers strategies, in this example the manager is also indi¤erent with regard to which
worker she negotiates with. Thus, a (weakly) best response is to switch to the other op-
ponent. By properly adjusting each players proposal/acceptance rules, I can construct
a new equilibrium. The outcome of this equilibrium is e¢ cient, and the payo¤ vector is
v0 = (; 1=(1 + )1; =(1 + )). This nding more closely resembles Rubinsteins result; for
instance, each worker o¤ers 1=(1+ ) to himself. Whereas the manager in Example 1 is held
up by the workers, the manager in this case can threaten to switch to the other worker and
thereby weaken the bargaining power of the current one. These two e¤ects counteract each
other in this equilibrium, and for  ! 1, the payo¤ vector v0 ! (1; 1=2; 1=2).
The managers equilibrium payo¤s di¤er substantially from each other in these two ex-
amples. Another intuitive explanation is that in Example 1, before the rst agreement is
reached, one period of delay implies a loss 1   of the social surplus for worker i but a loss
1   2 of the total social surplus for the manager because the managers second agreement
is also postponed.38 These losses could be explained as the bargaining costs or the relative
impatience of each party. Intuitively, the party with the higher bargaining cost or impatience
has lower bargaining power in the negotiation process and earns lower shares from the agree-
ments. Conversely, in Example 2, before the rst agreement is reached, one period of delay
also implies a loss 1  2 of the social surplus for worker i if he rejects the managers o¤er,39
so the managers bargaining disadvantage in Example 1 vanishes. This nding explains why
the manager earns higher equilibrium payo¤ in Example 2 than the payo¤ in Example 1.
38In Example 1, since the worker i at the bargaining table is never replaced before the rst agreement,
from the worker is perspective, the value 1 of the agreement becomes  if it is delayed by one period, so the
loss of the value is 1   . However, from the managers perspective, the value 1 +  of the two agreements
becomes  + 2 if the rst agreement is delayed by one period, so the loss of the value is 1  2.
39In Example 2, if the worker i at the bargaining table rejects the managers o¤er in period t, he expects
that he will be re-chosen at the bargaining table in period t+ 2 (in equilibrium). From his perspective, the
value 1 of the agreement in period t will become 2 if he rejects the o¤er in the current period. So the loss
is 1  2 for such a rejection.
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These two examples show that multiple equilibria may arise if the manager has to nego-
tiate with several workers sequentially and if the ordering of her opponents is endogenously
determined. I extend this analysis to the general case with n  2 and show that there is a set,


















 ! 1. Accordingly, I produce the following proposition.
Proposition 11 For any value w 2 [W n;W n], there is an equilibrium in which the man-
agers payo¤ is w.
In the proof of this proposition, for w = W n, the equilibrium I construct is a natural
generalization of the equilibrium introduced in Example 1, and for w = W n, the equilibrium
I construct is a generalization of the equilibrium introduced in Example 2. To save notations
in the following analysis, I refer to these equilibria as the no worker-switching equilibrium
with n workers and the worker-switching equilibrium with n workers, respectively.
I claimed above that if the workers follow the same strategy, the manager is essentially
indi¤erent with regard to which worker she chooses to negotiate with. Not surprisingly, new
equilibria could be constructed if the retaining probability is between zero and one and if
the o¤ers are properly adjusted. I derive these equilibria explicitly in the proof and show
that any value between W n and W n could serve as the managers equilibrium payo¤.
Some other points are also worth mentioning. The set described here does not capture
all of the equilibrium payo¤s of the manager when n  2. In the next subsection, after
introducing the property of ine¢ ciency, I will demonstrate that the managers equilibrium
payo¤may actually exist outside of this set. Additionally, although the equilibrium concept
used here is SPE, the equilibria that I considered in the examples and in the proposition
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satisfy the denition of Markovian Perfect Equilibrium because all of the strategies only
depend on the payo¤-relevant information (i.e. the maximum number of agreements to be
reached). Thus, I can relax the assumption of information completeness and perfectness in a
way that the workers can only observe the number of peers who have left, which is a better
approximation of real-world situations.
4.4.2 Ine¢ ciency of equilibrium
In addition to the multiplicity of equilibrium, another widespread concern in the literature
is the e¢ ciency of the bargaining outcomes. This issue is of particular interest given that
delays are observed quite frequently in real-life bargaining processes. In this subsection, I
explore how the interaction of the managers ability to endogenize the bargaining ordering
and the workersabilities to coordinate their moves may give rise to ine¢ cient outcomes.
Consider the following example.
Example 3 An equilibrium with delay when n = 2.
Phase 1: there are 2T > 0 periods in this phase. In the lth period, where l 2 f1; 2; ; 2Tg,











manager switches to worker j 6= i in the l0th period, where l0 < 2T , then the strategy prole
of the no worker-switching equilibrium in Example 1 is played from this period onwards.
Phase 2: after Phase 1, the manager switches to worker j. The manager makes an o¤er
y = 2T+1(1   x) and rejects any o¤er less than x, whereas worker j makes an o¤er
x = +
3 2T+2(1+)
(1+)(1 2T+2) and rejects any o¤er larger than y
. If worker j rejects the managers
o¤er, then in the next period, the manager switches to worker i, and the game returns to
Phase 1.
If  and T satisfy the condition w1 + z1 > 1 and the game starts in Phase 1, the above
strategy prole consists of an equilibrium. Notice that given the non-serious o¤ers and
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acceptance rules in Phase 1, the rst agreement is reached in period t = 2T . As a result, there
is delay in equilibrium. In the proof of this example, I show that if the players are relatively
patient, the condition holds for some T . Thus, the existence of this type of equilibrium is
guaranteed.
Unlike the outcomes in Example 1 and 2, the worker who reaches the rst agreement
in this equilibrium has a lower payo¤ than the other worker, whereas the managers payo¤
w1+
2=(1+) is larger than the ones that she could obtain from those outcomes. Intuitively,
if the manager can endogenize the bargaining ordering to credibly delay her opponents
opportunity to make a counter-o¤er, she can weaken her opponents bargaining stance in
the current round and enlarge the share she can obtain. This process is reected by the
interaction in Phase 2. This strategy provides another way for the manager to hold up the
workers with her bargaining advantage. Delay arises in equilibrium if the rst worker at the
bargaining table plays relatively tough to avoid being the one who is most severely held up.
This process is reected by the interaction in Phase 1.
This equilibrium has a form that the rst agreement is reached in an even period, which
is the rst period for the worker who is involved in this agreement to be chosen at the
bargaining table. If n = 2, this is the only possible form for an equilibrium with delay. The
reason is that, if the rst agreement is reached between the manager and worker i in period
t > 0 in any other form, this pair of players must have met and bargained in some periods
before t. By deviating from and frontloading this o¤er (and implicitly the second agreement)
in those periods, all of the players strictly benet. This restriction shows that in a setup
with only two workers, the workers are rather competitive to each other, and their abilities
to hold up the manager collectively through ine¢ cient delay is quite limited. Nevertheless,
if there are more workers, other forms of delay may arise, and the workershold-up e¤ect
could become stronger, as shown by the next example.
Let  solve 1 +    3   4   5 = 0 and suppose that  > . I have  < 1.
Example 4 An equilibrium with delay when n = 3.
146
(1) If an agreement is reached in period t = 0, then the strategy prole in the no worker-
switching equilibrium with two workers is played in the continuation game starting in period
t = 1.
(2) If no agreement is reached in period t = 0, then the strategy prole in the worker-
switching equilibrium with three workers is played in the continuation game starting in period
t = 1.
(3) In period t = 0, worker i at the bargaining table makes an o¤er x  1   4=(1 + );
the manager rejects any o¤er less than y = ( + 2 + 3)=(1 + )2.
The rst agreement is reached in period t = 1 in this equilibrium. This example demon-
strates how the workers may exert another hold-up e¤ect on the manager through ine¢ cient
delays. The key of this hold-up e¤ect is that, to trigger an e¤ective punishment or reward
based on the managers behavior, multiple equilibria must exist in the continuation game.
This scenario is feasible only if at least two workers remain in the continuation game. If
n = 2, the continuation play after the rst agreement is uniquely determined. Thus, in this
case, whenever the manager has a chance to frontload the rst agreement, she will do so.
Conversely, if n > 2 and frontloading this agreement may cause the manager to be punished,
the managers attempt to do so will be restricted. The di¤erence between these two situa-
tions shows that the workers can generally coordinate themselves in a more exible manner
if their group is relatively larger.
Regarding the property of equilibrium ine¢ ciency, a widely considered problem is that
the ine¢ ciency may vanish if the real-time between two o¤ers converges to zero. For instance,
if the term "period" denotes a minute instead of a week or a month, the social cost of delay
in the above mentioned examples may be viewed as negligible. One of my main results shows
that equilibrium delay could be bounded away from zero even if the o¤ers are made within
arbitrarily close time frames. This nding is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Let  = exp( ), in which  denotes the real-time interval between two
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o¤ers, and  denotes the positive interest rate. In the multilateral bargaining game with
n  2, there may be an equilibrium with T periods of delay such that lim!0(T ) > 0.
I explicitly prove this proposition in the game with n = 3. First, I apply the same
logic used in Example 4 to show that when  increases, the possible periods of delay T
expands. The reason is, when the discounting cost is relatively small to the manager, the
equilibrium path on which the workers would coordinate in the continuation game becomes
more crucial to the managers current decisions. To avoid incurring potential punishment
from the workers, the manager may have to accept long periods of delay. Second, I solve for
the limiting case with  ! 1 (! 0) and show that the real-time delay may not disappear.
This proof can be easily modied to incorporate more workers. Intuitively, when the number
n increases, the managers payo¤di¤erence between the worker-switching and the no worker-
switching equilibria becomes larger, and it is possible to construct an equilibrium with even
longer periods of delay.
In the last subsection, I claimed that there is an interval in which any of the values
could be the managers equilibrium payo¤. However, this interval does not capture all of the
managers equilibrium payo¤s. For instance, I show that the managers equilibrium payo¤
in Example 3 is actually larger than . If ine¢ cient equilibria exist, the players may interact
with each other in more complicated ways. I establish the following result.
Lemma 13 In the multilateral bargaining game with n  2, there may be an equilibrium in
which the managers payo¤ is larger than W n and an equilibrium in which the managers
payo¤ is less than W n.
Consider a game with n = 3. Notice that in Example 4, the managers payo¤ is (1  
3)=(1 2), which is exactly the same as her payo¤ in the worker-switching equilibrium with
three workers. However, because of the social cost of delay, the workerspayo¤s in Example
4 are lower than those in the corresponding worker-switching equilibrium. This nding
shows that the manager enjoys a relative bargaining advantage in such an equilibrium with
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delay. By threatening to switch to this ine¢ cient equilibrium in the continuation game if
no agreement is reached in the rst several periods of the game, the manager can further
weaken the workersbargaining postures and increase her payo¤. Using this logic, I clearly
construct an equilibrium in the proof and show that the managers payo¤may be larger than
W n.
Conversely, I also construct an equilibrium in the proof to show that the managers
equilibrium payo¤may be less thanW n. If the manager is rewarded by the worker-switching
equilibrium in the continuation game for accepting an o¤er in period t = 0 but is punished
by the no worker-switching equilibrium in the continuation game for rejecting the o¤er in
this period, the share being acceptable to the manager in period t = 0 could be substantially
reduced. This nding implies that there are equilibria in which some workersequilibrium
payo¤s could be higher than the payo¤s that they would receive in the no worker-switching
equilibrium. This property is important because if such an equilibrium is used as a new
scheme to punish the manager for failing to reach an agreement in the rst several periods,
the managers payo¤ can be further lowered. The proof contains a more detailed argument
on this point.
Unfortunately, I can not easily provide a complete characterization of the managers
equilibrium payo¤ set by relying on this multilateral bargaining setup. The essential feature
of the game considered here is that the exits of the workers and the ending of the game
are endogenously determined, and the lack of a well-dened recursive structure substantially
complicates the analysis. Another di¢ culty regarding the model is that the set of equilibria
does not expand monotonically as  increases. The intuition is as follows: for a putative
equilibrium to exist, some of the "threats" may no longer be credible if the players become
more patient. For instance, the equilibrium that I constructed to derive a payo¤ lower than
W n is valid only for a moderate value of  (i.e.  2 (; 0)  (0; 1)).
Nevertheless, the qualitative properties of the double-sided hold-up problem are well
captured by the ine¢ ciency and multiplicity of equilibrium derived in this section.
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4.4.3 Bargaining with asymmetric workers
Thus far, my analysis depended on the assumption that the workers are symmetric. Thus,
if they follow the same strategy, the manager is indi¤erent with regard to which two workers
she bargains with. However, this assumption is not necessarily true for my main results. In
this subsection, I show that the double-sided hold-up e¤ects may also arise if the workers
are asymmetric.
Suppose that there are two workers, A and B, and that their contributions to the project
are uA and uB, respectively, as valued in the periods during which the agreements are reached.
Without loss of generality, I assume that uA  uB > 0. Consider the strategy prole in the
following example.
Example 5
(1) If no agreement is reached: A makes an o¤er x = 
1+
uA   2(1+)2uB, and rejects
any counter-o¤er larger than x0 = 1
1+
uA   3(1+)2uB. When bargaining with A, the manager






uB and rejects any counter-o¤er larger than y0 = (1  )uA+ 2(1+)2uB. When
bargaining with B, the manager makes an o¤er y0 and rejects any counter-o¤er smaller than
y.
(2) If no agreement is reached: if A rejects the managers o¤er in period t, he is re-chosen
in period t+ 1. If B rejects the managers o¤er in period t, he is re-chosen with probability
p = (1+2 
2 3)uB (1+ 2 3)uA
(+2 4)uB (2 4)uA in period t+ 1.
The strategy prole above consists of an equilibrium if y0  uB and p 2 [0; 1]. The





uB. This equilibrium corresponds to the no worker-
switching equilibrium in Example 1, although a slight modication is needed to satisfy the
managers condition of indi¤erence regarding her choice of opponent. This modication is
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needed because if worker B "believes" that after rejecting the managers o¤er he will be
re-chosen with a probability of one in the next period and acts aggressively based on this
"belief" (e.g., makes an o¤er 
1+
uB   2(1+)2uA), the manager will actually switch to worker










uB   2(1+)2uA if uA > uB).
Now consider another strategy prole.
Example 6
(1) If no agreement is reached: A makes an o¤er w = 
3
1+
uA + (1   )uB, and rejects






uB. When bargaining with A, the man-








bargaining with B, the manager makes an o¤er z0 and rejects any counter-o¤er smaller than
z.
(2) If no agreement is reached: if A rejects the managers o¤er in period t, he is re-chosen
in period t + 1 with probability q = (1+ 2
2)(uA uB)
( 4)uA (2 4)uB . If B rejects the managers o¤er in
period t, he is re-chosen with probability 0 in period t+ 1.
This strategy prole consists of an equilibrium if z  0 and q 2 [0; 1]. The managers






uA. This equilibrium corresponds to the worker-
switching equilibrium in Example 2. Similarly, I need to adjust worker As toughness to
satisfy the managers indi¤erence condition if uA > uB.
Assume that uA  2uB and let b solve 1   2   3 = 0: In this case, if  > b, all of
the aforementioned conditions hold, and both of the strategy proles consist of equilibria.
Furthermore, under these assumptions, I nd that v00 > v0, which implies that the manager
has multiple equilibrium payo¤s. By jointly adjusting the workersbargaining postures, I
can show that all of the values between v0 and v00 could be the managers equilibrium payo¤s.
The argument is analogous to the proof of Proposition 11.
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Now suppose that there is a third worker C with potential contribution uC . Let uC 
uB  uA. Assume that uA is su¢ ciently close to uC and that  is su¢ ciently close to 1. By
modifying the proof of Example 4, I can show that a delay arises in equilibrium even if the
workers are asymmetric.
However, new issues may arise if the players are impatient or if the workersasymmetry
is large. Consider a situation in which uA = 10uB > 0. I can easily verify that in any
potential equilibrium, if the manager starts bargaining with worker A rst, her payo¤ is no
less than (1   )uA. This result occurs because by rejecting the o¤er in period t = 0, the
manager can make a counter-o¤er (1   )uA in period t = 1. In turn, this counter-o¤er
will undoubtedly be accepted by A. Conversely, if the manager bargains with worker B
rst, then her payo¤ is no larger than maxfuB + 2uA=(1 + ); 2(uA+ uB)g. These terms
indicate that after rejecting the o¤er in period t = 0, the manager can have a maximum
total payo¤ of uB + uA=(1 + ) in period t = 1 (such that her o¤er x = uB is accepted by
B) or uA + uB in period t = 2 (in this case, her o¤er is rejected by B in period t = 1, but
she is lucky enough to have all of the surplus starting in period t = 2). If  is relatively
small (e.g.,  < 2=5), the manager strongly prefers to bargain with worker A rst, and the
equilibrium outcome will be unique.
However, deriving a complete analysis of a game with asymmetric workers and an endoge-
nous bargaining procedure may be quite complicated. Generally, the equilibrium set varies
with the degree of the workersasymmetry and the discount factor . Nevertheless, I show
that the multiplicity and ine¢ ciency of equilibrium may exist if the players are su¢ ciently
patient and their degree of asymmetry is relatively low. These ndings show that my main
results are robust even if I slightly perturb the structure of the original game.
4.5 Conclusions
In a multilateral bargaining model in which a manager sequentially negotiates with several
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workers, I addressed how the bargaining procedure is determined endogenously and its e¤ects
on the properties of equilibrium. Precisely, two hold-up e¤ects arise in this model. On
the one hand, because time-discounting matters, the workers can take advantage of the
managers attempt to end all of the negotiations as soon as possible and collectively hold up
the manager by coordinating their moves. On the other hand, by endogenizing the ordering of
her opponents, the manager can also hold up the workers and weaken their bargaining powers.
The interaction of these two e¤ects results in the multiplicity of equilibrium, and some of
the equilibria exhibit delayed agreements, which imply that the outcomes are ine¢ cient.
Moreover, delay may not vanish if the time interval between two periods converges to zero.
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Appendix
The proof of Example 1.
Proof. Before the rst agreement is reached, because the two workers follow the same
strategy, the manager is indi¤erent with regard to which worker to bargain with. Thus, if
her o¤er in period t 1 is rejected by worker i, re-choosing this worker to be at the bargaining
table in period t is a best response. This justies her strategy in (2).
Consider the strategies in (1). Because the o¤er x (y) is acceptable to the manager
(worker i), making an o¤er x0 > x is not a protable deviation for worker i, while making
an o¤er y0 < y is not a protable deviation for the manager.
Consider the deviation that worker i makes an o¤er x00 < x in period t. Because this














, deviating to an o¤er x00 is not protable for worker
i. Similarly, consider the deviation that the manager makes an o¤er y00 > y in period t.
Because this o¤er is rejected by worker i, in the continuation game starting in period t + 1



















, deviating to y00 is not
protable for the manager.
Consider the acceptance/rejection strategies specied in (1). If worker i rejects the o¤er
y in period t, then in period t+1 his payo¤ is 1++
2
(1+)2
. But if he accepts the o¤er y in period
t, his payo¤ is +
2+3
(1+)2






, deviating to reject the
o¤er y is not protable for worker i. If the manager rejects the o¤er x in period t, then in




















reject the o¤er x is not protable for the manager.
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The proof of Proposition 11.
Proof. Let w =
Pn
l=1 







] for l < n and wn = 1+









l, then w = W n. So the decomposition of w is always feasible. The approach is to construct




+ (1  )Pn lm=1 m 1wl+m;
and let pl satisfy the condition
1  yl = pl(1  wl) + n+1 l(1  pl)(1  wn):
Consider the following strategy prole.
(1) In period t, if there are n+1  l  2 agreements remaining, worker i at the bargaining
table makes an o¤er wl, and rejects any o¤er larger than yl; the manager makes an o¤er yl,
and rejects any o¤er less than wl.
(2) In period t, if there are n + 1   l  2 agreements remaining, and if worker i rejects
the managers o¤er in this period, with probability pl he will be re-chosen at the bargaining
table in period t+ 1 and with probability 1  pl he will be re-chosen after the manager has
bargained with every j 2 Ntnfig for one round.
Following the same logic in the proof of Example 1, I can show that given the values
of yl and pl this strategy prole consists of an equilibrium, in which the managers payo¤
is w. Specically, yl solves the condition that the manager is indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting the o¤er wl in period t, and pl solves the condition that worker i is indi¤erent
between accepting and rejecting the o¤er yl in period t.
The proof of Example 3.
Proof. If the players follow this strategy prole and the game starts in Phase 1, the rst
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agreement is reached in period t = 2T with an o¤er x.
Consider Phase 1. wl and zl are the manager and worker is expected payo¤s discounted
in this lth period, so the acceptance rules are optimal. If the condition w1 + z1 > 1 holds, I
have wl+zl > 1 for any l 2 f1; 2;   2Tg, which implies that the manager and worker is total
needs in the lth period is larger than 1, so no deviation from the proposal rules is protable
for any player. Finally, if the manager switches to worker j in the l0th period, where l0 < 2T ,
she is punished by the no worker switching equilibrium starting from this period. Because






, in which the right-hand term represents
the managers deviation payo¤, such a deviation is not protable for her.
Now consider Phase 2. The proof is quite similar to the one of Example 1, so I can verify
that there exists no protable deviation from the proposal rules or acceptance rules.
Finally, I show that for some T and , w1+z1 > 1. Consider T = 2. Then for w1+z1 > 1,
it is su¢ cient to have 6(1 + )(1 + 2) > 1 + 2 + 4. Apparently, there is a  2 (0; 1) such
that for any  > , the condition holds. So the existence of this equilibrium is guaranteed
by a su¢ ciently large .
The proof of Example 4.
Proof. The strategy prole specied in (1) and (2) consists of an equilibrium in the contin-
uation game starting in period t = 1, so I only need to check that no one has incentive to
deviate from the strategies in (3).
If the manager rejects an o¤er y0 in period t = 0, she has total payo¤1+ 
2
1+
in period t = 1











y0 < y =    2
(1+)2












. If this o¤er x is accepted, then worker i has payo¤ 1  x in period 0. So worker i only
makes an o¤er x  1  4
1+
in period t = 0.
If  > , I have 
4
1+
+    2
(1+)2
> 1, the manager and worker is total needs in period
t = 0 is larger than one, thus delay arises in equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 12.
Proof. The proof is by construction. In step 1, I construct an equilibrium with delay,
and explore the relationship between the discount factor  and the possible periods of delay
T = 2T 0 in this equilibrium. In step 2, I derive the limit of real-time delay when  ! 1, or
equivalently,  ! 0. Because in a general case if T is odd, at least I have an even number







Step 1: Consider the game with n = 3. The following strategy prole consists of an





(1) Let i denote the worker at the bargaining table in period t = 0. If the manager
switches to another worker j 6= i in period t before the rst agreement is reached, the
strategy prole in Example 4 is played in the continuation game starting in period t.
(2) Consider that i has not been replaced. If the rst agreement is reached in period
t < 2T 0, then the strategy prole in Example 1 is played in the continuation game starting
in period t+ 1. If the rst agreement is reached in period t  2T 0, then the strategy prole
in Example 2 is played in the continuation game starting in period t+ 1.
(3) Before the rst agreement is reached, worker i at the bargaining table makes an o¤er
x = 1  V3, and rejects any o¤er larger than y  1  V3; the manager makes a non-serious
o¤er such as x0 = 1 in period t < 2T 0 and an o¤er x00 = 1   V3 in period t  2T 0, rejects




2 +  + 1
2
in period t < 2T 0 and rejects any o¤er less than
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y00 = 1  V3 in period t  2T 0.
The proof of this step is as follows. First, given the strategies in (1) and (3), the manager
has no incentive to switch to another worker j in period t > 0 before the rst agreement
is reached. Because such a deviation is strictly dominated by accepting the o¤er in period
t = 0. Second, If the manager and worker i have incentive to reach an agreement before
period 2T 0, it is optimal for them to reach it in period 0 instead of in period t > 0. Because
if they reach the agreement with an o¤er x in period t > 0; a deviation in period t = 0 with
an o¤er tx + 1 
t
2
will result all of the players with higher payo¤s. Thus, I only need to
check that the rst agreement is not reached in period t = 0. Notice that in period t = 0, the
largest share that worker i could o¤er to the manager is 1 2T 0V3. If 2T 0  (
4+3+22+2+1)
(2+1)(+1)2
holds, I have inequality
2T
0






)  1  2T 0V3 + (1  V2) + 2(1  V3):
This inequality implies that its weakly better for the manager to reach the rst agreement
in period 2T 0 instead of accepting the most favorable o¤er in period t = 0. So the strategy
prole demonstrated above consists of an equilibrium, in which the rst agreement is reached
in period 2T 0.
Step 2: Let T = 2T 0 be the number of delayed periods derived in the step 1. In this
step, I show that lim!0T > 0. Let the real number r satisfy r   1 < T = 2T 0  r
and r = (
4+3+22+2+1)
(2+1)(+1)2




(e 2 + 1) (e  + 1)2
 
e 4 + e 3 + 2e 2 + 2e  + 1

:
Let RHS denote the term on the right hand side and LHS denote the term on the left hand
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(ln 8  ln 7):
Apparently, lim!0T > 0. Thus, even the time interval  between two o¤ers becomes
arbitrarily small, real-time delay can happen in the game with n = 3.
The proof of Lemma 13.
Proof.
Part 1: The managers equilibrium payo¤may be larger thanW n. Consider the following
strategy prole in the game with n = 3, in which i denotes the worker who is at the
bargaining table in period t = 0:
(1) If no agreement is reached before period t = 2, the strategy prole in Example 4 is
played, and worker i is retained at the bargaining table in period t = 2. If an agreement
is reached in period t < 2, the strategy prole of the worker-switching equilibrium with two
workers is played in the continuation game starting in period t+ 1.
(2) If no agreement is reached in period t = 0, in period t = 1 worker i only accepts an
o¤er x  1  5
1+
, and the manager makes an o¤er y = 1  5
1+
.
(3) In period t = 0, the manager only accepts an o¤er x0  +4 6
1+
, and worker i makes




Notice that if no agreement is reached before period t = 2, the strategy prole denoted in
(1) consists of an equilibrium, so I only need to check that the playersstrategies in periods
t = 1 and t = 0 satisfy the requirement of no protable deviations. The key point is, if




game starting in period t = 2. So he accepts the managers o¤er y = 1  5
1+
in period t = 1.
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The discounted value of this payo¤ is +
2+3+4 6
1+
in period t = 0, which is larger than
(1 3)
1 2 .
Part 2: The managers equilibrium payo¤may be less than W n. Consider the game with
n = 3. This part of proof consists of two steps. Let  solve 1+   2  23 = 0 and 0 solve
1 +    3   4   5 = 0. I have 0 <  < 0 < 1.
Step 1: The following strategy prole consists of an equilibrium if   :
(1) If an agreement is reached in period t = 0, the strategy prole of the worker-switching
equilibrium with two workers is played in the continuation game starting in period t = 1.
If no agreement is reached in period t = 0, the strategy prole of the no worker-switching
equilibrium with three workers is played in the continuation game starting in period t = 1.
(2) In period t = 0, worker i makers an o¤er x = 0, and the manager accepts any o¤er
y  0.
The key of the proof is, if the manager accepts the o¤er x = 0 in period t = 0, she
is "rewarded" by the worker-switching equilibrium in the continuation game, and her total




= 2: If she rejects, she is "punished" by the no worker-switching







in period t = 0. For   , 2  +22+23+4+5
(1+)3
, so the manager
accepts the o¤er x = 0 in period t = 0. Notice that this equilibrium enlarges the rst
workers payo¤ to an entire unit, which is important for the next equilibrium.
Step 2: The following strategy prole consists of an equilibrium if  2 (; 0), in which
i denotes the worker who is at the bargaining table in period t = 0:
(1) If no agreement is reached before period t = 2, the strategy prole in the step 1 is
played in the continuation game starting in period t = 2, and worker i is retained at the
bargaining table in period t = 2. If an agreement is reached in period t < 2, the strategy
prole of the no worker-switching equilibrium with two workers is played in the continuation
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game starting in period t+ 1.
(2) If no agreement is reached in period t = 0, in period t = 1 worker i only accepts an
o¤er x  1  , and the manager makes an o¤er y = 1  .
(3) In period t = 0, the manager only accepts an o¤er x0   3 4+5
(1+)2
, and worker i




The key of the proof is, if no agreement is reached before period t = 2, worker i can
get 1 in the continuation game starting in period t = 2. This enables him to bargain
more aggressively in periods t = 1 and t = 0. Precisely, he rejects any o¤er larger than








if she makes an acceptable o¤er to worker i. If the managers
o¤er in period t = 1 is rejected, she has payo¤ 2 in period t = 2 and the discounted value
of this payo¤ in period t = 1 is 3:Notice that if  2 (; 0), 1++4
(1+)2
> 3, so the manager
actually makes the o¤er y = 1   in period t = 1 if no agreement is reached in period t = 0.
This further implies that an o¤er y0 =  
3 4+5
(1+)2
is enough for the manager to accept in
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